From a hostile shore
Australia and Japan at war in New Guinea
Edited by Steven Bullard and Tamura Keiko

From A Hostile Shore

Japanese text: 過酷なる岸辺から
オーストラリアと日本のニューギニア戦
ステーブ・ブラード、田村恵子編
From a hostile shore
Australia and Japan at war in New Guinea

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マーガレット・リーソン
The Australia–Japan Research Project (AJRP) was launched in August 1996. In June 1998, its website was launched as the first tangible result of the collaboration to promote research related to the experience of our two countries at war.

I am now very pleased to introduce the next tangible product, this book, entitled From a hostile shore: Australia and Japan at war in New Guinea. Its chapters, presented in both Japanese and English, have been written by prominent historians and researchers from Australia and Japan. They deal with a range of topics, from strategy and overall operations, personal attitudes and experiences of war, through to the grief of families in the post-war period.

New Guinea was one of the harshest imaginable environments in which to fight a war. For the first time in its history, the security of Australia was threatened by the southward thrust of the Japanese. The subsequent actions along the Kokoda Trail live in Australian memory as being synonymous with absolute hardship, extraordinary physical demands, endurance, courage, and, above all, sacrifice. Sickness, disease, the climate, and the land itself were as much to be endured as the often bitter assaults of the enemy. There is no reason to believe it was any different on the Japanese side.

During the visit to Australia by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro in May 2002, which included a tour of the Australian War Memorial, Prime Minister John Howard commented on the “great benefits and merits of the long-standing close ties and cooperation between Australia and Japan”. It is a measure of the strength of the relationship now that the bitter actions in New Guinea can jointly be the subject of open, objective and scholarly research. With the memory of those actions fading for many in both countries, it is important that this can be done.

The AJRP website has grown considerably since its launch, to the point where it is now a major resource for military historians and others interested in the history of Australia and Japan in conflict. The AJRP has aimed to foster research in both Japan and Australia, so that people from each country can better understand our experiences of war. It is my firm belief that this book builds on the strengths of the project. I am sure you will find significant value in reading these accounts, whether in English or Japanese.

I would like to congratulate the staff of the AJRP on their efforts in producing the website and this book, and sincerely thank the contributors for their cooperation and time. Finally, our gratitude goes to the Embassy of Japan for the generous support they have given the project since its commencement in 1996.

Steve Gower AO
Director, Australian War Memorial
Foreword

The Japanese Ambassador to Australia

I take immense pleasure in endorsing this book, *From a hostile shore: Australia and Japan at war in New Guinea*. I believe it will help the peoples of Japan and Australia to appreciate the results of the Australia–Japan Research Project (AJRP). The AJRP began as a joint project of the Japanese Embassy in Canberra and the Australian War Memorial under the Japanese Government's "Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative", which was established by then Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi in August 1994.

The aim of this project is to promote study and research into what took place between the two countries, particularly in time of war, and to build a solid basis for mutual understanding and trust between the two peoples. Over the last eight years, the AJRP has created a huge database of documents and materials relating to the war between Japan and Australia.

A number of events, including workshops involving Australian and Japanese historians in both countries, have contributed greatly to a closer scrutiny of the field of war history between the two countries. This information has been made available to the world on the AJRP homepage (www.awm.gov.au/ajrp) since June 1998, in the form of a database, thanks to the massive amounts of archival material on the war held by the Australian War Memorial.

Today, the Japan–Australia relationship is one of the most amicable bilateral relationships in the world. However, we should always remember that our two countries once fought each other in a war, and that our relations continued to suffer in the years immediately following the Second World War. But since that time, a great many people, both in Japan and Australia, have made great efforts toward reconciliation. On 15 August 1995, the then Prime Minister Murayama, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, said: "We should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future."

I believe that not only the essays in this book, but also the information on the AJRP homepage, will contribute to the further development of the Japan–Australia relationship.

I would like to express my appreciation to the Australian War Memorial and the staff of the AJRP. I am most grateful to the people of both countries who have cooperated on this project.

Oshima Kenzo
Ambassador of Japan

まえがき

在オーストラリア日本国大使

このたび、豪日研究プロジェクト（AJRP）の研究成果をまとめた小冊子、「敵艦なる島辺からオーストラリアと日本のニューギニア戦争」が発刊され、豪日戦民の様々な姿を紹介できることは、私の喜びとすることです。

AJRPは、1994年8月、村山富市総理（当時）が発表した平和友好交流計画の一環として、1996年8月、在オーストラリア日本大使館と豪州戦争記念館の協力によって発足しました。その目的は、日本と豪州の間の戦争の歴史を直接することによって、両国民の相互理解と相互信頼の土台を築くことです。

この8年間には、戦争記念館が収蔵している豪日間の戦争に関連する膨大な資料のデータベース化、両国の歴史研究者によるワークショップの開催といった活動を通じて、歴史を見つめ直すための数々の取り組みが行われてきました。また、研究者のみならず両国の国民、そして世界の人々にそれらを紹介するために、1998年6月、AJRPのホームページも開設されました。

日本関係は現在、世界で最も良好な2国間関係の一つといわれています。しかし、ここに至る過程には、第二次大戦中の両国の戦争、戦後の厳しい時代、そしてそれを乗り越えて和解を進めようとする豪日両国の多くの関係者の努力がありました。戦後50周年に当たる1995年8月、村山総理（当時）は、「我々は歴史を学ぶことは、未来を築くための必要条件である」と述べています。

この点からも、ここに収録された論文を始め、AJRPの多くの研究成果が、日豪関係の一層の発展に貢献するものと確信します。

最後になりましたが、豪州戦争記念館及びAJRPスタッフの努力に敬意を表するとともに、豪日両国の多くの関係者の協力に感謝申し上げます。

在オーストラリア日本大使館
特命全権大使 大島賢三
Introduction
The Australia–Japan Research Project
Steven Bullard
The Australia–Japan Research Project

The Australia–Japan Research Project (AJRP) is pleased to be able to publish From a hostile shore: Australia and Japan at war in New Guinea. It contains a selection of modified essays and seminars from the AJRP website, which have been chosen because they are representative of the research undertaken for the project. New Guinea was an unwelcoming place far from home for the many Australians and Japanese involved in its air, land and sea campaigns. Participants from both sides faced an enemy they did not understand, in battles that often exceeded limits of physical and psychological endurance. The AJRP presents this book in the hope that the experiences of those who fought, suffered, died and grieved as a result of the war can be faithfully passed on to a generation of English and Japanese readers now distant in time from these hostile shores.

This introduction outlines the history of the project and introduces some of its activities. The role of New Guinea in Japanese wartime planning is the subject of chapter 1, which was written by Tanaka Hiromi, a prominent military historian from the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Japan, and Fellow of the Australia–Japan Research Project. Tanaka examines the significance of the New Guinea theatre within the wider context of the war. Chapter 2, originally a seminar by the Australian War Memorial’s Principal Historian, Peter Stanley, explores Australian fears of Japanese invasion during the war. The following two chapters examine the air and sea campaigns in the New Guinea region from a Japanese and Australian perspective. Shindo Hiroyuki, a military historian at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo, provides an overview of Japanese air activities. David Stevens, from the Sea Power Centre in Canberra, examines the struggle for maritime power in the region and the influence of these campaigns on land operations.

Chapter 5, written by Tamura Keiko, a senior research officer with the project, explores the war experience of a Japanese soldier in New Guinea, based on his personal diary. The diary, which has since been returned to the soldier’s family in Japan, contains an often poignant account of life far from home, and includes many poems which illustrate...
encounters with the local people and environment. Mark Johnston, an Australian military historian and author, examines the attitudes of Australian soldiers to their Japanese counterparts in chapter 6. Wartime propaganda and stereotypes, and the brutal nature of the campaign, led most Australians to hate and fear their enemy, despite favourable evaluation of their martial prowess and occasional recognition of their civilian past and humanity. The last two chapters explore the postwar experience of two groups: the Japanese soldiers awaiting repatriation in Rabaul, and the families of Australians who died on the Montevideo Maru. In chapter 7, Tanaka Hiromi explores measures undertaken at Rabaul to feed and clothe the Japanese soldiers and prepare them for life back in Japan. In the final chapter, Margaret Reeson introduces the experience of the families of men who disappeared from Rabaul during the war.

Readers looking for further information about the project, as well as detailed footnotes for most of the chapters contained in this book, should go to the project’s website at www.awm.gov.au/ajrp. Japanese names throughout the book follow traditional Japanese order; that is, surname followed by given name.

Overview of the AJRP

In August 1994, then Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi announced the “Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative”, a project to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War the following year. The aim of the Initiative was to enable the people of Japan to “look squarely at the past” concerning the “unbearable suffering and sorrow caused among many people in the neighbouring countries of Asia” during the war. The Initiative provided support for historical research and exchange programs within several former Allied countries, including the Netherlands, Britain and New Zealand. Within Japan, the Initiative provided for the establishment of the Japan Center for Asian Historical Documents (www.jacar.go.jp).

The Embassy of Japan in Canberra began discussions with the Australian War Memorial early in 1996 to consider how best the aims of the Initiative could be realised in Australia. A planning workshop in December of that year was followed by a symposium in March 1997. Academics, military historians, archivists, Japan specialists and other interested parties from Australia and Japan gathered to discuss issues concerning the study of Japan–Australia relations, including the type, location and quantity of available source materials. (Many of the papers from the symposium have been published online at www.awm.gov.au/journal/j30/index.htm.) The symposium exposed the diverse range of
approaches available for the fledgling project, and the breadth of material available for studies of the relationship of the two countries.

It was decided that the AJRP would be established within the Military History Section of the Australian War Memorial, and that it would aim to provide a resource for historians and others interested in the relationship between Australia and Japan, especially in war, with a focus on the period 1901–57. The scope of the project’s charter is recognition of the basic lack of information available for the study of Japan’s war, particularly against Australia. Further, the few Japanese historians who have worked in these areas have not been known in Australia. Even the most basic secondary texts, such as the *Senshi sosho* (War history series), have not been available in English translation. A great opportunity existed for the project to provide finding aids for original historical material, to enable access to basic secondary texts, and to bring together researchers despite linguistic and cultural barriers.

The AJRP has been part of the Military History Section (originally Historical Research Section) of the Memorial since its inception. Staff of the project have greatly benefited from the experience and knowledge gained from working closely with military historians. The AJRP has been able to provide some assistance in return, by providing language support and advising on matters related to the project’s research. The varied activities of the AJRP have required a diverse range of skills from its staff. Japanese-language expertise was considered essential, owing to the nature of the historical materials described in the database, though later activities have admitted staff with a background in history or military history. In addition, much of the design of the project’s database and website was conducted in house by AJRP staff, after an initial consultancy from a local Canberra IT firm.

### Activities of the AJRP

The construction of a database of historical sources relating to the period 1901–57 has been the core activity of the project. The database, which was later published on the internet, initially contained descriptions in English of Japanese-language documents. The underlying database for the AJRP was carefully designed in consultation with archivists and historians. While focusing on standards of archival descriptions, AJRP staff ensured that the database would enable historians and researchers to locate and access historical materials of most use to their research interests. The main feature of the database is the ability to browse records by several different categories, such as

キャンベラの日本大使館は、1996年初頭からオーストラリア戦争記念館と話し合いを始め、この事業目的をオーストラリアでいかに現実にするかを検討した。その年12月の計画会議の後、1997年3月にはシンポジウムが開催された。そこででは研究者、軍事史専門家、アーキビスト（文書館員）や日本研究者だけでなく、日本とオーストラリアの多くの関係者が集まり、日中関係研究について論議し、その研究に利用できる文献の種類や所蔵場所や量を検討した。このシンポジウムは発表された論文の多くは、インターネット上のジャパンアーキビストプロジェクトについて、多様なアプローチが可能であることや、2国間の関係の研究のために、幅広い種類の研究資料が存在していることが明らかになった。

そして、AJRPをオーストラリア戦争記念館の軍事史部門に設置し、1901年から1957年までの日中関係、特に戦争に関連して、歴史研究者や他の関係者に利用できる資料を提供することが決定された。プロジェクトの出発点は、日本の戦争、特にオーストラリア戦に関しての情報が基本的に多いという点である。さらに、このような研究する日本研究者は非常に少なく、オーストラリアで知られていなかったことであった。もっとも重要な話題となり、たとえば戦争史書や、戦争史に関する情報は多かったが、英語に翻訳されていなかった。このような状況において、一次史料の検索ガイドの作成や、基本的二次資料の提供や、言語的評価的な壁を乗り越えて研究者が必要とするプロジェクトが作られていたと説明される。

AJRPはその創設以来、戦争記念館の軍事史部門（戦時歴史研究部門）に属している。プロジェクトスタッフは、軍事史研究者と共に仕事をすることで、経験や知識を必要とし、プロジェクトの発展を助けるために、プロジェクトの研究関連事項について情報源に助言したり援助を提供している。スタッフがAJRPの多岐にわたる活動をするためには、各種の知識や技術が必要であった。日本語能力は、データベースで取り扱う歴史資料の性格として必要条件であったが、後日歴史や軍事史の知識が必要となった。加えて、プロジェクトのデータベースは、ウェブサイトのデザインに、当時キャンベラのソフトウェアに当たるものの、それ以後はAJRPのスタッフが担当した。

### AJRPの活動

プロジェクトの活動の中心は、1901年から1957年の期間の歴史資料をデータベース化することである。このデータベースは、インターネット上で利用できるが、当初日本語で書かれた文書の英語解釈を含んでいた。このデータベースは、アーキビストや研究者との協議を通じて物語の注意を持ってデザインされた。文書館の
location, keyword, date, and functional classification (for example, “map” or “diary”). In addition, users can locate historical records in the database through interactive maps, or through a traditional search engine.

The first series of records described in the database was a collection of original Japanese-language documents known as AWM82. This series of approximately 800 items consists of two main parts: items captured in the field in the South-West Pacific Area, and items produced in the immediate postwar period at Rabaul. The former documents were captured in the battlefield and collated by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS). Such captured documents were evaluated and classified by ATIS staff to indicate their usefulness as intelligence for current operations. These include official documents such as unit diaries, orders, battle reports, embarkation and nominal rolls, maps, personnel records and citation reports, as well as personal items such as military pocketbooks, savings books, personal diaries, letters and postcards. The second main group of documents was produced in the immediate postwar period and relate to the surrender and internment of Japanese soldiers at Rabaul while awaiting repatriation to Japan. These were collected by the Headquarters 8th Military District and include official reports, letters between the Japanese and Australian authorities, administrative documents concerning life in the camps, as well as personal items such as address books, diaries, letters, a song book, and educational material.

Around 85 personal items from the collection, such as military pocket books and postal savings books, were returned to the families of Japanese soldiers after a list of AWM82 documents compiled by General Kuwada Etsu (Ret’d) was published in Gunji Shigaku (Military History) in 1982 and 1983. Further lists of the collection were produced by Doris Heath, a wartime translator and interpreter, and Professor Tanaka Hiromi from the National Defense Academy. The latter list was used as the guide for entries in the AJRP database.

After completing the listing of AWM82 in the database, AJRP staff expanded the coverage of the database to include a list of administrative documents and newspaper articles concerning Australian involvement in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF). These items had been collected by the Kure Municipal History Office. The list was provided by Professor Chida Takeshi during a visit sponsored by the Japan Foundation in December 1998. Another section of the database documents details, similar in kind to those official records in AWM82, held by the NIDS library. These items were

The 8th century poem ‘If I go by sea’ by Otomo no Yakamochi was made famous in song during the Second World War. This illustrated version was painted in Rabaul after the war.
identified by Professor Hara Takeshi, a senior NIDS historian, during the planning symposium in 1997.

