Chapter 4

The naval campaigns for New Guinea

David Stevens

第4章
ニューギニアにおける海軍作戦
デービッド・スティーブンス
The naval campaigns for New Guinea

This chapter briefly examines some of the major issues surrounding the operations of Allied and Japanese naval forces during the war in New Guinea from 1942–44. The most important point to keep in mind is that the naval campaigns were not concerned simply with the defeat of the enemy fleet at sea. Although often taken for granted, the sustained and successful involvement of maritime power had a direct influence on operations ashore. There was a continuous struggle by both the Allies and Japanese to keep the sea for their own use while denying it to their adversary.

Early manoeuvres

By early 1942, Allied authorities could be in no doubt that the Japanese held the initiative in the Pacific War. After a series of unbroken victories stretching from Pearl Harbor to Java, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) held undisputed command of the sea in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Lae and Salamaua on the north-east coast of New Guinea were occupied on 7 March 1942 when the Japanese landed a force of 3,000 men. With the enemy seemingly unstoppable, many Australians believed that their own homeland might be the ultimate objective. The Australian government turned to the United States for assurance and President Roosevelt recalled General Douglas MacArthur from the Philippines to take charge. MacArthur knew that it would be some time before the United States would be capable of launching a counter-attack; but, on assuming supreme command of the South-West Pacific Area (SWPA), he also found that he had very few resources available for defence.

The Japanese, however, had already rejected the invasion of Australia as being beyond their ability. Instead, before the United States could muster a significant response, they aimed to occupy Port Moresby and the southern Solomons, followed by Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. The Japanese expected these additional operations to shore up their defensive perimeter while simultaneously cutting Australia’s vital communications with America. Isolated from its allies, Australia would thereafter be prevented from acting as a staging area for manpower and materiel.

Assisted by an efficient intelligence system, MacArthur had an accurate understanding of Allied naval operations. This allowed him to begin a campaign of attrition against the enemy fleet, a strategy that would eventually succeed in neutralising its capabilities. However, it was not until the Solomon Islands campaign that the Allies were able to achieve a significant victory, thereby disrupting the Japanese supply lines and further weakening their resolve.

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of Japanese intentions, and soon made it clear that he considered Australia's security lay in Port Moresby rather than on the mainland. Unfortunately, garrison forces at Port Moresby amounted to only one militia brigade group, and reinforcement would not be easy. A mountainous and undeveloped island, New Guinea had virtually no land routes of communication. Airfields were few and equally undeveloped, and there was no intermediate airbase closer than Townsville. New Guinea was therefore solely dependent upon sea lines of communication and their control by friendly air and naval forces.

On 25 April 1942, the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre in Melbourne issued an assessment that a Japanese assault on Port Moresby was imminent. On 1 May the cruisers HMAS Australia and Hobart, and USS Chicago, escorted by three American destroyers, sailed from Hervey Bay in Queensland under the command of Rear Admiral John Crace, RN, commander of the Australian squadron. The formation was ordered to rendezvous with an American force built around the aircraft carriers USS Yorktown and Lexington.

Three days later the Japanese Port Moresby attack force carrying some 6,000 troops and supported by aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers, sailed from Rabaul. Crace’s force was detached on 7 May to block the movement of any Japanese ships through the Jomard Passage. Here it came under heavy air attack, although it did not encounter Japanese surface units. Indeed, the battle of the Coral Sea, which extended over 7–8 May, was the first naval battle in history in which the opposing ships did not sight each other. The aircraft carriers and their close escorts played the key role and the battle resulted in each side having one carrier sunk and another damaged. Their losses might not have been huge, but the encounter was a strategic defeat for the Japanese. The IJN had failed to establish control of the Coral Sea and, with the covering force depleted and air cover reduced, the Port Moresby operation was postponed.

In the breathing space provided, MacArthur reinforced the troops in New Guinea and ordered the construction of additional airbases at the south-eastern tip of New Guinea and on the Cape York peninsula. Meanwhile the IJN turned its attention to the major operation against the American base at Midway. This time there were no doubts about the outcome. For the Japanese Combined Fleet, the battle of Midway was a major disaster. Four fleet carriers were sunk and the naval air arm received a blow from which it never completely recovered. The Japanese had lost not only their capacity to control command of the sea, but also the strategic initiative for the remainder of the Pacific War.