Another major section of the database concerns Japanese-language propaganda leaflets produced by the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO) and distributed to Japanese-occupied areas in the South-West Pacific Area during the war. These leaflets, a set of which is held by the Memorial, consist of three main types: surrender leaflets, news bulletins, and nostalgia leaflets (depicting domestic scenes of life in Japan), and were part of a wider campaign to weaken fighting spirit among the Japanese and build morale among local peoples. The AJRP was able to use its skills to provide an online finding aid for this valuable collection.

Captured Japanese-language documents deemed of strategic and operational importance, such as those held in AWM82 and by the NIDS library, were translated and distributed by ATIS during the war. These translations, in addition to transcripts of interrogations of Japanese prisoners, research reports and other intelligence records, are held by the Memorial in the series AWM55 and AWM56. Several printed indexes are available for this collection. The similarity of this material to Japanese captured records, however, has led the AJRP to incorporate descriptions of the ATIS material into the project’s database.

Collaboration has been a cornerstone of AJRP efforts to disseminate its research. Initially, four specialists were invited to contribute bibliographical essays that would complement the detailed database descriptions. These essays, and several more which were later commissioned, provide a detailed guide to research materials available for the study of various aspects of the wartime experience of the two countries. The essays concern official Australian records of the Pacific War (David Horner), historical records for the study of war in Papua and New Guinea (Hank Nelson), Australian unit histories of the Pacific War (Richard Pelvin), as well as an annotated selection from the photograph collection of the Memorial (Richard Reid). Further essays concern records relating to BCOF held by the Kure Municipal History Office (Keiko Tamura), and an overview of the AWM82 collection (Tanaka Hiromi). More recent essays discuss Japanese unit histories (Iwamoto Hiromitsu), and sources for the study of Japanese submarine operations against Australia (David Stevens) and Japanese attacks on the Australian mainland (Shindo Hiroyuki).

In addition, several Australian and Japanese scholars have presented seminars on themes
related to the aims of the project. In particular, a seminar series was held in 1998–99 with the assistance of the Japan Foundation. Topics discussed in these seminars, which have been attended by Memorial historians, curators and research centre staff, as well as academics from universities in Canberra, include an overview of Japanese military historical sources after the war (Tanaka Hiromi), the compilation of the BCOF history in Kure (Chida Takeshi), sources for the study of Allied prisoners of war (Utsumi Aiko), and the archives tradition in Japan (Muta Shohei). Other ad hoc seminars have been given on comfort women (Yoshimi Yoshiaki) and the Japanese officer class (Ted Cook).

These seminars and other activities have resulted in a network of contacts throughout Australia, Japan, the United States, Papua New Guinea, Britain and New Zealand. In some cases, the AJRP has been responsible for bringing together researchers with similar interests, but who have operated in entirely different fields. Of particular note is the continuing contact between the project and the premier institutes for military history in Japan, NIDS and the National Defense Academy.

There have also been numerous informal visits to the Memorial by scholars, researchers and others interested in aspects of the Japanese experience of war, or in the relationship between Australians (and other Allies) with the Japanese. In many cases, the AJRP has been able to provide specific assistance to these visitors to enable them to quickly locate material relevant to their interests. Noteworthy examples of such material are the diary of Kusaka Jin’ichi, a senior naval commander at Rabaul, and the diary of infantry soldier Tamura Yoshikazu, the subject of chapter 6 of this volume.

In addition to providing translations of several seminars and essays, the AJRP has undertaken to translate sections of the Japanese official account of the war in New Guinea. The Senshi sosho (War history series), compiled by the War History Office of NIDS, is a significant record of Australia’s major enemy during the Second World War, but inaccessible to Australian military historians and others without Japanese-language skills. The AJRP has received permission from NIDS to translate and publish on our website, extracts from the volumes dealing with the land campaigns in New Guinea, especially those relating to Papua early in the war.

Popular history

One of the central issues that has concerned the AJRP is the question of perspective in military history. Is it possible, for example, to represent objectively the experiences of former enemies, and even allies, without resorting to stereotypes and obscurity? Barriers
of language, culture and national difference are often deemed too high to scale. Too often, this has resulted in historians writing accounts of the Second World War in the Pacific that lack a clear indication of how the other side experienced or represented their own encounter with war.

In an effort to engage these problems the AJRP undertook the Remembering the war in New Guinea project. It was supported by the Toyota Foundation and conducted in collaboration with scholars from the Australian War Memorial, the Australian National University, the National Defense Academy of Japan, NIDS, the University of Papua New Guinea, and from other institutions in Australia, the United States and Britain. The project aimed to bring together historians from different cultural, national and linguistic backgrounds to explore the diversity of experiences of war in New Guinea. The intention was not to find a common perspective from which to represent these experiences, but rather to provide a forum whereby a diversity of viewpoints could be freely exchanged in an international symposium and workshop, interviews, and other related research.

The results of the project are published on the internet and include transcripts from the symposium, detailed campaign histories, investigation of various themes, and answers to common questions related to the war in New Guinea. The website caters for all, from academics to students, with any interested person able to find out more about the experience of those involved.

In 2002 the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the battles in the Owen Stanley Range in Papua resulted in renewed popular interest in Australia about the war in the Pacific, particularly the campaigns along the Kokoda Trail. An immense amount of discussion and opinions filled the print, radio and television media, and a number of new monographs and articles discussed the details and significance of these battles against the Japanese in 1942. Despite this exposure and attention, it was clear that even though sixty years had passed, there was still little known about the Japanese experience of these campaigns. On a strategic and operational level, what were the Japanese intentions in New Guinea, and how well were they prepared? On a personal level, what was the experience of the individual Japanese infantryman, or the Formosan labourer, or the civilian doctor, all of whom found themselves in a hostile place far from home?

Clearly, there is a need for these stories to be told and for further research to be undertaken. The Human face of war section of the project’s website is an attempt to tell some
of these stories against the backdrop of histories of the campaigns written for an audience with different backgrounds. Some of the stories are well known in Japan among military circles, but relatively unknown in Australia. Others attempt to clarify misconceptions about the Japanese campaigns, or to explore themes common to both groups of combatants. These sections of the project’s website are provided in English and Japanese. It is the hope of the project that young people from both countries can see something of the experience of their former enemies, and move beyond stereotypical misconceptions and accounts of war soaked with nationalist sentiment.

The continued support of the Japanese Government through the Embassy of Japan in Canberra, and the Australian War Memorial, has enabled the project to enhance its reputation as an invaluable resource for historians and those interested in the history of the relations between our two countries. The AJRP is confident that the recent addition to its website of interpretive content aimed at a more popular audience, in both English and Japanese, will contribute to developing more balanced and accurate historical views of the experience of war, despite this often being painful and confronting. An awareness that a former enemy’s experience of war was often very similar to our own, though born from a different cultural and historical context, is, after all, the true nature of reconciliation.

Steven Bullard  
Project Manager  
Australia–Japan Research Project

当たり、オーストラリア国内では太平洋戦争への関心、特にコヨタ道沿いに展開された作戦への関心が高まった。非常に多くの情報が新聞やラジオやテレビで流され、本や雑誌記事でも1942年に日本を相手に繰り広げられたこの戦闘の詳細な内容や重要性について語られた。このように注目されるテーマであるにも関わらず、60年後の年月がたっても、この作戦に関わった日本兵の体験はほとんど知られがたい。戦略や作戦の段階での日本軍のニューフォニアでの戦況は何だったのか、そしてどのくらい日本軍はそのための準備をしていたのかだろうか。また、故郷を遠く離れ、異国の地に赴いた日本軍の歩兵の個人体験はどのようなものであったのか、そして台日人労働者や、文民医師の体験はどうだったのか。

このような体験談を記録し、さらに研究をしていかなければならないことは明らかである。AJRPインターネットサイト内の「戦争の個人像」で、異なった視点を対象に、作戦史と共に個人体験を紹介しようと試みている。いくつかのエピソードは、軍事史に興味のある日本人にはなじみのある話であるが、オーストラリアではほとんど知られていない。他の部分では、日本軍の作戦に対しての誤解や、日米友好に可能性のあるテーマを迫っている。このインターネットサイトは英語と日本語で書かれている。両国の若者が、かつての敵の体験から何かを見出し、ナショナリズムに乗り保暖り誤った固定観念や戦争誤解を克服することができるよう、プロジェクトは希望する。

キャンベラの日本大使館を通じての日本政府と、オーストラリア戦争記念館の相互間ない援助を受けられ、当プロジェクトは歴史研究者や2国間の歴史に関心がある人々から、知識や情報の非常に貴重な供給源としての高い評価を受けている。一般利用者向けのパブリック戦争史解説が最近インターネットサイトに加えられたが、たとえ直接訴えるのは苦痛を伴うとは言え、よりバランスがとれ正確な歴史観にもとづいた戦争体験を紹介していくために貢献できると確信している。文化や歴史的背景の相違にもかかわらず、往々にして、以前の敵の戦争体験が我々自身の体験に類似していると気がつくことによって、真の和解がもたらされるであろう。

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Chapter 1

Japan in the Pacific War and New Guinea

Tanaka Hiromi

第1章

日本にとっての太平洋戦争とニューギニア戦

田中宏巳
Many Japanese view the Second World War as a conflict between Japan and the US that began at Pearl Harbor. There is a tendency to downplay the significance of the actual role of Australia in the war. However, the battles fought in New Guinea and surrounding areas were conducted between Japan and US–Australian allied forces. The role of Australian forces in these battles far exceeds the general Japanese understanding of the events.

Of the three battles in the Pacific War which resulted in the great loss of Japanese life, namely those in New Guinea, Burma and the Philippines, surprisingly it is New Guinea that is of least interest in Japan. This apathy suggests that there has been no steady research into the reasons for the campaigns in New Guinea, why it was so miserable, or how it related to the passage of the war in general. It is a fact that, aside from Professor Kondo Shinji, there has been no research in Japan into these issues. To the best of my knowledge, there has never been an academic conference held in Japan on the topic of the war in New Guinea. Consequently, the opening of the *Rememering the war in New Guinea* symposium, with Japanese researchers and their esteemed Australian colleagues, was perhaps a bold undertaking. It is to be hoped it will stimulate more interest in the war in New Guinea amongst the Japanese.

For all intents and purposes Japan began the war in 1937 against China and pursued Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese army southward. Since the middle of the 19th century, the southern Chinese region surrounding Yanzi Jiang had been the centre of interest for foreign powers. There were concerns that conflict with the West would arise if Japan approached this region. At that time the US and England clearly indicated a position of aid for China and began to supply materiel to Chiang Kai-shek. In order to cut off these supply routes, the Japanese army gradually penetrated southward into French Indo-China, resulting in increased American opposition. US and Japanese trade relations, which were the lifeline of the Japanese economy, were severed, leaving in turmoil both the supply of iron and oil, essential for war preparations, and the importation of other raw materials.
Japan, isolated and cornered, plunged headlong into conflict with America, England and the Netherlands in December 1941 as a means of procuring essential raw materials. The Malay Peninsula and Indonesia were rich in crude oil, bauxite, nickel, iron ore, tin and rubber, and for this reason were termed the “southern resource belt”. The initial policy was to secure these regions as colonies, then seek peace and an end to the war.

According to Japanese naval strategic planning from about 1930 a weakened US Navy would retreat to Hawaii after initial engagements. There they would regroup before mounting an offensive against the Philippines. The Japanese navy planned to mount repeated raids en route, thus provoking the weakened US fleet into a decisive battle in the vicinity of the Philippines. It would be a triumph as decisive as the victory in the Japan Sea during the Russo–Japanese War. Even after the emergence of the new plan to occupy the southern resource belt, there was little alteration to the existing strategic plan.

It is no exaggeration to say that the development of the war, apart from the main engagements in the Philippines, was unexpected for both Japan and the US. The main reason for this unexpected outcome was that General MacArthur escaped from the Philippines not to Hawaii, but to Brisbane in Australia, and used the region (including New Zealand) as a strategic base to wage his counter-offensive. Japan, expecting the American forces to return to Hawaii, had not considered facing an attack from a US–Australian allied force based in Australia.

The significance of this unexpected turn of events was that Japan lacked information on the geography, politics, economy and military strength of the region. This basic lack of vital information was illustrated in 1942 by the difficulties faced by Vice Admiral Nagumo's task force attacking Darwin using nautical charts of the Arafura Sea without depth markings. The Japanese navy, which was based on Truk Island, held a deep interest in New Guinea and the Solomons. Surveys of water passages and the topography of New Guinea and the surrounding islands had been conducted by the Naval Hydrographic Office from 1933–38 using foreign publications and charts. They published numerous volumes outlining weather conditions, ocean currents, water depth and coastal terrain. These, however, did not comment on internal social or economic conditions. The army, on the other hand, had hastily conducted surveys just prior to the outbreak of war, on the ability of the southern resource belt to provide resources for military materiel. However, it appears that these surveys did not include New Guinea. In any case, maps captured

近藤新治氏以外、これらの問題について本格的に研究してこなかったのか現実である。私が知る限り、日本国内でニューギニア戦に関する研究が行われたことはなく、したがって日本の研究者が、多くのすぐれた研究成果を上げてきたオーストラリアの研究者とともにシノポジウムを開催するのは冒険かもしれない。しかしこれを機会に、日本でニューギニア戦に対する関心が高まることを大いに期待している。

1937年、日本は中国で本国の戦争を開始し、蒋介石が指揮する中国軍を追って南下した。揚子江を中心とする中国南部地域には、19世紀前半まで、イギリスをはじめとする欧米列強の利益を集中しており、日本軍がこの地域に接近すれば、欧米列強との衝突も懸念された。この堀から米英両国は中国支援の態度を鮮明にし、軍艦品の補給に乗乗り出したので、日本軍は蒋介石援助ルートの遮断のためさらに南下し、結果的にフランスの植民地であるベトナムに進出させざるをえなくなった。このためとくにアメリカとの対立が深まり、日本経済の経済線であった日米貿易関係が悪化し、戦争継続に不可欠な鉄鋼や石油をはじめとする重要資源の輸入が困難になった。

迎え入れられた日本軍は、1941年12月、アメリカ、イギリス、オランダ等との新たな戦争に突入した。開戦の直後に動く戦争に必要な資源の獲得にあり、目標とする地域は、石油、ボーキサイト、ニッケル、鉄鉱石、錫、ゴムなどその豊富なマレー半島及びインドネシア方面で、この方面は「南方資源地域」と呼ばれた。これらの方面を占領したのに、和平の余裕を見つけ、戦争の終結をはかるのが当初の方針だった。

1930年頃から日本海軍が立てていた作戦計画では、初期の戦闘で劣勢に立たされた米軍のハワイまで後退し、そこで態勢を立て直して、フィリピン方面に進むとする攻撃をすらあらかじめ計画していた。しかし、日本海軍は、途中で乗り返し米艦隊に攻撃を加えて弱体化させ、フィリピン近海にいたところで決戦を挑み、日米戦における日本海戦のようになった決定的勝利を収める、というシナリオを描いていた。南方資源地域の占領という新しい計画が登場しても、従来の作戦計画に大きな変更はなかったのである。

戦争の展開は、フィリピンが主戦場となった以外、あとはすべて予想外のものであったというよりも過言ではない。たぶんアメリカにとっても、予想外だったはずである。予想外になった最大の原因は、日本軍の攻撃を受けたタッカーサー将軍が、フィリピンからハワイではなく、オーストラリアのブリスベンに脱出し、ニュージーランドを含むこの方面を反攻作戦の拠点にしたことにあった。日本にしてみれば、ハワイの方向から来襲するはずのアメリカ軍が、オーストラリアで態勢を立て直し、米米連合軍を編成して反撃して出てくるというのは考えてもない展開であった。

予想外ということは、この方面の地誌に関する知識、政治経済や軍事に関する情報を
from the Dutch and Australian armies, and maps drawn from reconnaissance photographs provided some understanding of local conditions.

Local maps demonstrate that occupying New Guinea and the Solomons was necessary in order to enforce a blockade of military supply routes from the US to Australia and to prevent the expected Allied counter-attack from the south. The navy based on Truk, wanted to occupy and control New Guinea and the surrounding islands. Even the occupation of Rabaul, which was used as a base for the invasion of New Guinea and the Solomons, was pushed through by the navy, despite opposition from the army, for the purpose of preventing Allied air raids on Truk. The strategy to invade Port Moresby was also promoted by the navy to increase the defensive position at Rabaul.

The army had dominated the war in China, so the advance south into the resource belt of the Pacific was approached like a campaign on a giant land mass. New Guinea and the Solomons were a distant unknown quantity. Consequently, the army adopted a passive stance concerning operations promoted by the navy in that area. In 1942, the navy made preparations for the Mo Operation, the occupation of Port Moresby, and the FS Operation, an invasion of Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia which aimed to block the supply route between the US and the Australian mainland. However, the naval defeats in the Coral Sea and at Midway left the Japanese extremely weakened in the region. The direct Allied counter-offensive began with the landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi. In addition, the Allied forces, under the command of MacArthur, were advancing north along the "MacArthur axis", which ran from Bougainville, the northern coastline of New Guinea, the Philippines, Okinawa and then on to mainland Japan. Meanwhile, the US navy and naval units were approaching Japan by the "Nimitz axis" which ran from the Gilbert Islands, the Marshall Islands and the Mariana Islands.

The Second World War in East Asia and the western Pacific consisted of three campaigns of differing motives and locations, namely the war in China, the war to procure primary resources in the south, and the war in the western Pacific. The opponents in each of these theatres were also different: the Chinese in China, the English, Australian and Dutch primarily in the southern resource belt and the Americans in the western Pacific.

Japan had become bogged down in the war in China at a time when national resources were weakening. It then began both the campaign to secure natural resources in the south and the unexpected war in the western Pacific. Japan had to distribute its military

持っていたなかったことも意味した。その他については、1942年、ダービン方面を攻撃した南雲部隊の機動部隊が、水深で自軍縮小されていないアラウラ海の海戦に困ったように、基礎的知識さえ十分だった。陸海軍を比較すると、トラック島に根拠地を持ち海軍の方が、ニューギニアやソロモン諸島に強い関心を持っていた。海軍のニューギニア及び周辺諸島の水路や地図の面では、海軍水路部の手で1938年から38年にかけて発刊の文獻資料によって行われた数冊の水路誌が出版されているが、気象、海流、水深、海岸部の地形等の記述からどんと、内陸部の社会経済についてほとんど触れていなかった。一方陸軍は、開戦直前に南方資源帯の兵要地図に関する調査を急ぎに行ったが、その中にニューギニアが含まれていなかったと思われる。おそらく、オランダ軍もオーストラリア軍から押収した地図や、味方の航空機撮影した航空写真を元に作成した地図が、ニューギニアに対するわずかながらでありかったと考えられる。

オーストラリアに対するアメリカの軍事輸送を遮断し、オーストラリア方面から来ると予想される連合軍の攻撃を阻止するためには、ニューギニア及びソロモン諸島の確保と部隊の配下が必要であった。戦略が東南アジアに進むと、ニューギニアやソロモン諸島への進攻がきっかけになったラパラル占領と、トラック島に対する敵空襲の攻撃を困難にすることを目指して、海軍は東南アジアの反攻を押し切って進軍し、またニューギニア進攻のきっかけとなったポートモレスビー進攻作戦も、海軍がラパラルの防衛をより強固にするために実施したものだった。

これに対して陸軍は、東南アジア戦争が結論を果たせた中国の戦争から南方資源帯に進出した背景から、どうしても大陸側から太平洋を覇する習性があった。開戦後、重要拠点となったシンガポールやジャカルタから見て、ニューギニアやソロモン諸島はかなり未知の地方でしか映らず、海軍の期待に対してこの地域への作戦について、どうしても消極的になった。海軍はラパラルを根拠地、1942年、東ニューギニアのポートモレスビー攻撃を指すMO作戦のほか、米軍の連携を遮断するために、サモア・フィジー＝ニューカレドニアの攻略を指すFS作戦を準備した。しかし珊瑚海海戦の失敗とミッドウェー海戦の敗北は、この地域での日本の立場を著しく弱め、連合軍の本格的反攻作戦の開始となるガダルカナル・ツラギへの上陸となった。これ以降、マッカーサーの率いる連合軍は、ブーケンビル、ニューギニアの北辺を通り、フィリピン、沖縄に至るマッカーサー線を北上する形で日本本土に迫るとともに、南方米海軍及び海兵隊は、ギルバート諸島、マーシャル諸島、マリアナ群島をつなぐニミッツ線に沿って日本を目指すようになった。
capability and resources, which were inferior to the Allies, over three expansive theatres of operation. The Allied forces had no reason to become involved in China and had no need to secure resources and so concentrated their superior numbers and matériel in the western Pacific. Consequently, there was a significant difference in actual strength between the two sides.

The battles from Guadalcanal to New Guinea developed into a war of attrition that the Japanese had hoped to avoid due to their limited military strength and manufacturing capacity. It cannot be overstated that the relative merits of conducting a similar war of attrition in the western Pacific were not determined by manufacturing capacity but by the ability to transport supplies by sea over such long distances. The limits of the Japanese army's supply capabilities had been reached in the Guadalcanal campaign, though there were sufficient resources to evacuate surviving units. In 1943, however, it was determined that even if an Allied land campaign towards Rabaul was imminent, there was no possibility of a Japanese withdrawal and units in Rabaul would therefore be abandoned. Although postwar Western commentators often say that the Japanese military glorified the destruction of its army, the fact is that withdrawal in such a situation, if possible, was the army's preferred course of action. The Japanese army's choice of annihilation over withdrawal during the war occurred where units were stranded on islands without either transport or room to withdraw.

It is possible to divide the war in New Guinea into two stages. The first concerns the defensive and offensive operations centred on Port Moresby on the southern coastline, and the second concerns the repeated land operations and movements of Allied and Japanese troops from 1943–44 on the northern coastline of New Guinea. The navy occupied Rabaul in order to protect its base on Truk, and then planned to invade Port Moresby in order to strengthen its position at Rabaul. The Japanese army sought to prevent Allied counter-offensives from Australia, and to expel any Allied forces from New Guinea in preparation for a possible advance on Australia. The failure of the overland and seaborne campaigns to capture Port Moresby signalled the end of these operations and the end of the first stage of the war.

In January 1943 Imperial HQ decided to change focus by retreating from Guadalcanal and undertaking offensive operations in eastern New Guinea, thus ushering in the second stage of the New Guinea war. This change was not determined by a Japanese reading of Allied strategy based on an attack on Rabaul from the direction of both Guadalcanal...
and eastern New Guinea. Rather, the decision was politically motivated to hide the defeat at Guadalcanal from the Japanese people. So the leaders of the war effort described the retreat from Guadalcanal as a “change of direction” rather than a withdrawal. Consequently, New Guinea became the objective of the new operations. In short, the New Guinea operations did not result from a new policy based on the overall direction of the war. It emerged from Japan’s domestic political and social situation, and is considered to have been largely influenced by proposals from Hirohito, the Showa emperor.

The defeat at Guadalcanal stretched Japan’s supply capacity beyond its limit. The distinguishing feature of the New Guinea war, conducted immediately after this defeat, was that the Japanese forces could not expect any direct supplies from Japan from the very beginning. Consequently, the Japanese forces, having previously advanced into the south for natural resources, decided to procure supplies locally. However, agricultural development in New Guinea at that time was more primitive than that of Malaya and Indonesia. It was still in the phase of hunting and gathering, so it was nearly impossible to obtain food supplies locally. The operation was executed in haste, and the Japanese forces entering New Guinea with such ignorance began to suffer from starvation as the food they carried with them ran out. Fierce attacks by the Allied forces further increased the number of deaths from starvation and illness.

The area of eastern New Guinea alone is as large as the Japanese archipelago without Kyushu Island, and that of eastern and western New Guinea together is more than twice as large as the whole of Japan. Some would argue that, given the size of New Guinea, it would have been possible for the side invading from the sea to freely choose a landing point and to avoid the type of battle characteristic of island campaigns, where the side on land is cornered. In other words, it could be possible to shift the main battlefield and war-front inland, and start a battle between land forces alone. However, large areas of inland New Guinea were covered with steep mountains and unexplored jungles. These circumstances made it impossible for groups of people to move about in inland areas. This meant that warfare was conducted in the narrow coastal area and that the nature of the war inevitably became similar to campaigns on small islands.

In the natural environment of New Guinea, this appears to have been the only choice available. However, the Japanese in New Guinea chose a third option of advancing into the inland areas. More than 10,000 Japanese soldiers repeatedly climbed over mountains as high as 4,000 metres. Napoleon himself, who led his forces over the Alps, would.
perhaps have been impressed by this feat. General MacArthur had said that “the jungle will finish them for us”, after being informed of the Japanese inland retreat. As this remark indicates, the jungle and steep terrain took a heavy toll on the Japanese forces and numerous soldiers perished on the way. Despite a substantial reduction in numbers, some soldiers survived after crossing several mountain ranges and large swamps along the Sepik River. Although they no longer had the ability to fight back, their tenacious survival perhaps delayed subsequent actions by the Allied forces.

The Japanese could neither understand why the Allied forces were advancing north-west along the north coast of New Guinea, nor predict where or when they might land. It is not clear when the Japanese realised that the repeated campaigns of the Allies were not aimed at Rabaul, but advance operations for an offensive to the Philippines. In September 1943, Japanese command changed its existing operations policies and instituted a “vital national line of defence”. This was intended to strengthen the domestic defence mechanism. The mission of the Japanese troops outside the line in eastern New Guinea was to check the progress of the Allies and to try and prevent the establishment of advance bases in western New Guinea for an invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese army in eastern New Guinea continued to prosecute a hopeless campaign against the Allied forces.

Finally, I would like to address the significance of the New Guinea war. In the Pacific
War it was not uncommon for the front line to move hundreds of kilometres in one stroke. The Allied advance north began in earnest in 1944 after a year of little movement on the front line. The vital national line of defence was also established after an interval of relative inactivity. Even during this time the front in New Guinea was central. It could be said that the gradual westward movements of the Japanese and Allied forces bought valuable time for the Japanese army to reorganise. However, Japanese command placed no significance on New Guinea within the overall context of the war. The army was the main force in the second stage of the New Guinea campaign, but its actions were conservative from the beginning. With the sudden realisation that the Allied goal was the Philippines and not Rabaul, there was still no regard or understanding of the significance of New Guinea. And so the Japanese were slow to adapt to the changing situation.

The main reasons for this, lie in the fact that the war in New Guinea resulted from necessities that arose out of the course of the conflict. Japanese strategic planning lacked a clear policy of war leadership and military strategy, and was based on reactions to Allied movements. It is natural that an army which has no strategic flexibility or reserve strength in its war effort will be defeated. However, Japanese command paid no heed to the changing conditions of the war and from the beginning lacked a strategy. It must also be said that they suffered greatly from their inability to read the tactics of the Allies once the battle had begun.

*Translated by Steven Bullard and Inoue Akemi*
Chapter 2

“He’s (not) coming south”
The invasion that wasn’t

Peter Stanley
Australians had feared the prospect of invasion since the earliest years of white settlement. In 1942 those long-standing apprehensions looked set to become a reality. It's common for Australians to assume that the invasion threat was real. To test the prevailing perception I circulated a questionnaire to about fifty people from several community groups. They included members of a local historical society, a University of the Third Age group and a conference of history teachers.

About two thirds agreed that Japan had planned to invade Australia in 1942. Around three quarters tended to agree that the Kokoda campaign had saved Australia from invasion and that the Brisbane Line strategy actually entailed abandoning northern Australia to the Japanese. Just about everyone – 95 per cent – agreed that John Curtin was a great wartime leader.

So the popular perception is that Japan planned to invade Australia, and would have if they’d won the battle for Papua. And that the man responsible for preventing this was John Curtin. This paper takes issue with that perception. I'm arguing that there was, in fact, no invasion plan, that the Curtin government exaggerated the threat, and that the enduring consequence of its deception was to skew our understanding of the reality of the invasion crisis of 1942.

The popular perception was founded in the long-held views of Australia’s strategic planners. The Australian Chiefs of Staff had regarded the prospect of the loss of the “Malay barrier” as the first stage in the Japanese plan for a major attack on Australia. With the actual fall of Malaya and Singapore and the breach of the “Malay barrier”, that prediction appeared to be coming true.

And, indeed, the Japanese had been interested in Australia. Since the sixteenth century Japanese merchants and writers had been intrigued by the “South Seas” or nan’yo. Business interests developed early in the twentieth century and a rich scholarly literature grew reflecting Japanese interests in the South Seas, including Australia. However, there was no Japanese plan before 1942 to advance beyond the perimeter to be won in the

白人による植民の最初の嘆から、オーストラリア人たちは侵略されることを恐れていた。1942年に、ついに長年の危機が現実となろうとし、それ以後もそのような認識が根強くある。侵略の危機は実際にあったのだ、と考えるオーストラリア人は多い。このような一般的認識を確かめるために、私は各種コミュニティ・グループに属する50人ほどにアンケートをとった。対象になったのは、地元の歴史研究会の会員や、第3世代大学（高齢者を対象とした学習講座）の受講者や、歴史教師会の出席者などである。

回答者のうち、約3分の2が、日本は1942年にオーストラリア侵略を計画していたと答えた。また回答者の4分の3が、ココダ作戦がオーストラリアを侵略から守ったと考え。ブリスベンライン作戦は、実際には北部オーストラリアを日本に放棄することを意味していたと考えていた。そして、ほとんど全員、つまり回答者の95％がジョン・カーティン（オーストラリア首相、1941～45年）は優れた戦争指導者だったとの意見に賛成した。

以上の点から言えば、日本はオーストラリア侵略を計画していたということ、もし東部ニューギニア作戦でオーストラリアが勝てていなければ、それが実現になっていただろうということ、そして、「オーストラリアを救った」責任者であっただけのカーティンは、優れた戦争指導者であったということである。これらの意見を、ここで考えてみたい。私の主張したいことは、侵略計画は実際には存在しなかった。カーティン政権はこの脅威を誇張した、そして、その後も存在しているこの幻想は、1942年の侵略危機に関しての歴史的資料の理解をゆがめているという点である。

以上述べたような一般的認識は、オーストラリアの戦略計画担当者たちが長い間持っていた見解に基づいている。オーストラリア軍参謀長らは、「いわゆる「マレー半島防壁」を失うことは、「日本のオーストラリア攻略大作戦の第1段階である」と考えていただけた。実際にマレー半島とシンガポールが崩壊し、「マレー防壁」が崩され、この予想が現実のものとなったと考えられた。

確かに、日本はオーストラリアに興味を持っていた。16世紀以来、日本商人や作家たちは「南洋」に興味をそそれ、南洋貿易への関心は20世紀の初頭から高まり、そ
initial conquest. Australia barely rated a mention in the 1941 conferences which planned Japan’s strategy. In the euphoria of victory early in 1942 some visionary middle-ranking naval staff officers in Tokyo proposed that Japan should go further. In February and March they proposed that Australia should be invaded, in order to forestall it being used as a base for an Allied counter-offensive (which of course it became). The plans got no further than some acrimonious discussions. The army dismissed the idea as “gibberish”, knowing that troops sent south would weaken Japan in China and Manchuria against a Soviet threat. Not only did the Japanese army condemn the plan, but the Navy General Staff also dismissed it, unable to spare the million tons of shipping the invasion would have consumed. By mid-March the proposal lapsed. Instead, the Japanese adopted a plan to isolate Australia, impeding communication between Australia and the United States by the occupation of islands to Australia’s north-east (New Caledonia, Samoa and Fiji), though in the event these further operations were negated by the defeats of Coral Sea and Midway. This conclusion is supported by all the scholarship, notably the late and much missed Henry Frei, whose *Japan’s southward advance and Australia* (Melbourne, 1991) documents the debate and its conclusion from Japanese official and private sources.