1942年4月25日、メルボルンに設置された合意作戦情報センターは、日本軍によるポー
トモレスビー攻撃が間近に迫っていると報告した。5月1日に、オーストラリア機動艦
隊司令官ジョン・クレイズ海軍少将の指揮下、「オーストラリア」と「ホバート」のオース
トラリア軍巡洋艦2隻がアメリカ海軍巡洋艦「サンゴ」と共に、アメリカ軍遠征艦3隻に護
衛されて、クイーンズランドのハーベイ湾を出発した。この機動艦隊は、航洋艦「ヨー
クタウン」と「レキシントン」を中心としたアメリカ海軍艦隊と終結するようにと
いう指令を受けていた。

その3日後、日本軍のポートモレスビー攻撃部隊の約6,000名の将兵は、空母や巡洋艦
や駆逐艦に護衛されてラパラウルを出発した。クレイズの部隊は5月7日に、ジョマード
水路を通過しようとする日本軍の船団を阻止する任務にいった。そこでは日本軍の艦
船とは遭遇しなかったものの、空からの激しい攻撃を受けた。5月7日から8日にかけ
ての珊瑚海海戦は、海軍戦史上初めて、相対する艦隊が互いに相手の姿を見なかった戦いであった。航空母艦とその護衛艦が重要な役割を果たし、双方ともそれぞれ空母1隻
が沈没し、もう1隻が被害を受けるという結果になった。大きな損害はなかったも
の、この対決は日本にとって戦略的敗北であった。日本海軍は珊瑚海の制海権確
保に失敗し、海上の海軍力が激減し制空権が弱まったため、ポートモレスビー攻撃作戦は

HMAS Australia under attack during the battle of the Coral Sea. Though losses on both sides were roughly equal it was a strategic defeat for the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Although Coral Sea and Midway checked Japanese ambitions, they had not been curbed, and the occupation of Port Moresby remained a priority. However, since a direct amphibious assault was still impractical, the Japanese instead accelerated studies for an overland advance from their bases on the northern New Guinea coast.

For the remainder of 1942 the pattern of fighting in New Guinea was characterised by a series of slow and costly engagements ashore and, for the Allies, there were few incentives to commit major naval forces. Moreover, warships of all types were scarce and, with the profusion of reefs, and lack of accurate hydrographic information, operations close to the New Guinea coast were inherently unsafe. The proximity of Japanese airbases and the lack of Allied air superiority added further difficulties to surface operations. As a result, for the initial stages of the New Guinea campaign and at least until the capture of Buna, direct naval assistance was limited to that provided by American motor torpedo boats and the ubiquitous corvettes of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

The Allied view

Once the land campaign in New Guinea was underway, Australia’s role as a rearward support base came to the fore, and Allied shipping movements along the eastern Australian coast and up to forward areas increased rapidly. After Coral Sea, the Japanese no longer risked surface ships south of New Guinea, and so their attempts to disrupt Allied communications were generally limited to what could be achieved by their aircraft and submarines. Nevertheless, there were occasional sorties by warships, including some bombardments of Allied shipping in Milne Bay. In September 1942 the Japanese cruiser Tenryu and destroyer Arashi sank the supply ship Anshun.

The first serious Japanese anti-shipping offensive had begun four months earlier with a sortie by five fleet submarines to the east coast, and the midget submarine attack on Sydney on the night of 31 May–1 June. A Japanese campaign of this type was not unexpected, but Australian reactions were initially hampered by a lack of suitable assets. To its credit, the RAN was quick to introduce coastal convoys and, by early 1943, a complete system stretched from Melbourne to Darwin and advanced New Guinea bases.

Despite the protective effort, in the period to August 1942, enemy submarines sank seven merchant ships and damaged another six. A few of these vessels were carrying purely commercial cargoes, but most carried at least some military equipment.

While the protection of all shipping was important, military cargoes always took priority.
and special convoys to New Guinea had begun as early as January 1942. By December 1942, regular convoys from Townsville to New Guinea became routine. Designated TN/NT, these supply convoys continued to operate until 23 March 1944. Over fifteen months, 1,148 merchant vessels made the journey in 254 separate convoys.