The reaction of the Australian people to the crisis of early 1942 has been described as one of “panic”. Certainly official and other historians have heightened the drama of the months in which invasion was regarded as possible. The official historian Paul Hasluck had some sport with the reactions of the Government “up at Canberra, which appears to have been more badly scared than any other part of the continent”. He described how public service typists were put to copying important documents so, if Canberra were bombed or occupied, “the Government could survive the loss of paper”. Sarcasm comes easily in hindsight, but at the time the rhetoric and the actions of the Curtin government abetted and fuelled popular disquiet. Advertising and propaganda, not least through posters such as “He’s coming south” made the case graphically. (So damaging to morale did this appear that the Queensland government actually banned it.) Curtin’s own Committee on National Morale alerted him to the dangers of his alarmist policy and protested against the use of “fear posters”. This committee, chaired by the mysterious Alf Conlon and including a dozen of the nation’s leading intellectuals (including Charles Bean), warned of the consequences of the government harping on the prospect of attack. The committee warned that the perception of “danger...thrust idealism into the background and replace it with a crude physical self-preservation”.

Propaganda “fear posters”, such as this one produced in 1942, were not welcomed by all, but fed long-standing racial stereotypes and fears of Japanese invasion.
Certainly the actions of the Curtin Cabinet display disquiet, if not panic. Even before the fall of Malaya, New Britain or Singapore, Curtin had appealed for help to Churchill and Roosevelt. He claimed “it is beyond our capacity to meet an attack of the weight the Japanese could launch” on Australia. On the eve of the fall of Singapore, Frank Forde, the Army Minister, urged Curtin to obtain a division from Canada and 50,000 US troops “in view of the likelihood of an attack upon Australia”. By early March Cabinet, on the advice of the Australian Chiefs of Staff, anticipated a landing around Darwin in early April and a landing on the east coast by May.

Curtin’s anxiety must have grown when in October 1942 he read a Chiefs-of-Staff file entitled Japanese plan for invasion of Australia. The file does give a full outline, complete with a map annotated in Chinese, for a Japanese invasion of Australia via Western Australia with a diversionary attack around Darwin. The map was forwarded via the Australian legation in Chungking from Nationalist China’s Director of Military Intelligence, Admiral H. C. Yang. But if John Curtin accepted it as genuine (as Paul Burns suggests in his book, The Brisbane Line controversy (Sydney, 1998)) none of Curtin’s military advisers agreed. Even the Chinese did not consider it genuine. In any case, the invasion was supposed to have been launched in May 1942, but the map was

![Map of Japanese invasion plan](image)

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“discovered” only five months later. Curtin showed it to journalists in March 1943 to substantiate his contention that “Japanese strategy ... is being implemented”. The map has since been used (notably in Michael Montgomery’s book, Who sank the Sydney? (North Ryde, 1991)) as evidence of Japanese plans to invade.

Curtin’s apprehensions ought to have been greatly calmed by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the South-West Pacific Area. MacArthur briefed the Advisory War Council in March, five days after arriving in Melbourne. Its members may have been relieved to hear his opinion that “it is doubtful whether the Japanese would undertake an invasion of Australia ...”, though they may have entertained misgivings over his reason “as the spoils here are not sufficient to warrant the risk”. MacArthur suggested that the Japanese might “try to overrun Australia in order to demonstrate their superiority over the white races”, but as a strategist he thought that an invasion would be “a blunder”. In September 1942, though, Curtin was still pressing for an Allied force of 25 divisions for Australia’s defence. Roosevelt, in a telegraph that month, reassured him that Americans “fully appreciate the anxiety which you must naturally feel” for Australia’s security. Nevertheless, he had to stress that the forces then in Australia, including two American divisions and a large air corps were “sufficient to defeat the present Japanese force in New Guinea and to provide for the security of Australia against an invasion”. The confidential “backroom briefings” Curtin gave journalists, documented by Fred Smith, give an indication of his concern as well as his ignorance. On 21 September 1942, after complaining of Churchill and Roosevelt’s obtuseness, Curtin told journalists that the Japanese could still “base on the Kimberleys and cross overland ... diagonally across in this direction”. This contradicted both the advice of his service advisers and geographical common sense.

By contrast, Winston Churchill, who had faced a more immediate threat of invasion for a year in 1940–41, took a more phlegmatic view of the likelihood of the Japanese attack. He consistently downplayed the likelihood, telling the House of Commons in January 1942 that the Japanese were more likely to devote their attention to making the most of their conquests rather than “undertaking a serious mass invasion of Australia”. His Chiefs of Staff consistently expressed the view that “a genuine invasion of Australia does not form part of the Japanese plans”. The Curtin government, kept informed by both the Dominions Office and by its High Commissioner in London, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, was aware of this view throughout. The Australian Chiefs of Staff, asked to comment on this and other British statements, did not demur. Both Churchill and Roosevelt appeared...
to have understood that Australia was practically secure and that they had to deal with Curtin's fretfulness rather than the strategic reality.

Not until early 1943 is there any indication that the Curtin cabinet accepted the Japanese threat had diminished. The official poster “Ringed with menace!”, dating from about mid-1943, demonstrates how ludicrous the contention had become. In reality, Australia was spotted with inconvenience rather than ringed with menace. But Curtin refused to publicly concede the declining likelihood of actual invasion until June 1943. Not until 27 September 1943 – after the capture of Lae and as Australian divisions advanced into the Markham Valley and onto the Huon Peninsula – do the Cabinet minutes at last record simply “the danger of invasion, he said, had passed”. But even as he confirmed in an off-the-record briefing in March 1944 that “there would now never be any danger to the eastern side of Australia”, he was still raising the possibility of Japanese attacks on Darwin and Western Australia, his home state.

What explains Curtin’s anxiety? Australian and Allied leaders in Australia knew of the Japanese decision not to invade within a month of the debates between staff officers in Tokyo in March 1942. In early April “Magic” intercepts reached Australia which confirmed that no invasion was contemplated. An actual danger of invasion had never existed and the likelihood diminished through 1942 as Allied victories eroded Japan’s offensive capability. Curtin was told as much by London and Washington, and MacArthur, Curtin’s principal strategic adviser, consistently advised that it was improbable. Why did
Curtin continue to bang the invasion drum? Glyn Harper has suggested that Curtin kept up the pretence of an invasion threat for electoral advantage in 1943. Other answers may be that, by so loudly proclaiming the danger, Curtin could kill two birds with one stone. First, he could mobilise the Australian people, whose commitment to the sacrifices necessary for victory was often less passionate than his own. Second, his advocacy of a possibility known by Axis to be false, supported the deception that the Allies had broken key enemy codes. Had Curtin admitted the impossibility of invasion sooner Axis powers may have suspected how he could have known.

This much is logical, and yet a deeper answer seems to lurk in Curtin’s psyche. Curtin felt the burden of responsibility of his office so gravely that it contributed to his death in 1945. His rejection of advice that invasion was not going to occur, his repeated appeals for reinforcements in secret communications, and his privately dwelling on the prospect suggest that he was unable to accept the reality. David Day, in his recent sympathetic biography of Curtin, argues that “much of the anxiety and bitterness” which stemmed from Curtin’s fruitless appeals for forces for Australia’s defence to Roosevelt and Churchill could have been avoided had they taken Curtin and MacArthur into their confidence. Certainly Churchill and Roosevelt’s desire to divert the 7th Division convoy to Burma soured relations, and not until May 1942 did they tell Curtin of their decision to “beat Hitler first”. But it would seem that it was Curtin’s refusal to accept the strategic evaluations of London and Washington that caused his unease. In the event, Churchill and Roosevelt were right and Curtin was wrong. He has been represented as the “Saviour of Australia”, but, however much Australia’s contribution stemmed from his passionate commitment to victory, his organisational skills and his personal example as an inspiring leader, Curtin did not save Australia from any real threat. Instead, one of the lasting legacies of his whipping up of the fear of invasion has been a persistent heritage of bogus invasion stories.

Epilogue

This paper was presented at the Memorial’s Remembering 1942 conference on 31 May 2003. On 1 June the Daily Telegraph devoted five pages of its Inside Edition supplement to a feature variously headlined “Imagine the unthinkable”, “Rising Sun over Sydney” and “Was invasion closer than we feared?” These pages were based on painstaking research conducted by “history enthusiasts” Warren Brown and John Collins, based on their yet-to-be-published fictional history Strike south. Accompanied by Warren Brown’s impressions of Zeros over the harbour, bombs exploding beside the Town Hall and...
Japanese soldiers boarding a Bondi tram, the feature presented a fictional speculation of a Japanese invasion. It posited an invasion around Darwin in early July and a Japanese force heading southwards toward central Australia. A further drawing showed Japanese soldiers plodding through the “dead heart” and the accompanying text described a “scorched earth” strategy defeating this advance towards Adelaide. Why Adelaide was not explained. The feature included a map of the landings around Botany Bay, Narrabeen and Pittwater captioned in minute type, “This graphic illustrates a fictional attack on Sydney”.

This feature raises questions about what Australians know and believe about this aspect of their history and about a newspaper’s responsibility to its readers. “Alternative” or “counterfactual” history is increasingly being used as an acceptable technique, one that can produce useful questions or insights. (I have used the method myself, most recently several weeks before, in a conference workshop debating its application to secondary history teaching.) At the same time, in the light of the misconceptions which most Australians evidently entertain (especially of the likelihood of invasion in 1942, publishing such a feature so prominently (beginning with the newspaper’s cover) and without any historical counterweight was surely reprehensible. One letter was later published in the Telegraph. On 4 June a Geoff Ruxton of Kogarah wrote to say that he was “simply appalled” at the feature, which was “an insult to anyone’s intelligence”. Perhaps because the feature confirmed prevailing preconceptions, no controversy ensued.

The Daily Telegraph had in fact asked the Memorial’s historians (Dr Robert Nichols and me) for a thousand words of historical background on the submarine raid and the invasion threat. Between 30 May, when we were asked, and 1 June the Telegraph found itself short of space and the thousand words Robert and I had written were dropped. As a result, tens of thousands of readers were left with a vivid impression that invasion could have been feasible but without any historically-based interpretation putting a countervailing or contextual view.

Late in February 1942, in the aftermath of the fall of Singapore and what Curtin called “the battle for Australia” opened, the Daily Telegraph published the results of a survey of its readers’ opinions. Fifty-four per cent believed that Australia would be invaded, a smaller proportion than those who appear to agree today. If my informal survey has any validity, it is any wonder that most Australians still believe, in the face of all the evidence, that the Japanese were indeed Coming South in 1942?

一步一歩進む様子が描かれて、説明に「焦熱地帯」作戦がアデレードに向けての進攻を妨げたとする。しかしながらアデレードに向って進んだのかについては説明されていない。この特集にはポタニイ湾やパラリーヌやビットウォーター付近の上陸予定地図も含まれており、極めて小さい字で「この換弾はフィクションのシドニー攻撃を描いている」とし書きが添えられていた。

この特集は、オーストラリア人がこの当時の歴史について、何を知り何を信じているかを問い、新聞が読者に、正しい情報を与えるかが関係した情報変更をするかという責任問題をも指摘した。「既存のものと違う」あるいは「事実と反する」歴史、は問題提起をし消極的を意とすることで、それに受け入れられてきた。つまり間違ったことに、音声の歴史教育関連の学会ワークショップで私自身にこの方法を示した。しかし同時に、1942年の侵略の可能性をほとんどのオーストラリア人は誤って信じていることを考慮すれば、歴史的な訂り合いをとるための記事を載せることもなく、このような特集を大々的に掲載したことは非難されるべきである。新聞の一面にも紹介記事があった。その後1日後の投書がテレグラフ欄に掲載された。6月4日にコガラ進行のジェフ・ジャクストン氏は、この特集に「全くあれに返って」と書き、読者の知識が減ることを聞くのに、経験がある特集だったとコメントした。おそらくこの特集は、世間一般の認識に一層影響したため、その後これに反対する議論は生まれなかった。

実はデーリー・テレグラフ紙から、戦争記念館の歴史研究担当者（私自身とロバート・ニコル博士）に、特殊潜航艇攻撃と侵略の威脅に関しての1,000語以内の記事の依頼があった。記事依頼があった5月30日に、特集が掲載された6月1日の間に、テレグラフ欄は掲載面積の不足に気付いたようで、我々が寄稿した記事はボツになった。その結果、歴史研究に根ざした解釈のバランスなど、侵略の可能性があったという鮮明な印象を、何万人もの読者に植え付けてしまったのである。

1942年2月下旬に、シンガポールが陥落し、カーティスが「オーストラリアの戦い」と呼んだ戦列が始まった後、読者調査の結果がデーリー・テレグラフ欄に掲載された。それによると、読者の54%がオーストラリアが侵略されるだろうと信じていた。この率は現在仮に考えている人よりも少し多い。私が行った非公式調査に信頼性があるとすれば、ほとんどのオーストラリア人が、いろいろな証拠にかかわらず、いまだに「敵は本当に1942年に南に攻めて来ようとしていた」と信じており、それは驚くに足りることでもない。

田村恵子訳

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Chapter 3

Japanese air operations in New Guinea

Shindo Hiroyuki
From February 1942 until July 1944, a war of attrition was fought by the air forces of the United States, Australia and Japan in Papua, New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands. The air campaign in the South Pacific lasted a little over half the war but was nevertheless of extreme importance to its outcome. This is because it was around the island of New Guinea that the Japanese forces were first stopped, worn down and finally pushed back. This chapter concentrates on the major strategic and operational issues faced by the Japanese, focusing on Japanese air operations over the main island of New Guinea.

The first phase of the Japanese air campaign over New Guinea was the navy’s offensive against Port Moresby, from May until October 1942. Next, from early 1943 until June, the Japanese army filled in for the navy (whose air forces were increasingly committed to the Solomons campaign) and fought a campaign that was intended to be offensive but became increasingly defensive in nature. The third phase was a short period in the summer of 1943 in which the Japanese army assigned a more positive role to its air forces in New Guinea, only to see the bulk of that force destroyed in a single air attack. Finally, the Japanese army air forces fought an unglamorous defensive campaign for approximately a year, from the summer of 1943 until their army was pushed out of New Guinea and the war itself shifted to the Marianas and the Philippines.

Occupation of Rabaul and the start of air operations against Port Moresby

When the Japanese army and navy developed plans for a war with the United States and Great Britain in 1941, the islands of the Bismarck Archipelago, particularly New Britain, were included in their target list from early on. This was because Japanese planners saw Rabaul on New Britain, with its excellent natural harbour, as a potential threat to Truk Island in the Carolines – 1,100 kilometres to the north and the site of the Japanese navy’s most important base in the central Pacific Ocean. Japanese control of New Britain and the surrounding islands was therefore necessary to protect the base at Truk.

On 5 November 1941, the army’s South Seas Force was assigned the task of seizing Guam and then the airfields in the Bismarck Islands. The navy’s special landing forces

1942年2月から1944年7月まで、アメリカ、オーストラリアそして日本の航空部隊は、ニューギニア東部、中部そしてビスマルク・ソロモン諸島地域において消耗戦を展開した。両太平洋方面における航空作戦は戦争の約半分の期間続き、戦争の勝敗にとって非常に重要な意味をもっていた。なぜならば、ニューギニアの陸上、上空、そして周辺海上での戦いによって、日本軍は初めて進攻を制御され、疲弊させられ、ついには後退させられたからである。以下、ニューギニア島における日本の航空作戦に焦点をあて、日本の主要戦略及び作戦関連事項について述べたい。

日本の軍によるニューギニア島での航空作戦の第1段階は、1942年5月から10月までの海軍によるポートモレスビー攻略作戦だった。第2段階の作戦は、（当初ソロモン諸島での作戦に航空力を注入した）海軍に代わって、1943年夏初頭から6月まで陸軍が実行したが、本来は攻撃作戦を実行するつもりだったが、実に防衛的な性格をおびた作戦になっていった。第3の段階は、1943年夏の短い期間で、日本陸軍航空部隊がニューギニアでより積極的な役割を担ったが、たった1回の敵の空襲によって、そのほとんどが破壊されてしまった。最後に、日本陸軍航空部隊は1943年の夏から約1年間あまり、戦略的な防衛作戦を行った。その後、日本陸軍はニューギニアから後退、実質的な戦いはマリアナ諸島とフィリピンに移っていた。

ラバウル占領とポートモレスビー航空作戦の開始

来るべき対英米戦に備えて、1941年に日本陸軍と海軍が作戦計画を作成した際に、ビスマルク諸島、特にニューボリミン島は早い時期より日本軍の攻撃対象リストに含まれていた。日本軍作戦計画担当者は、自然の良港であったニューボリミン島のラバウルが、そこから北へ1,100kmの距離で、日本海軍の最重要基地であったカロリン諸島のトラック島に脅威を及ぼす可能性があると考えられた。それゆえ、中部太平洋地域において、ニューボリミン島と周辺の島々を日本の勢力下に押さえることは、トラック島の基地を守るために必要性があった。

1941年11月5日、陸軍南海部隊はグラム島とビスマルク諸島に占拠を図っていた飛行場を占拠せよとの命令を受けた。海軍の陸戦部隊が、グラム島の占領を引き続き、その後陸軍と協力してラバウルの占拠を行う予定になっていた。そしてトラック島に拠点を置いていた海軍第4航空艦隊が、グラム及びラバウル・ビスマルク両作戦の支援をすることに
日本の海軍は、フィリピンやマレー半島、そしてインドネシアなどで予想以上の速く勝利を収めたため、上記の作戦の実行中に次の展開を決定しなくてはならなかった。オーストラリア侵略があまりにも物資を必要とするため不適切と判断された後に、海軍司令部は第7艦隊と第11航空艦隊に対して、東部ニューギニアのラウとサラモア、そしてポートモレスビーとソロモン諸島を攻撃するよう指令を出した。

海軍十勝航空群所属の零式戦闘機は、1942年1月31日にラパルを出撃に進出した。2月2日と5日には、横浜航空群所属の九七式飛行艇がポートモレスビーを初めとし、ニューギニア上空での航空戦が開始された。2月9日、ニューブリテン島南部沿岸のガスマタを占領し、そこで飛行場建設作業を開始した。更なる作戦遂行のため、第4航空隊が編成されその司令部がラパルに置かれたが、それは27機の攻撃機と爆撃機27機の公称戦力をもっていた。2月24日には、第4航空隊がポートモレスビーの攻撃を始めた。

1942年3月7日、日本軍司令部は主要攻撃作戦を継続することを目的とした第2段階作戦を決定した。この新しい作戦の一環として、アメリカとオーストラリア間の補給ルートをさらに囲むために、ソロモン諸島とニューギニア地域において進攻を続けるという決定がなされた。ニューギニア東海岸部のラウとサラモアは3月8日に占領された。その後、南米航空隊が零戦11機をラウに送り込み、ラウは非常に将来の厳しい航空基地となった。
somewhat of a stalemate, with neither side achieving air superiority and the Japanese failing to drive the Allied air forces out of New Guinea.

The commitment of army air forces to the South Pacific

The next stage in Japanese air operations over New Guinea involved the deployment of Japanese army air forces in the region. After the Americans landed on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons on 7 August 1942, the Japanese air forces based in Rabaul were forced to make increasingly greater efforts in the Solomons, while continuing their campaign against New Guinea. The air battle in the Solomons was fought principally by naval aircraft and, as this commitment grew, the Japanese army's air forces would play a greater role over New Guinea.

On 11 November Hattori Takushiro, of the Army General Staff, called for the deployment of army air forces to the region in order to regain air superiority. With estimates of future American air power projecting 24,500 US air force and navy first-line planes operating in the South Pacific by December 1943, it was now recognised that the most urgent need facing Japan was to increase air power.

Faced with looming defeat on Guadalcanal, and setbacks in their drive on Port Moresby from the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Kokoda, the Japanese military finally decided to commit some of its air forces to the South Pacific. On 18 November an Army–navy central agreement on operations in the South Pacific Area was signed, and the 6th Air Division was committed to the New Guinea front. In accordance with the agreement, 60 Nakajima Type 1 “Oscar” fighters of the 11th Sentai (air group) reached Rabaul via Truk on 18 December, and almost immediately became involved in air defence operations. By the end of the month they were flying missions against targets such as Buna on mainland New Guinea. On 29 December, army heavy bomber units were ordered to deploy from Burma to New Guinea.

On 4 January 1943 the army and navy high commands ordered that operations on New Guinea be continued. The purpose of Japan's operations in the South Pacific was to “secure a position of superiority”. Lae, Salamaua, Wewak and Madang on New Guinea were to be strengthened or occupied, and the area north of the Owen Stanley Mountains was to be secured so that it could function as a base for operations aimed at Port Moresby. The Japanese then had 164 army and 190 navy aircraft on their bases at Rabaul and the surrounding area. Thereafter, Japanese air operations over New Guinea were conducted principally by the army, operating out of Wewak and other bases.

1942年7月末まで、ラバウルとラウの海軍航空隊は、オーエン・スタンレー山脈を越えてポートモレスピーを他のニューギニア島の連合軍基地を集中した攻撃に続けた。日本軍の艦隊機部隊はまた、自軍基地に対しての連合軍の空からの攻撃を迎撃するためしばしば発進した。個々の空戦では、オーストラリア軍やアメリカ軍機の損失のほうが多かったとは言え、連合軍の航空戦力の減少は深刻ではなかった。一方、損失数は連合軍ほどではなくとも、訓練と経験を積んだ陸軍兵を失い、しばしば経験不足の者がこれに参戦したことで、日本軍の艦隊機力の劣劣は徐々に落ちていく。よってこの時期は、航空力ではどちらも優位に立たず、日本軍は連合軍空軍をニューギニアから追い出すことができなかったという、いわゆる膠着状況だったといえる。

南太平洋方面における陸軍航空隊

ニューギニアでの日本軍航空作戦の次の段階は、日本陸軍航空隊の投入にある。1942年8月7日にアメリカ軍がソロモン諸島のガダルカナル島に上陸した後、ラバウルに基地をおいた日本軍航空隊は、ニューギニア攻撃作戦を継続しながらも、ソロモン諸島にさらに多くの戦力をつぎ込む必要があった。ソロモン諸島での航空戦は基本的には海軍機によって行われたが、その戦闘が激しくなるにしたがって、陸軍航空隊が、ニューギニアにおいてもっと重要な役割を果すようになった。

11月1日、陸軍参謀部の局飛行第四局、航空戦力の優勢を真っ先に使うために、陸軍航空部隊の派遣を要請した。1943年12月までは、南太平洋方面における将来の航空戦力は、アメリカ軍前線陸軍機及び海軍機で2万5,000機に達するであろうという予測のもと、日本軍は火急に航空戦力を増大する必要性があった。

ガダルカナル島での敗北が明らかに迫り、ポートモレスピーへの日本軍の進攻がコックの戦いで挫折した後、陸軍はようやくその航空部隊を南太平洋方面に派兵することを決定した。11月18日に、「南太平洋方面作戦基幹部隊中央部隊」が発足され、ニューギニアの前線司令部の統轄が北朝鮮に移された。この合意に則って、12月18日に飛行第11戦隊の一式戦闘機60機（導入）がトラック島経由でラバウルに到着し、直ちに防空防衛作戦に参戦し、12月末には、ニューギニア本島のマヌなどを攻撃するために出撃した。12月29日には陸軍専門機戦隊は、ピルマからニューギニアへの移動を命じられた。

1943年4月1日、陸海軍の司令部は、ニューギニアにおける作戦を続けるよう指令を出した。日本軍の南太平洋方面における作戦目的は、「優位性の確保」にあった。そこでニューギニア本土のラウ、サラモア、ウエーケックそしてマヌを強化または占領し、オーエン・スタンレー山脈以北の地域を、ポートモレスビー攻略の基盤として確保すべく、との指令が出された。この時点で、日本軍は陸軍機164機、海軍機190機を、ラバウルとその周辺の航空基地に置いていた。これ以後、ニューギニア上空の航空作戦...
Further commitment and destruction of army air forces

On 25 March 1943, in recognition of the importance of the New Guinea front to Japan’s war efforts, a revised Army–navy central agreement was concluded. This resulted in a substantial commitment to the defence of Lae and Salamaua and the strengthening of bases along the northern New Guinea coast, while a delaying operation would be fought in the Solomons. The assault on Port Moresby, while officially still a long-term objective, was, for all practical purposes, abandoned.

Reflecting this revised strategy, the army decided to strengthen its air forces in the New Guinea area. The 68th and 78th Sentai of the 14th Air Brigade, flying the Kawasaki Type 3 “Tony” fighter, arrived in Rabaul in late April and were duly deployed to New Guinea. The 13th Sentai, flying the Kawasaki Type 2 “Toryu” twin-engine fighter and the 24th Sentai, flying the venerable “Oscar” began arriving in Rabaul in late May.

The situation changed further when the Japanese discovered that the Allies were constructing airfields in the New Guinea highlands, at Mount Hagen and Bena Bena, which would threaten the Japanese airfields at Madang and Wewak. Ground operations to meet these new threats were immediately planned. To provide further support the 7th Air Division, which was formed in late January 1943, was deployed to Wewak on 19 June.

While the actual deployment of these air units was delayed due to the insufficient readiness of bases in New Guinea, army air strength – at least on paper – was steadily reinforced during this period. The army made another organisational change during this period, when it created the 4th Air Army to exercise overall command over the 6th and 7th Air Divisions. The new air army was formed in mid-June, and its headquarters had deployed to Rabaul by 10 August.

Eventually about a quarter of the army’s air forces would be committed to the South Pacific. Considering that most of these units were the best that the army had, and would be subjected to losses of approximately 50 per cent per month, this was indeed a major commitment by the army.

The major 7th Air Division units deployed to New Guinea in July 1943 at this time were the 59th Sentai (fighters), 5th Sentai, 7th Sentai (heavy bombers) and 61st Sentai (heavy bombers). Meanwhile, on 9 July, the 6th Air Division also moved its headquarters to Wewak.

The Nakajima Ki-43, code-named “Oscar” by the Allies, was a highly successful army fighter in the early stages of the war, renowned for its manoeuvrability in dogfights.
With these new deployments, it seemed that the army air forces had overcome the growing disparity between the Japanese and the Allied air forces. However, in mid-June, the army finally had to face reality, and agreed upon an Outline for operations guidance in the New Guinea Area with the operations section of the navy high command, which called for a holding strategy in New Guinea. While this meant that the assault on Port Moresby was finally and formally shelved, the army air forces in New Guinea still had the task of neutralising the Allied airbases at Mount Hagen, Bena Bena, Wau, Salamana and other places. In addition, they had to defend their own airbases, and provide fighter escort for convoys attempting to supply the Japanese garrisons on New Guinea.

Defensive tasks sapped much of the Japanese army’s air strength on New Guinea. In fact, by this time the army air forces were fighting a largely defensive campaign. Out of 1,308 sorties flown in July 1943, 494 were convoy escort, 84 were intercept and 190 were ground support. Such missions meant that fewer aircraft and pilots were available for mounting air attacks on Allied airbases, even though such air attacks were necessary to regain air superiority.

In early August 1943, the 4th Air Army had an operational strength of 130 aircraft. This was just one-third the 4th Air Army’s nominal strength, and represented an operational rate of only 50 per cent approximately, due to widespread illness among the aircrews along with, of course, the lack of aircraft replacements.

Nevertheless, the Japanese attempted to carry out their plan to regain air superiority. On 12 August, the 4th Air Army began to carry out air raids on the Allied airbases at Hagen, Bena Bena, Wau, Salamana and elsewhere. This effort came to naught, however, when on 17 August 1943 Allied air armadas mounted a surprise air attack on Wewak, the Japanese army’s principal airbase on New Guinea. Over 100 Japanese aircraft were destroyed, and the 4th Air Army was reduced to an operational strength of just over 30 planes.

The major cause for the scale of the defeat, as stressed by 8th Area Army, was said to be lack of preparation, particularly the lack of sufficient aircraft shelters, and an inadequate warning system. The Japanese were still relying almost completely on a visual warning system, which did not provide enough time for aircraft on the ground to either scramble or be hidden. This problem was exacerbated by the primitive condition of the airfields, which did not allow quick scrambling of a large number of aircraft.
Yet another major cause stressed by the 4th Air Army was the fact that all of its aircraft had been located in front-line airbases, such as Wewak. The 4th Air Army, along with the 6th and 7th Air Divisions, had wanted to deploy its units more in depth (instead of placing all its strength on the front line), with a certain number of aircraft based at airfields further to the rear. However, both the army high command and the 8th Area Army had insisted that as many aircraft as possible be based at airfields at the front, to make them easier to use in operations.

The end of the Japanese air forces in New Guinea

After the debacle at Wewak, the army tried to rebuild, while at the same time, strengthening its airbase at Hollandia, in order to provide more depth to the Wewak position. The Allies, however, would not wait while these efforts were being made. In September, the Allies pushed the Japanese back from their positions at Lae and Salamana, and on 22 September they landed near Finschhafen, on the north-eastern coast of New Guinea. In late September the Japanese army air forces had only 60 or 70 operational aircraft, even though they had two air divisions, the 6th and 7th, in the area.

Faced with these developments, the Japanese high command was finally forced to make a major strategic change. On 15 September 1943 the concept of the Absolute national defence zone was adopted as policy, under which a delaying action would be continued in the South Pacific while a new line of defence was prepared along the Marianas–Carolines–Philippines arc. Counter-operations would follow and, if the situation permitted, offensive operations in New Guinea would be resumed in mid-1944 or later.

On 30 September the army and navy high commands adopted new strategies based upon the new concept. The 6th Air Division, using what few planes it had, continued its mostly defensive operations out of Wewak. When the Allies landed at Saidor on 2 January 1944, thereby sealing off the Dampier Strait, the 4th Air Army launched an all-out counter-attack. By this time, however, it had less than 100 operational aircraft, and was able to fly only 160 sorties in all on five separate missions. Not only did this have a negligible effect on the Allied landing force, but mission losses took the 4th Air Army down to less than 50 operational planes.