Maximum protection was provided for the transport of personnel, and thankfully no troop ships were ever lost. There were, however, some close escapes. On 23 August 1942, MV Malaita reached Port Moresby with a load of troops and supplies. On sailing for Cairns six days later, she was torpedoed and severely damaged by the Japanese submarine RO-33. The escorting destroyer, HMAS Arunta, counter-attacked and destroyed the submarine, but Malaita did not return to service until 1947.

The Japanese continued their campaigns of disruption in 1943. Enemy aircraft maintained frequent attacks against the supply lines around New Guinea and across northern Australia, while submarines tended to operate further south. With fighting ashore concentrated along the north coast of New Guinea, the Allied northern supply line and, in particular, the run from Milne Bay to Oro Bay, assumed the greatest importance. Insufficient friendly aircraft were available to cover all ships on this passage and, because of the navigational dangers, smaller warships such as the RAN’s corvettes shouldered most of the escort burden.

Attacks by Japanese submarines off the east coast continued, but were generally kept under control, primarily because the number of submarines allocated was always too small for the area involved. The IJN did not consider attacks on trade and shipping to be important, and did not prioritise the anti-shipping campaign. Nevertheless, enemy submarines continued to achieve the occasional success. SS Starr King, sunk off Sydney on 10 February 1943, carried 7,000 tons of army supplies. SS Lydia M. Childs, sunk off Newcastle a month later, carried a cargo of tanks.

The requirement to protect shipping continued to place a heavy strain on Allied air and naval resources. By the end of 1943, naval authorities had allocated over sixty warships for convoy escort duties, while other formations remained available to provide cover. These vessels included Australian and Allied destroyers, corvettes and a wide assortment of smaller anti-submarine vessels. The period May–June 1943 saw the Japanese campaign peak with nine ships torpedoes over four weeks. The scale of the attack forced Australian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Royle, to reduce the number of convoy sailings by half so that the number of escort vessels allocated to each convoy could be doubled.

The merchant ship Anshun lying sunk in Milne Bay in September 1942, next to the hospital ship Manunda. The latter was not targeted in the Japanese naval attack.
Meanwhile, the Royal Australian Air Force pressed all possible reconnaissance aircraft into service, employed three reserve squadrons on the escort task, and ordered training aircraft to carry weapons and keep a sharp lookout for submarines.

The Japanese, though, were also feeling the strain and could not maintain even a minimum effort. By the end of June, all their submarines had been withdrawn from Australian waters for defensive operations closer to home. Strangely, however, it was the final attack of the enemy campaign that was to be among the most effective. On 16 June, with two torpedoes, the submarine I-174 sank the US Army Transport Portmar, fully loaded with fuel and ammunition, and severely damaged a tank landing ship.

The establishment of the Seventh Amphibious Force under Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, USN, marked the turning point for MacArthur's navy and heralded a return to the offensive by Allied naval forces in New Guinea. Supported by ever increasing strength at sea and in the air, Allied troops were for the first time able to take full advantage of amphibious mobility and naval gunfire support. The first opposed amphibious landing by Australian troops took place at Lae at the beginning of September 1943. It was followed by a successful assault on Finschhafen a few weeks later.

In contrast to the earlier overland campaigns, amphibious operations reduced losses and increased the speed of advance. By relying on amphibious movement, strongly-garrisoned points could be bypassed and troops landed on lightly or undefended beaches. The Allies, the Japanese admitted, had “inflicted an annihilating blow on us without engaging in direct combat” at Lae. This example was subsequently repeated many times as MacArthur's forces “coast hopped” up the northern New Guinea coast through Hollandia, Wakde and Numfor Island. By March 1944 MacArthur had recaptured the Admiralty Islands, and at Manus he formed an advanced naval base from which he could launch his great amphibious operation for the liberation of the Philippines.

Fully integrated into Barbey's Seventh Amphibious Force, Australian warships were involved in many of these operations. The RAN's three armed merchant cruisers, Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia, were converted to infantry landing ships, while Australian cruisers and destroyers were tasked to provide shore bombardments and seaward cover.