The Japanese navy also launched attacks against the Saidor invasion force, since the loss of the Dampier Strait would mean that Rabaul and New Guinea would be isolated. Japanese air forces in the New Guinea–Solomons area had become desperate by とができなかったことも、問題をさらに悪化させた。

また第4航空軍が指揮した大きな問題点は、すべての飛行機をウエワクなどの前線航空基地に配置したことだった。第4航空軍は、第6及び第7飛行師団と共に、何十機かを後方の基地に置くという形のある部隊配置を希望していた。しかし、陸軍参謀本部も第7方面軍も、機動作戦がしやすいように、できるだけ多くの飛行機を前線の基地に配置するようにと強く主張したのだ。

ニューギニアでの日本軍航空部隊の終焉

ウェワクでの大敗北の後、軍はホランジアの航空基地の再建と強化をすることで、ウェワク守備にさらに頼る態勢とした。しかし、連合軍はそれが続くまで待てはいないかった。9月に連合軍は日本軍のラウとサラモアの基地を攻撃し、9月22日にはニューギニア島東部海岸のフィンシュヘーヘン付近に上陸した。9月下旬には、日本陸軍は、第6と第7の2飛行師団を配置していながら、わずか60～70機の使用可能な航空機しか保有していなかった。

このような展開に直面して、日本軍参謀本部は戦略の大変革を迫られた。1943年9月15日絶対国防圈の概念を政策として採用され、この戦略において南太平洋方面では連合軍の進攻を遅延させる作戦を取る一方、マリアナ、カロリンそしてフィリピンを結ぶ線に新しい防衛線を敷こうとした。そして反撃を繰り行い、もし状況が許すならば、ニューギニアにおける攻撃作戦を1944年中頃かそれ以後に再開するというものであった。

9月30日に陸海軍司令官は、新しい概念にのっとった新規模作戦を実行に移した。第6飛行師団は残りわずかのかの飛行機を使用し、もっぱら守勢の作戦をウェワクより継続した。1944年1月2日に連合軍がサイドル岬に上陸しダンピール海峡を遮断した際、第4航空軍は激しい反撃を開始した。しかしこの時点で、飛行可能な航空機を100機たらずしか保持しておらず、5回の出撃で戦へ100機しか発進できなかった。しかし、連合軍の上陸部隊にはほとんど影響をあたえなかっただけでなく、そこで生じた損失は、第4航空軍の保有機数を50機まで減少させたのだった。

ダンピール海峡を失うことは、ラパウルとニューギニアの遮断を意味したため、日本海軍もサイドル岬に上陸した連合軍部隊に攻撃を仕掛けた。1月中旬には、ニューギニア南方全域の日本陸海軍航空部隊の保有機は、たった100機しかないという深刻な状況に陥っていた。

陸軍参謀部は状況を測るため、1944年1月末に、第4航空軍の作戦中核部隊、ホランジアからさらに西へと移すことを見決めた。また司令部は、第4航空軍の一時的な補強
mid-January, with only 100 planes operational across the entire region.

In order to improve its position, the army high command decided at the end of January 1944 to move the 4th Air Army's centre of operations further westward than Hollandia. The high command also decided at this time to temporarily reinforce the 4th Air Army with 2nd Area Army fighter and bomber units. While they would remain under 2nd Area Army control, these units were to “cooperate” with the 8th Area Army.

In the meantime, the Japanese navy's air force was finally knocked out of both New Guinea and the Solomons. On 17 February 1944, US navy carriers launched a massive raid on the key Japanese base in the central Pacific, Truk Island, destroying over 200 Japanese aircraft and inflicting heavy damage. Since Truk was now directly threatened, the Japanese navy had to replace its air losses with the only air forces available, which were those at Rabaul. Three days after the attack, all of the remaining naval aircraft of the Japanese 2nd Air Flotilla at Rabaul were flown to Truk, and the Japanese naval air arm's presence in the New Guinea–Solomons area came to an end.

On 25 March 1944, the 4th Air Army was transferred to the 2nd Area Army, and its headquarters arrived in Hollandia. As an airbase, however, Hollandia was still not adequately prepared. Facilities were still not ready, and radar and other warning and intelligence networks were only being prepared. Hollandia was as vulnerable as Wewak had been, but, by the end of March, the Japanese army had managed to assemble approximately 300 aircraft there. Of these, however, only about 150 were operational.

In an eerie repeat of the earlier disaster at Wewak, the bulk of Japanese aircraft at Hollandia were wiped out in an air raid carried out over two days, 30–31 March 1944. Over 150 planes were destroyed on the ground. This time, the Japanese were not given any time to recover. On 22 April 1944, the Americans landed near Hollandia. The personnel of the 6th Air Division, including its remaining pilots, were forced to leave the 100 remaining aircraft and retreat overland to the west, arriving in Sarmi by early May. The division was never reconstructed, ultimately being disbanded in August 1944.

This left the 7th Air Division, operating at this time primarily out of bases in the East Indies. But this force, too, was severely depleted. On 25 May 1944, it had an operational strength of only 87 aircraft. When the Americans landed on Biak Island two days later, the 7th Air Division tried to provide air support for the defenders, but since it had so few aircraft – most of which had to be used for convoy escort and air defence missions – it was, 第2方面軍所属の戦闘機部隊と爆撃機部隊をすることを決定した。これらの部隊は、第2方面軍の指揮下に留めず、第8方面軍と「協力する」という取り決めであった。

一方、日本海軍航空隊は、とうとうニューギニアとソロモン諸島から撃退された。1944年2月17日、アメリカ海軍機動部隊は、太平洋中部方面の日本軍拠点であるトラック島の基地に大攻撃を仕掛け、この攻撃で日本軍機200両以上が破壊され、大きな損害を受けた。トラック島が直接攻撃にさらされたため、日本海軍はそこでの損失を、唯一ラバウルに残っていた航空部隊で補うしかなかった。この攻撃の3日後、ラバウルの海軍第2航空戦隊の海軍機全体がトラック島へ移動し、ニューギニアとソロモン海域での海軍航空部隊の活動は終結した。

1944年3月25日、第3航空軍は第2方面軍へ配属となり、その司令部がホランジアに到着した。しかし、ホランジアは航空基地としての準備がまだ十分ではなかった。施設は未完成で、レーダーの機器についても準備段階であった。ホランジアにウエックや同様の基地がないのに不満で、3月末には海軍は約300機をそこで集約させた。しかしそのうちの150機のみが作戦参加可能であった。

まるで前のウエックでの惨事の再演のように、ホランジアにあった日本軍機の大部分は、1944年3月30日と31日の空襲で撃滅してしまった。その際、150機以上が地上で破壊されたのだった。今回は、日本軍に再攻撃の時がなかった。1944年4月22日、ア
was unable to do so effectively. By early July the Biak garrison had been wiped out. This was to be the last major action in which Japanese air forces operated over New Guinea. Thereafter, the major action in the Pacific would shift to the Marianas, Palau and then the Philippines, and what remained of the Japanese army and navy air forces was committed to these areas. The air war in New Guinea was effectively over, having ended in an Allied victory.

アメリカ軍はホランジア近くに上陸した。第6飛行群の兵員は、まだ生き残っていた操縦士を含め、残りの100機の飛行機を捨てて西へと陸上移動を強めされ、5月下旬にサルミに到着した。この師団は再編成されることなく、結局1944年8月に解散になった。

この結果、蘭領東インドに基地をおき、そこから出撃していた第7飛行師団だけが残った。しかしこの師団も大きな損失をこうむっていた。1944年5月25日の時点で、たった87機の戦闘能力しかなかった。その後、アメリカ軍がビアク島に上陸した際、第7飛行師団は陸上防衛隊に空からの掩護を試みた。しかし師団の飛行機は、船団の上空直撃や空中防衛任務に出動していたため、手持ちの飛行機数が少なくなっており、ほとんど効果がなかった。7月上旬にはビアクの守備隊は全滅していた。これが、日本軍航空隊のニューギニアでの主要作戦活動をもたらした。その後、太平洋における作戦の中心は、マリアナ諸島、パラオ、そしてフィリピンへ移っていき、日本陸海軍がまだ保有していた戦力はこの地域に投入された。ニューギニアでの作戦は実質的に終結し、連合軍が勝利をおさめたのだった。

田村恵子訳
Chapter 4
The naval campaigns for New Guinea
David Stevens

第4章
ニューギニアにおける海軍作戦
デービッド・スティーブンス
The naval campaigns for New Guinea

This chapter briefly examines some of the major issues surrounding the operations of Allied and Japanese naval forces during the war in New Guinea from 1942–44. The most important point to keep in mind is that the naval campaigns were not concerned simply with the defeat of the enemy fleet at sea. Although often taken for granted, the sustained and successful involvement of maritime power had a direct influence on operations ashore. There was a continuous struggle by both the Allies and Japanese to keep the sea for their own use while denying it to their adversary.

Early manoeuvres

By early 1942, Allied authorities could be in no doubt that the Japanese held the initiative in the Pacific War. After a series of unbroken victories stretching from Pearl Harbor to Java, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) held undisputed command of the sea in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Lae and Salamaua on the north-east coast of New Guinea were occupied on 7 March 1942 when the Japanese landed a force of 3,000 men. With the enemy seemingly unstoppable, many Australians believed that their own homeland might be the ultimate objective. The Australian government turned to the United States for assurance and President Roosevelt recalled General Douglas MacArthur from the Philippines to take charge. MacArthur knew that it would be some time before the United States would be capable of launching a counter-attack; but, on assuming supreme command of the South-West Pacific Area (SWPA), he also found that he had very few resources available for defence.

The Japanese, however, had already rejected the invasion of Australia as being beyond their ability. Instead, before the United States could muster a significant response, they aimed to occupy Port Moresby and the southern Solomons, followed by Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. The Japanese expected these additional operations to shore up their defensive perimeter while simultaneously cutting Australia’s vital communications with America. Isolated from its allies, Australia would thereafter be prevented from acting as a staging area for manpower and materiel.

Assisted by an efficient intelligence system, MacArthur had an accurate understanding...
of Japanese intentions, and soon made it clear that he considered Australia’s security lay in Port Moresby rather than on the mainland. Unfortunately, garrison forces at Port Moresby amounted to only one militia brigade group, and reinforcement would not be easy. A mountainous and undeveloped island, New Guinea had virtually no land routes of communication. Airfields were few and equally undeveloped, and there was no intermediate airbase closer than Townsville. New Guinea was therefore solely dependent upon sea lines of communication and their control by friendly air and naval forces.

On 25 April 1942, the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre in Melbourne issued an assessment that a Japanese assault on Port Moresby was imminent. On 1 May the cruisers HMAS Australia and Hobart, and USS Chicago, escorted by three American destroyers, sailed from Hervey Bay in Queensland under the command of Rear Admiral John Crace, RN, commander of the Australian squadron. The formation was ordered to rendezvous with an American force built around the aircraft carriers USS Yorktown and Lexington.

Three days later the Japanese Port Moresby attack force carrying some 6,000 troops and supported by aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers, sailed from Rabaul. Crace’s force was detached on 7 May to block the movement of any Japanese ships through the Jomard Passage. Here it came under heavy air attack, although it did not encounter Japanese surface units. Indeed, the battle of the Coral Sea, which extended over 7–8 May, was the first naval battle in history in which the opposing ships did not sight each other. The aircraft carriers and their close escorts played the key role and the battle resulted in each side having one carrier sunk and another damaged. Their losses might not have been huge, but the encounter was a strategic defeat for the Japanese. The IJN had failed to establish control of the Coral Sea and, with the covering force depleted and air cover reduced, the Port Moresby operation was postponed.

In the breathing space provided, MacArthur reinforced the troops in New Guinea and ordered the construction of additional airbases at the south-eastern tip of New Guinea and on the Cape York peninsula. Meanwhile the IJN turned its attention to the major operation against the American base at Midway. This time there were no doubts about the outcome. For the Japanese Combined Fleet, the battle of Midway was a major disaster. Four fleet carriers were sunk and the naval air arm received a blow from which it never completely recovered. The Japanese had lost not only their capacity to contest command of the sea, but also the strategic initiative for the remainder of the Pacific War.
Although Coral Sea and Midway checked Japanese ambitions, they had not been curbed, and the occupation of Port Moresby remained a priority. However, since a direct amphibious assault was still impractical, the Japanese instead accelerated studies for an overland advance from their bases on the northern New Guinea coast.

For the remainder of 1942 the pattern of fighting in New Guinea was characterised by a series of slow and costly engagements ashore and, for the Allies, there were few incentives to commit major naval forces. Moreover, warships of all types were scarce and, with the profusion of reefs, and lack of accurate hydrographic information, operations close to the New Guinea coast were inherently unsafe. The proximity of Japanese airbases and the lack of Allied air superiority added further difficulties to surface operations. As a result, for the initial stages of the New Guinea campaign and at least until the capture of Buna, direct naval assistance was limited to that provided by American motor torpedo boats and the ubiquitous corvettes of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

**The Allied view**

Once the land campaign in New Guinea was underway, Australia's role as a rearward support base came to the fore, and Allied shipping movements along the eastern Australian coast and up to forward areas increased rapidly. After Coral Sea, the Japanese no longer risked surface ships south of New Guinea, and so their attempts to disrupt Allied communications were generally limited to what could be achieved by their aircraft and submarines. Nevertheless, there were occasional sorties by warships, including some bombardments of Allied shipping in Milne Bay. In September 1942 the Japanese cruiser *Tenryu* and destroyer *Arashi* sank the supply ship *Anshun*.

The first serious Japanese anti-shipping offensive had begun four months earlier with a sortie by five fleet submarines to the east coast, and the midget submarine attack on Sydney on the night of 31 May–1 June. A Japanese campaign of this type was not unexpected, but Australian reactions were initially hampered by a lack of suitable assets. To its credit, the RAN was quick to introduce coastal convoys and, by early 1943, a complete system stretched from Melbourne to Darwin and advanced New Guinea bases.

Despite the protective effort, in the period to August 1942, enemy submarines sank seven merchant ships and damaged another six. A few of these vessels were carrying purely commercial cargoes, but most carried at least some military equipment.

While the protection of all shipping was important, military cargoes always took priority
and special convoys to New Guinea had begun as early as January 1942. By December 1942, regular convoys from Townsville to New Guinea became routine. Designated TN/NT, these supply convoys continued to operate until 23 March 1944. Over fifteen months 1,148 merchant vessels made the journey in 254 separate convoys.

Maximum protection was provided for the transport of personnel, and thankfully no troop ships were ever lost. There were, however, some close escapes. On 23 August 1942, MV Malaita reached Port Moresby with a load of troops and supplies. On sailing for Cairns six days later, she was torpedoed and severely damaged by the Japanese submarine RO-33. The escorting destroyer, HMAS Arunta, counter-attacked and destroyed the submarine, but Malaita did not return to service until 1947.

The Japanese continued their campaigns of disruption in 1943. Enemy aircraft maintained frequent attacks against the supply lines around New Guinea and across northern Australia, while submarines tended to operate further south. With fighting ashore concentrated along the north coast of New Guinea, the Allied northern supply line and, in particular, the run from Milne Bay to Oro Bay, assumed the greatest importance. Insufficient friendly aircraft were available to cover all ships on this passage and, because of the navigational dangers, smaller warships such as the RAN’s corvettes shouldered most of the escort burden.

Attacks by Japanese submarines off the east coast continued, but were generally kept under control, primarily because the number of submarines allocated was always too small for the area involved. The IJN did not consider attacks on trade and shipping to be important, and did not prioritise the anti-ship campaign. Nevertheless, enemy submarines continued to achieve the occasional success. SS Starr King, sunk off Sydney on 10 February 1943, carried 7,000 tons of army supplies. SS Lydia M. Childs, sunk off Newcastle a month later, carried a cargo of tanks.

The requirement to protect shipping continued to place a heavy strain on Allied air and naval resources. By the end of 1943, naval authorities had allocated over sixty warships for convoy escort duties, while other formations remained available to provide cover. These vessels included Australian and Allied destroyers, corvettes and a wide assortment of smaller anti-submarine vessels. The period May–June 1943 saw the Japanese campaign peak with nine ships torpedoed over four weeks. The scale of the attack forced Australian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Royle, to reduce the number of convoy sailings by half so that the number of escort vessels allocated to each convoy could be doubled.
Meanwhile, the Royal Australian Air Force pressed all possible reconnaissance aircraft into service, employed three reserve squadrons on the escort task, and ordered training aircraft to carry weapons and keep a sharp lookout for submarines.

The Japanese, though, were also feeling the strain and could not maintain even a minimum effort. By the end of June, all their submarines had been withdrawn from Australian waters for defensive operations closer to home. Strangely, however, it was the final attack of the enemy campaign that was to be among the most effective. On 16 June, with two torpedoes, the submarine I-174 sank the US Army Transport Portmar, fully loaded with fuel and ammunition, and severely damaged a tank landing ship.

The establishment of the Seventh Amphibious Force under Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, USN, marked the turning point for MacArthur’s navy and heralded a return to the offensive by Allied naval forces in New Guinea. Supported by ever increasing strength at sea and in the air, Allied troops were for the first time able to take full advantage of amphibious mobility and naval gunfire support. The first opposed amphibious landing by Australian troops took place at Lae at the beginning of September 1943. It was followed by a successful assault on Finschhafen a few weeks later.

In contrast to the earlier overland campaigns, amphibious operations reduced losses and increased the speed of advance. By relying on amphibious movement, strongly-garrisoned points could be bypassed and troops landed on lightly or undefended beaches. The Allies, the Japanese admitted, had “inflicted an annihilating blow on us without engaging in direct combat” at Lae. This example was subsequently repeated many times as MacArthur’s forces “coast hopped” up the northern New Guinea coast through Hollandia, Wakde and Numfor Island. By March 1944 MacArthur had recaptured the Admiralty Islands, and at Manus he formed an advanced naval base from which he could launch his great amphibious operation for the liberation of the Philippines.

Fully integrated into Barbey’s Seventh Amphibious Force, Australian warships were involved in many of these operations. The RAN’s three armed merchant cruisers, Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia, were converted to infantry landing ships, while Australian cruisers and destroyers were tasked to provide shore bombardments and seaward cover.

The Japanese view

The Japanese armed forces, and the IJN in particular, had been designed around the need to maximise battle strength. The navy paid only minimal attention to the problem
of maintaining and supplying protection services. This was a critical weakness for, despite Japan’s industrial development, her merchant marine was inadequate even for peacetime needs. Japan could not match American shipbuilding capacity, and an initial shortage of suitable transports and cargo vessels combined with wartime attrition, soon caused major breakdowns in Japanese logistics. To compensate, sea movement by warships rapidly became the norm for men and equipment.

Despite these limitations, the Japanese in New Guinea could rely on adequate reinforcement by surface transport from Palau and Rabaul for most of 1942, and as a result were able to maintain an offensive posture. However, by the end of the year they were faced with Allied victories at Milne Bay, Kokoda, and Buna, and attention had turned towards strengthening and consolidating their position along the northern coast of New Guinea. Hampering this objective, Allied air and submarine attacks on their poorly-defended convoys were becoming increasingly effective. Heavy equipment, food, and ammunition were soon in short supply, while difficulty in maintaining an adequate supply of spare parts severely reduced Japanese air strength. Meanwhile, the Combined Fleet had, by mid-November 1942, suspended all offensive operations and ordered its light forces to operate chiefly in fulfilling the constant requirement for supplies. The major units based at Truk were held back in preparation for a decisive action against the US Pacific fleet at some time in the future.

The Allies continued to improve their interdiction and maritime strike capability. In January 1943, the submarine USS Wahoo reported that after a ten-hour running battle off New Guinea, she had sunk an entire convoy of two Japanese freighters, one transport and one tanker. In early March, in what was to be their last major resupply operation, the Japanese attempted to run a large reinforcement convoy from Rabaul to Lae. Good intelligence allowed the Allies to mount a massive air attack, and in what became known as the battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese lost all eight transports, four out of eight destroyers, and at least a third of their troops. Smaller convoys were sometimes seen after this time, but shipping available for operations had fallen dramatically. The Japanese recognised that their continued losses by surface transport could no longer be maintained and they removed eastern New Guinea from their vital area. A new strategic plan, drawn up in May 1943, established a defensive perimeter on a line joining Wake, the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, Nauru and Ocean Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago. Thereafter the Japanese abandoned hope of further offensive operations in New Guinea, and isolated areas became almost totally reliant on submarines and small barge
Japanese submarines began their supply missions to New Guinea in December 1942 and, with the attrition of other transport assets, it was soon usual for most of the Japanese submarine service to be dedicated to transport. Although safer than other methods, supply by submarine was hardly more efficient. Stripped of all unnecessary equipment, submarines were then incapable of offensive operations and still only able to transport a very small load. Even the largest 2,000-ton submarines were estimated to have a cargo capacity of only 20 tons below decks and another 40 tons above, or alternatively 50 troops and 15 tons of cargo. The usual load, however, was much less and nearly half the early missions failed after the submarine was unable to establish communications with forces ashore. Despite the introduction of several ingenious devices to increase cargo capacity and reduce unloading time, such measures could not make up for the lack of a fully functional transport service.

Despite often possessing the advantages of position and preparedness, the majority of Japanese troops in New Guinea were never to come to grips with Allied forces. Subjected to what was, essentially, an extremely effective blockade, enemy troops suffered terribly from illness and malnutrition. Claims have since been made that deaths in combat account for only 3 per cent of the 100,000 Japanese who died in New Guinea. Those on the ground were under no illusions. One of the few Japanese survivors of Buna was
Conclusions

To say that the Allied navies supported the actions of land forces in New Guinea would be an understatement. Although Allied maritime power could not ultimately remove the Japanese from New Guinea, it did directly affect the course of events ashore. Throughout the operations, the protection and maintenance of the sea lines of communication were vital to the successful progress of MacArthur’s campaign. The simultaneous denial to the Japanese of their own supply lines meant that the enemy had no hope of competing with Allied “troopers, beans and bullets in greater and greater numbers”. Later, when the Allies had clearly established the capability to establish local superiority on the sea and in the air, it was possible to exploit this control for combined operations. Compared to overland assault, power could thereafter be projected at times and places chosen by the Allies and with remarkable speed and economy.

The Japanese, on the other hand, consistently failed to allocate sufficient priority to either a concentrated offensive against Allied shipping, or protection of their own lines of communication. Once they had lost control of the sea and air off the New Guinea coastline, any Japanese local superiority ashore could never be effectively applied. Starved of reinforcements and supplies, Japanese strong points were consistently neutralised, and either disposed of piecemeal or left to waste away. Though often ignored by historians, the operations of naval forces around New Guinea were vital to the war’s outcome, providing the “enabling factor” that allowed the campaign to be fought to its successful conclusion.

損を補うことはできなかった。

ニューギニアでの日本軍は、部隊配置と軍備の点ではしばしば優位にたったものの、連合軍に立ち向かうことができなかった。非常に効果的な連合軍の海面での攻撃の前で、日本軍は病気や栄養失調にひどく悩まされた。ニューギニアで死亡した10万人の将兵のうち、戦闘で死亡したのはただの3％にすぎないとされている。実際に戦場にいた兵士たちは、それがはっきりわがしていた。ブナで生き残った数少ない日本兵の一人は、「我々が負えたのは、兵員への補給ができないこと、そして、我々海軍と航空部隊の戦力の補給ルートを妨害できなかったからである」と語っている。

結論

連合軍の海軍は、ニューギニアでの陸上部隊の活動を支援したわけではない。連合軍海軍は、日本軍をニューギニアから完全に追い払うことができなかったのではいえ、陸上戦の展開に直接に影響をおよぼした。この期間の海上交通の防衛と経済は、マッカーサーの作戦を成功に導くためには絶対不可欠であった。それと同時に、日本軍の補給ルートを妨害したことで、日本軍は「もっともっと数多くの兵隊と豆と鉄砲」をもった連合軍と競うことができなかった。その後、この地域で絶対的な制海権と制空権を握った連合軍は、その力を海上と空の合同作戦に利用することになった。陸上攻撃に較べると、それ以後の連合軍は、選んだ時と場所に驚くべきスピードと効率性をもって攻撃力を投じることができるようにようになったのである。

一方日本軍は、連合軍の航空輸送に集中攻撃をかけることや自軍の兵站の保護に対して、十分な関心を示さなかった。いったんニューギニア沿岸の制海権と制空権を失うと、海岸地域での日本軍の優位性は失われた。援軍や補給物資の不足は、日本軍の強固な守備を崩し、そして陣地戦は徐々に連合軍の手に落ちるか、放棄された。しばしば歴史研究者によって見落とされているが、ニューギニア近辺での連合軍海軍の作戦活動は、ニューギニア戦を勝利に導いた要因であり、戦争の結末にも重大な影響を与えているのである。

田村恵子訳
Chapter 5
Japanese soldier’s experience of war
Tamura Keiko
In this essay, a Japanese soldier’s experience of war in New Guinea will be explored, based on his diary, which was found in Australia almost sixty years after the soldier’s death. The diary was kept in a pocketbook which was issued to every Japanese soldier. The entries, which were made between April and December 1943, filled about 160 pages. The frequency of entries varied over time. During the earlier stages of his days in New Guinea, the diarist sometimes wrote up to ten pages a day. In contrast, the entries became sparse after September, and there were no entries for October and November. The last entry was made on 8 December 1943 when he recalled the start of the Pacific War.

The diary does not contain the name of the owner, but it belonged to Tamura Yoshikazu. He was 158.5 cm tall and weighed 57 kg. So he was about average in height for an adult male in that period, and relatively well built as his chest size was 84 cm. He also had good eyesight. Tamura turned 26 years old on 27 April 1943. He was unmarried, and his immediate family consisted of a father, two sisters and a brother. The anniversary of his mother’s death was on 6 February. He also recorded the registration numbers of his firearms, sword and watch, and his bank account number.

Tamura was from Tochigi Prefecture north of Tokyo. In his first period of service his unit served in northern Korea and China, and he wrote his memories of this period in the diary. Although English excerpts of his reflections on China are not included here, he vividly described the cold, dry climate and arid landscape of China, which was dotted with small villages. According to his writing, his unit does not seem to have been engaged in combat in China. After his first period of service, he went back to civilian life where he had fond memories of a climb up Mt. Fuji with his friends.

His second period of conscription became effective from January 1943 in Utsunomiya. He joined the 239th Infantry Regiment (Toto 36 Unit) of the 41st Division on 5 January and left Utsunomiya on 12 January. From Utsunomiya, the troops travelled to Shimonoseki where they boarded a ship bound for Korea. He recorded the departure scenes. The train travelled through the Japanese countryside in winter. He noticed that there was hardly anybody on the station platform to farewell the troops, whereas previously they...
had been cheered off loudly by big crowds.

The New Guinea diary started with an entry for April 1943 at a camp in Wewak. Tamura had been on active service for three months but had not heard from his family or friends in Japan. The last entry of the diary was on 8 December 1943. It is most probable that Tamura was killed and his diary captured by Australian soldiers soon after 8 December.

A characteristic of the diary is that it was not just a record of a soldier’s daily activities. He used the diary as a means to reflect upon his experiences in the military, and to reflect on his purpose in life, both as an individual and as a soldier for the nation. Some of the letters he wrote to his friends and his family were copied into the book. He also recorded some memories of his past experiences both at home and in China. He missed home as he lived in a tent in the jungle without any communication from Japan for months. The diary also described how the soldiers acted and felt during the air raids by the Allies. Furthermore, the emotions of a soldier faced with death and maintaining his honour are vividly expressed.

He employs two styles of writing in the diary – prose form and the 31-syllable tanka poetry form. Tamura recorded over one hundred tanka poems in his diary. The format he favoured was to record his activities and reflections for the day and then write down four or five poems at the end. Thus, the tanka poems were summaries of his thoughts and emotions on the incidents recorded.

After the war, the diary remained in the possession of Mr Allan E. Connell, who was originally from Melbourne. He had enlisted in the 57/60th Australian Infantry Battalion in October 1941, at the age of nineteen, and was discharged in January 1946. The diary was discovered while Mr. Connell’s son, Jeff, and daughter-in-law, Mrs Kay Connell, were sorting through Allan Connell’s possessions after his death. It is not known how the diary became the property of Allan Connell, as he did not talk about it at all to his family.

However, it is possible to speculate on the fate of the diary. According to his service record, Allan Connell was in New Guinea towards the end of 1943 and working in the intelligence field. All of the captured Japanese diaries and documents were sent to the intelligence section from the battlefield and eventually forwarded to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) in order to be assessed for their strategic value. Allan Connell, who was handling those diaries, probably decided to keep one pocketbook for himself when he found out that the diary did not contain any military information on the Japanese army.
might have anticipated that the diary would eventually be destroyed. Although such an action was not officially permitted, it appears that similar incidents were not unknown.

Upon discovery of the diary, Mr. Jeff Cripps, a friend of Jeff and Kay, contacted the Australia–Japan Research Project (AJRP) in 2001 and sent a photocopied page, in order to find out about the contents of the pocketbook. That particular page included several beautiful poems about life in the jungle in New Guinea. Those poems clearly revealed the soldier’s literary sensitivity towards the foreign flora and fauna. Later, Mr & Mrs Connell kindly agreed to provide photocopies of the whole diary for the project so that we could read it through and translate part of it. The AJRP would like to express its great appreciation to Mr & Mrs Connell and Mr. Cripps for their cooperation.

Movements and actions of the 239th Infantry Regiment of the 41st Division

According to the Japanese War history series, the 239th Infantry Regiment of the 41st Division was first raised in Utsunomiya, Tochigi prefecture in September 1939. For the operation in which Tamura was involved, the division consisted of about 19,000 personnel. According to official records, the regiment had moved to Qingdao on 29 January 1943. Between 20 and 24 February the troops landed in Wewak.

The unit history stated that, between March and April 1943, the regiment was engaged in airfield construction in Wewak and But. Between April and June 1943, the troops worked on an airfield in Dagua, constructing roads from Dagua on the coast, to Maprik which was inland. Between July and September 1943, the regiment came back to Wewak to engage in airfield construction again.

The Tamura diary mentions that the Wewak area was bombed during the period of airfield construction, but the bombing was restricted to a single bomber at night, while Allied reconnaissance planes flew over the area during the day. So, although the construction work was delayed, it did continue, and eventually the airfields were completed. According to the Australian Official History, by August 1943, the 6th Air Division of the Japanese army, with five fighter and three bomber groups, totalling 324 aircraft, was established at Wewak. The 7th Air Division with a total of 156 aircraft was also established at But, some kilometres west of Wewak. At this stage, Japan was aiming to regain the balance of air power and making plans to bomb Port Moresby and other areas.

However, Japan’s prospects were completely dashed on 17 August 1943. Allied forces became aware of the concentration of aircraft in the area and decided to attack them.
On 17 and 18 August Allied aircraft bombed four Japanese airfields in the Wewak area intensively and the Japanese army lost about 100 planes, including light bombers, fighters and reconnaissance planes. (See chapter 3 of this volume for details of these attacks.) From October 1943 to February 1944, the regiment was mobilised to go to Madang under Commander Nakai to participate in the Finisterrre and Saidor campaigns. In March and April 1944 the regiment was under the 41st Division at Madang.