The Japanese view

The Japanese armed forces, and the IJN in particular, had been designed around the need to maximise battle strength. The navy paid only minimal attention to the problem

方で行われた。海岸部での戦闘がニューギニア北部沿岸に集中していたため、北部への連合軍補給ルート、特にミルン湾からオロ湾への輸送は、最も重要となった。このルートを航行するすべての船を空中掩護するためには飛行機数が不足したことや、航路遡行の危険性があることから、小型軍艦であるオーストラリア海軍のコルベット艦などが護衛の大半を担った。

東部沖での日本軍潜水艦による攻撃は続いたが、なんとか被害を抑えることはできなかった。この攻撃に使用された潜水艦の数が、海域の広さに較べてまったく足らなかったからである。日本海軍は、商船や輸送船への攻撃を重要視せず、対輸送船攻撃を優先しなかった。にもかかわらず、日本軍の潜水艦は輸送船の攻撃に成功することもあった。1943年2月10日には、スタンキング号が7,000tの陸軍弾を積んだままヒルビル沖で沈没した。リディア・M・チャルズもそれから1ヶ月後、戦車を積んだままニューカッスル沖で沈没した。

連合国の空軍と海軍にとって、輸送船輸送の護衛任務は大きな負担になった。1943年末には、海軍空軍は船団護衛任務に60隻の軍艦をあて、警戒や護衛のための他の軍艦編成もされた。これらの船は、オーストラリア軍と連合軍の駆逐艦、コルベット艦、そして各種の小型対潜艦を組んでいた。1943年5月から6月にかけて、日本軍の攻撃はもっとも激になり、4週間で9隻の船が魚雷攻撃を受けた。攻撃が深刻化したため、オーストラリア海軍参謀長ロイド提督は、航行中の船団の数を減じて、護衛艦の数を増やすようにと命令した。またオーストラリア空軍は、使用可能な偵察機のすべ
of maintaining and protecting supply services. This was a critical weakness for, despite Japan's industrial development, her merchant marine was inadequate even for peacetime needs. Japan could not match American shipbuilding capacity, and an initial shortage of suitable transports and cargo vessels combined with wartime attrition, soon caused major breakdowns in Japanese logistics. To compensate, sea movement by warships rapidly became the norm for men and equipment.

Despite these limitations, the Japanese in New Guinea could rely on adequate reinforcement by surface transport from Palau and Rabaul for most of 1942, as a result were able to maintain an offensive posture. However, by the end of the year they were faced with Allied victories at Milne Bay, Kokoda, and Buna, and attention had turned towards strengthening and consolidating their position along the northern coast of New Guinea. Hampering this objective, Allied air and submarine attacks on their poorly-defended convoys were becoming increasingly effective. Heavy equipment, food and ammunition were soon in short supply, while difficulty in maintaining an adequate supply of spare parts severely reduced Japanese air strength. Meanwhile, the Combined Fleet had, by mid-November 1942, suspended all offensive operations and ordered its light forces to operate chiefly in fulfilling the constant requirement for supplies. The major units based at Truk were held back in preparation for a decisive action against the US Pacific fleet at some time in the future.

The Allies continued to improve their interdiction and maritime strike capability. In January 1943, the submarine USS Wahoo reported that after a ten-hour running battle off New Guinea, she had sunk an entire convoy of two Japanese freighters, one transport and one tanker. In early March, in what was to be their last major resupply operation, the Japanese attempted to run a large reinforcement convoy from Rabaul to Lae. Good intelligence allowed the Allies to mount a massive air attack, and in what became known as the battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese lost all eight transports, four out of eight destroyers, and at least a third of their troops. Smaller convoys were sometimes seen after this time, but shipping available for operations had fallen dramatically. The Japanese recognised that their continued losses by surface transport could no longer be maintained and they removed eastern New Guinea from their vital area. A new strategy plan, drawn up in May 1943, established a defensive perimeter on a line joining Wake, the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, Nauru and Ocean Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago. Thereafter the Japanese abandoned hope of further offensive operations in New Guinea, and isolated areas became almost totally reliant on submarines and small barges to carry out the mission of escorting planes. They sought to create a supply situation in which naval air groups could operate effectively.

日本側も戦前の前で、最低限の活動を維持するのさえ困難であった。6月末には本土付近の防御のために、すべての潜水艦がオーストラリア沿岸から引き揚げられた。奇妙なことに、日本軍の攻撃作戦が一番効果的な結果をもたらすことになった。6月16日、伊号第174号潜水艦が、燃料と爆薬を満載したアメリカ軍輸送船「ポートマー」を魚雷2本で攻撃し沈没し、戦車等の海上輸送にも大変な被害を与えた。

ダニエル・E・バービー米海軍少将を指揮官として、第7水陸両用部隊が編成されたことで、マッカーサーの海軍力は、ニューギニアで米海軍は反撃に転じた。海と空での戦力増強を背景に、連合軍は水陸両用機動力と艦砲射撃の援護を初めて最大限に活用することができた。1943年9月下旬にラウで、日本軍の反撃下、オーストラリア軍による水陸両用機動力を使った上陸作戦は決行された。そして、数週間後にはフィンツハーヘン攻撃が成功した。

初期の上陸作戦と比較して、水陸両用の機動力を使った作戦は、指針を簡略化し進攻の速度を認めえた。水陸両用の機動力を使い、堅固な防衛地帯は避け、兵士たちは防衛が薄いかえも発令しない海岸へ上陸した。ラオにおいて、「連合軍は直接の戦闘なしに掮ぐるような打撃を与えれば」と日本軍も認めた。ラオでの例に例らし、その後マッカーサー指揮の部隊はニューギニア北部の海岸を「ねとびし、ホランジア、ワクサー、そしてナムフォ島まで水陸両用作戦を何度か繰り返した。1944年3月までに、マッカーサーはアドミラルティ諸島を奪回し、マヌス島には海軍前進基地を設け、そこからフィリピン解放のための水陸両用作戦を開始した。

オーストラリア軍の艦船は、パーキン指揮下の第7水陸両用部隊に完全に組み入れられ、多くの作戦に参加した。オーストラリア海軍の巡洋艦は「ケンブリッジ」、「ウェストラリア」が、歩兵上陸船の船に改造される一方、オーストラリア軍の巡洋艦は、海岸側の鉄船射撃と上陸警戒の任務を与えられた。

日本軍の見解
日本軍は、特に日本海軍は、戦略力を最大限に活用するために構成された。海軍は、輸送任務の維持と保存に対して最低限の注意しか払わなかった。これは日本にとって致命的な弱点になった。なぜなら、日本国内の工業発展にかかわらず、日本の商業船輸送は、平時においても十分でなかったからである。日本はアメリカの造船力に太刀打ちできず、開戦時の輸送船と戦列船の不足の上に、戦時中の減耗が加わり、日本海軍の海軍輸送に大きな弊害が生じた。それを補うため、人材や機材の海上輸送を艦隊に頼る傾向が著しく

88 [Chapter 4] The naval campaigns for New Guinea

89 [第4章] ニューギニアにおける海軍作戦
Japanese submarines began their supply missions to New Guinea in December 1942 and, with the attrition of other transport assets, it was soon usual for most of the Japanese submarine service to be dedicated to transport. Although safer than other methods, supply by submarine was hardly more efficient. Stripped of all unnecessary equipment, submarines were then incapable of offensive operations and still only able to transport a very small load. Even the largest 2,000-ton submarines were estimated to have a cargo capacity of only 20 tons below decks and another 40 tons above, or alternatively 50 troops and 15 tons of cargo. The usual load, however, was much less and nearly half the early missions failed after the submarine was unable to establish communications with forces ashore. Despite the introduction of several ingenious devices to increase cargo capacity and reduce unloading time, such measures could not make up for the lack of a fully functional transport service.

Despite often possessing the advantages of position and preparedness, the majority of Japanese troops in New Guinea were never to come to grips with Allied forces. Subjected to what was, essentially, an extremely effective blockade, enemy troops suffered terribly from illness and malnutrition. Claims have since been made that deaths in combat account for only 3 per cent of the 100,000 Japanese who died in New Guinea. Those on the ground were under no illusions. One of the few Japanese survivors of Buna was Gunners from the corvette HMAS Geelong fire on Japanese positions in late 1944. Naval support played a vital role in the Allied counter-offensives in New Guinea.

90

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Japanese submarines began their supply missions to New Guinea in December 1942 and, with the attrition of other transport assets, it was soon usual for most of the Japanese submarine service to be dedicated to transport. Although safer than other methods, supply by submarine was hardly more efficient. Stripped of all unnecessary equipment, submarines were then incapable of offensive operations and still only able to transport a very small load. Even the largest 2,000-ton submarines were estimated to have a cargo capacity of only 20 tons below decks and another 40 tons above, or alternatively 50 troops and 15 tons of cargo. The usual load, however, was much less and nearly half the early missions failed after the submarine was unable to establish communications with forces ashore. Despite the introduction of several ingenious devices to increase cargo capacity and reduce unloading time, such measures could not make up for the lack of a fully functional transport service.

Despite often possessing the advantages of position and preparedness, the majority of Japanese troops in New Guinea were never to come to grips with Allied forces. Subjected to what was, essentially, an extremely effective blockade, enemy troops suffered terribly from illness and malnutrition. Claims have since been made that deaths in combat account for only 3 per cent of the 100,000 Japanese who died in New Guinea. Those on the ground were under no illusions. One of the few Japanese survivors of Buna was
later to admit that “We lost ... because we could not supply our troops, and because our navy and air force could not disrupt the enemy supply line”.

Conclusions
To say that the Allied navies supported the actions of land forces in New Guinea would be an understatement. Although Allied maritime power could not ultimately remove the Japanese from New Guinea, it did directly affect the course of events ashore. Throughout the operations, the protection and maintenance of the sea lines of communication were vital to the successful progress of MacArthur’s campaign. The simultaneous denial to the Japanese of their own supply lines meant that the enemy had no hope of competing with Allied “troopers, beans and bullets in greater and greater numbers”. Later, when the Allies had clearly established the capability to establish local superiority on the sea and in the air, it was possible to exploit this control for combined operations. Compared to overland assault, power could thereafter be projected at times and places chosen by the Allies and with remarkable speed and economy.

The Japanese, on the other hand, consistently failed to allocate sufficient priority to either a concentrated offensive against Allied shipping, or protection of their own lines of communication. Once they had lost control of the sea and air off the New Guinea coastline, any Japanese local superiority ashore could never be effectively applied. Starved of reinforcements and supplies, Japanese strong points were consistently neutralised, and either disposed of piecemeal or left to waste away. Though often ignored by historians, the operations of naval forces around New Guinea were vital to the war’s outcome, providing the “enabling factor” that allowed the campaign to be fought to its successful conclusion.

損を補うことはできなかった。
ニューギニアでの日本軍は、進路配置を周囲にいたったものの、連合軍に立ち向かうことができなかった。非常に効果的な連合軍の防御の前で、日本軍は苦戦と栄養不良にぐらぐらと傾いた。ニューギニアで死亡した10万人の将兵のうち、戦闘で死亡したのはたった3%にすぎないと言われている。実際に戦場にいた兵士たちは、それははっきりわかった。ブナで生きて残った数少ない日本兵の一人は、「我々が負けたのは、兵士への補給ができなかったこと、そして、我々海軍と航空部隊が敵の補給ルートを妨害できなかったからである」と語っている。

結論
連合軍の海軍は、ニューギニアで陸上部隊の活動を支援しただけではない。連合軍海軍は、日本軍をニューギニアから完全に追い払うことができなかったとはいえ、陸上戦の展開に直接に影響をおよばした。この期間の海上交通の防衛と維持は、マッカーサーの作戦を成功に導くためには不可欠であった。それと同時に、日本海軍の補給ルートを妨害することで、日本軍は「もっともっと数多くの兵隊と豆と弾薬」をもった連合軍と戦うことができなかった。その後、この地域で維持的な制海権と制空権を握った連合軍は、その力を海と空の合同攻撃に利用するようになった。陸上攻撃に較べると、それ以後の連合軍は、選んだ時と場所に驚くべきスピードと効率性をもって攻撃力を投じることができるようになったのである。

一方日本軍は、連合軍の飛翔輸送に集中攻撃をかけることや自軍の兵站の供給に対して、十分な関心を寄せることができなかった。いったんニューギニア沿岸の制海権と制空権を失うと、海岸地域での日本軍の優位性は失われた。援軍や補給物資の不足は、日本軍の強固な守備を崩し、そして守備地域は徐々に連合軍の手に落ちるか、破滅させた。しばしば歴史研究者によって見落とされているが、ニューギニア近辺での連合軍海軍の作戦活動は、ニューギニア戦を勝利に導いた要因であり、戦争の結末にも重大な影響を与えているのである。

田村恵子訳