In his memoir, Nyuginia-sen tsuioku ki (Memoir of the New Guinea campaign) (Tokyo, 1982), Hoshino Kazuo, who was a staff officer of the 41st Division, wrote that by the end of the war only 600 troops of the 41st Division survived out of an original strength of 20,000 men. He also wrote that, of the 200,000 Japanese troops who were sent to east and central New Guinea, only 10,000 were alive at the end of the war. Thus, the rate of attrition was extremely high, particularly towards the end of the war, due not only to the desperate battles the Japanese fought, but also to the disease and starvation the soldiers suffered during their retreat.

Extracts from the diary

The diary starts with the following entry. The exact date is not known, but it is most likely that the entry was recorded in early March 1943, about two months after the landing in Wewak. The writing shows that the diarist’s reference point at this stage was firmly fixed in Japan, as he contrasts the unfamiliar scenery and nature with those back in Japan.

When I hear birds of paradise sing, I remember cuckoos back in Japan. They live among tropical coconut trees. I don’t know what they are saying, but they make very weird cries that sound like “keukoh, kio, keukoh, kio”.

A mate of mine received a letter from home and he showed me a copy of a newspaper dated the end of January. Nothing seemed to have changed at home. It also contained an article about the front line in New Guinea. Who could know that I am in New Guinea now?

The climate here is similar to that of mid-August in Japan. Yet, there are so many noxious insects, and the mosquitoes in particular are a real nuisance. Since many of us are sick and do not feel well, our fighting spirit seems to be low.

Tamura was a keen letter writer and he yearned for letters from home. At the back of his pocketbook he recorded details of letters sent and received. He also copied some of the letters into his pocketbook. In this section, copies of three letters are included. The first letter
was sent from Palau to his younger brother. In this letter, Tamura was in high spirits and wanted to tell his younger brother about the adventure he had embarked on in the tropics. Palau was still peaceful around that time. Hoshino, a staff officer of the 41st Division, wrote in his memoir that he enjoyed coffee and cream soda at a tea room, and a full-course dinner with ice cream dessert at a hotel on the island. Hoshino also purchased accessories made out of turtle shell as souvenirs for Japan. Of course, those souvenirs were never taken back to Japan.

A letter 12 February

How are you? Are you working hard? I wonder if you are shivering in the cold weather. If you are, why don’t you come over here? You wouldn’t want to stay long because it’s too hot. How have you been back home? I am well. I swam in the sea on Emperor’s Day.

I would like to send you lots of coconuts through my dreams. So many that you could eat as much as you wanted and still not finish. I wonder if they will arrive home safely. You will be able to keep them in a basket by your bedside.

I will write to you about interesting things later.

To my dear young brother. From your older brother.

Tamura wrote a lot about his work in the Wewak area. His unit was engaged in airfield construction – work that was hard and monotonous. The following poems describe the work and his feelings about it. The only break the troops could enjoy from their labour was during the air raids.

Under the blazing sun,
Soldiers construct airfields
With sweat and without words.

The construction work progresses day by day.
The adjutant officer comes for inspection today as well.

We sit down by the shore, wiping sweat from our face
And look across the sea, waiting for letters from home.

On branches of coconut trees,
Birds of paradise sing.
Gradually the day is getting light.

田村は筆まてで、故郷からの手紙を心待ちにしていた。手帳には、手紙を誰に送り、誰から受け取ったかが記録されていた。何通かの手紙を手帳に書き写していた。ここに記録した手紙は、彼男弟にパラオから出した手紙を書いてある。この頃、田村はまだまだ土気が高く、熱帯で始まった冒険を弟に知らせなかったようだ。この時パラオは平和で、同時間に島に到着した第41師団参謀の星野一雄も、喫茶店でコーヒーとクリームソーダを飲み、島のホテルではフルコースを楽しみ、デザートにはアイスクリームを食べていたと書いている。星野はまた、日本の一部土産にペット用のアクセサリーを買ったり、もちろん、これらの土産物を持ち帰ることはなかった。

一信 [ママ] 二月十二日

どう元気で奮闘中か、寒いと震えているのと違うか、もしそうだったらこちらに来給度。一度で度って逃げ出すから、あれから内地も変わっちゃいませんか。兄も元気です。紀元節には海水浴でした。

夢で御子の実をたくさん送って上げましょう。どんなに食べても余る程、無事とどうかどうかね、社元にかごでも置いてねる様に。

またその中、珍しいことを知らせましょう。

兄より。弟に。
Air raids become so frequent that
We look forward to them on a quiet day
In order to have some rest from our work.
Cicadas are singing and leaves are falling.
It feels like autumn.
But when we see fresh green leaves,
We think of spring.

During his trip to the inland, Tamura and his colleagues met the local people in the area. For Tamura, the way they spoke, dressed and behaved was completely foreign. However, as we shall read in the following two pieces, he communicated with them and bought tropical fruits from them. He was impressed with the innocence of the local children. He found it amusing that the locals found the Japanese as curious as the soldiers found them. It is clear that he appreciated the differences and managed to see the local people as human beings.

**Natives**

They speak fast in a foreign language. The soldiers listen to the language earnestly in order to understand it.

We've got it. They've come to exchange goods.

In little string bags, they each carried about twenty bananas and papayas in order to exchange them with the goods the soldiers have.

They wear loincloths, but the rest of their bodies are naked. The way they live seems to be primitive.

I gave twenty sen for two bananas. These are the first bananas I have had in New Guinea. They tasted very, very sweet. The size of the fruit was as big as my arm or even bigger. They were astonishingly large.

I dreamed that we could eat as much fruit as we liked, but so far only two. Yet, I enjoyed my first taste of bananas in this place.

Natives 4 May

When I saw real naked natives for the first time, I felt frightened. But they did not do any harm. They were very well hung, and proudly decorated their hair.

Bananas were purchased from the locals. New Guinea did not possess the abundance of fruit Tamura had expected to find in the tropics.
with bird feathers. It was a surprise for me to see the way they showed off their
decoration.

When we reached our destination in the late afternoon, we rested by the regi-
mental barracks. Forty to fifty natives came, and they were all naked. Some were
carrying thick ropes and bush knives. A few were wearing crosses on their chests.
Furthermore, about half of them were completely naked.

The soldiers stared at them strangely. The natives were also staring at the sol-
diers intently. They went around the building about twice and disappeared. When
I asked other soldiers who had been here previously about them, they told us
that the natives came to have a look at us. To them, the soldiers looked very
weird. Probably, we looked very foreign to them.

I asked for bananas in the mountains. They seemed to be saying that they did not
have bananas at the moment. I felt I understood their language a little bit. Com-
pared with Chinese people, the native children did not have any traces of gloom-
iness and looked so innocent, as if they were blessed by God. They seemed to
regard the soldiers as a peculiar group. They were not frightened and did not cry
although we were still new to them.

Deaths inevitably occurred around Tamura while he was in Wewak. As the type of war he
was involved in was not direct bloody combat on the ground, the sudden disappearance of
his war comrades hit him hard. The following section expresses his feeling of loss.

A few days ago, my friend was killed by enemy shells in this bay. However, the
bay with its white waves does not look any different. There are a few drums
floating away from boats. The landscape of the headland is as lush as before.
Boats are moored to the wharf as before. But I feel so devastated!

He left us after a work session, sending his regards to other members of our
section. The next morning, this friend could not be found anywhere and now he
is at the bottom of the sea after an attack by enemy planes. What an unfortunate
fate he had.

But it is no use lamenting. We hope he is in a peaceful slumber and becomes a
god protecting the nation. At his grave, I prayed for my dead friend’s peaceful
repose.
Tamura records his feelings extensively in his diary and some of the entries reflect the ups and downs of his and his comrades’ spirits.

The first section expresses the mixed feeling soldiers had. The words probably come from a song that may have been sung by his friends in the unit during the early stages of the campaign. They show both the heightened spirit of adventure in a faraway land, and homesickness.

1 April

From the top of the hill with its fresh green grass
I gaze towards the ocean horizon.
Across the Pacific, across the Japan Current,
From far away, a boat is coming with might and courage
With letters from our homeland.

Sitting in the shade of a coconut tree
Looking across the sky above the ocean waves
Thinking about home from New Guinea.
With the heat, it hurts to realise
How far this place is from home.

The soldiers’ spirits were affected by various factors, such as illness and difficult living conditions. In addition, the unreasonable authority exercised by their superiors also influenced the level of morale. The following two sections demonstrate the problems the troops faced in maintaining high morale in the face of illness and hunger.

We are generally in bad shape. In spite of our superior’s words, our fighting spirit has been in decline.

It might be to do with working too hard or malnutrition. No, no. It was not like this at the beginning. Military life is never exciting, but the current situation is not at all rewarding.

The duty of a soldier is to carry out his tasks without complaining. Yet, somebody who does not have any worth as a person can throw his weight around just because he has the senior rank.

Diary 27 May

The fine rain was falling continuously even though the moonlight was bright.
was awoken by the sound of a plane engine. The dawn had come. I felt relieved that I could sleep through the night after I had recovered my health.

Compared with malaria in central China, I have heard this illness is more difficult to treat. Yet, I might be able to recover quickly. I stayed behind in the camp after my colleagues left for work, and spent my time looking after the firearms. Soldiers cannot help looking after their arms.

Our company leader is also in hospital. The number of patients exceeds expectations.

While Japan should be enjoying the season of fresh green leaves, the weather here is getting worse. The ceiling of the tent is leaking and makes us feel very uncomfortable.

I yearn for letters from home. Everybody feels the same here. I thought of home and wrote two letters to my friends.

Epilogue

The AJRP received a request from NHK, the Japanese national broadcaster, concerning final letters and diaries belonging to former Japanese soldiers, about a year after this essay appeared on the Project's web site. The Tamura diary was subsequently made known to NHK. Coincidentally, a request for information about the Tamura diary arrived from Jiji Press at around the same time. Articles about the diary appeared in various newspapers around Japan, and the NHK documentary, titled Last words, aired on 15 August 2003.

As a result of investigations with various institutions, Tamura’s family was located in Oyama City in Tochigi Prefecture. The head of the family in which Tamura Yoshikazu had been born and raised was now his younger brother, Sadanobu. His younger sisters were also alive and in good health. According to the notification of death received by the family, Yoshikazu had been “killed in battle in March 1944 at Bilian, New Guinea”. Bilian was near Cape Gunbi, where Allied troops had landed in January 1944, and was the site of fierce fighting between the two forces.

None of Tamura’s personal effects had returned from New Guinea. The diary is his only legacy. The Australian War Memorial decided to return the diary in accord with the deepest wishes of the family. It is at last possible for Tamura Yoshikazu, along with the diary, to finally return home to his waiting family sixty years after passing away.
Chapter 6

“Yet they’re human just as we are”
Australian attitudes to the Japanese

Mark Johnston
In December 1942, an Australian private, a veteran of recent fighting at Sanananda and of the Libyan and Greek campaigns, wrote some thoughts about the enemies he had faced:

My regard for Tony [the Italian] was always impersonal and for Fritz ... tinged with admiration, but none of us know anything but vindictive hatred for the Jap.

Australian soldiers felt an animosity towards the Japanese that they generally didn’t have towards their European enemies.

In action the hostility expressed itself in Australians’ greater enthusiasm for killing Japanese. “If an Italian or German were running away, one might let him go,” wrote Jo Gullett, “but never a Japanese.” Whereas in the Middle East Australian commanders had struggled to awaken fully a “killing instinct” in their men, the Japanese brought out that instinct.

An official wartime publication described how at Wau, fifty Japanese were “hunted down and exterminated”. The concepts of “hunting” and “exterminating” capture the mood of the time, which was not one of trying to bring an essentially like-minded foe to accept defeat by the rules of war, but one of seeking to annihilate an alien enemy. The killing of unarmed, sleeping, sick or wounded Japanese was common. Although official pressure was put on troops to take prisoners, the Australian front-line soldiers, like their American counterparts, had little desire to do so.

Japanese dead were not considered in the same light as German or Italian dead. War correspondent Frank Legg, who had been a member of the 2/48th Battalion at Alamein noted while first reporting 9th Division fighting against the Japanese that, whereas the common practice had been to bury each other’s dead in North Africa, here there was a “strange callousness”. For example, a Japanese who lay dead on a track on the Huon Peninsula had a bullet hole between his eyes and a note pinned to him which read “Don’t bury this bastard, it’s the best shot you’ll ever see.”

1942年12月、先にリピヤとギリシアでの作戦に従事し、最近サナナンダでの戦闘を経験したオーストラリアの二等兵が、彼が遭遇した敵について次のような所感を書いている。

私はトニー [イタリア人] には尊敬の念を感じないが、フリッツ [ドイツ人] には…いささか尊敬の念を抱いている。しかし、日本人について我々は皆憎い憎しみしか感じない。

オーストラリア兵は、ヨーロッパの敵には普通抱かない敵意を日本人に抱いていた。日本人に対する憎悪は、戦場では鮮明な形で現われた。つまりオーストラリア兵は、日本兵を殺すことに満足感があったのである。「もし、イタリア兵かドイツ兵が逃走するなら、見逃してやるかもしれないが、日本兵には決してそんなことはない」とジョー・ガレットは書いている。中東ではオーストラリア兵の殺戮本能を呼び覚ますのに苦労した豪軍の軍飼官も、日本兵との戦闘では、容易に兵からその本能を引き出すことが出来た。

ラワでいかな50人の日本兵が「追い詰められ、皆殺しにされた」かを戦中の公式記録が記録している。「追い詰められた」と「絶滅の念」が、その時代の空気を支配していた。この観念は、基本的には同じ心を持った敵を戦争のルールによって殺すというものではなく、異質な敵の絶滅を求めるものであった。日本兵なら、非武装であっても、就眠中であっても、また病気で臥せていたり、負傷していても、殺すことが日常的であった。拘束にすることが公式には求められたが、前線のオーストラリア兵は、前線のアメリカ兵同様、ほとんどそうしようとしなかった。

日本兵の死者は、ドイツ兵やイタリア兵の死者と同じようにみなされなかった。フランク・レッグは、アラマンの豪軍2/48大隊の兵士で、後に太平洋地区の従軍記者になった。彼は、日本軍と交戦する豪軍2/48大隊について報告したが、北アフリカでは互いの戦死者を埋葬するのが普通の習慣であったが、ここでは「奇妙な寛容さ」があると記録している。例えば、フォン・スバーラの小部隊が抑えられた日本人戦死者には、両眼の間に銃弾の跡があり、「この野郎を埋めろな」君が今まで見た最高の射撃の技だそうだ」と書かれた紙切れがビンで留めてあった。
Let’s examine briefly the sources of this contempt and hatred. Most obvious was that the Japanese were a far more pressing threat to Australia itself than were the European enemies. Tied to the awareness of the threat the war now posed to their homeland, was a hatred for those who menaced it. Early in 1943, General Blamey tried to stir up hatred of the Japanese in veterans of the recent campaign by emphasizing that the Australians were fighting to prevent the deaths of their families and the end of civilisation. The Japanese forces which advanced along the Kokoda Trail were described by the historian and second-in-command of the 2/14th Battalion as “cocksure hordes” seeking “to glut their lust and savagery in the blood of a conquered white nation”. If fear of invasion was one source of hatred, racial animosity was a second.

The Australians who fought in the Second World War had grown up in an era when assertions of racial superiority were far more acceptable than today. In 1941, Prime Minister Curtin had justified Australia’s entry into the war against Japan in terms of the nation’s commitment to maintaining the “principle of a White Australia”.

White superiority had been challenged by the outcome of other campaigns earlier in the year. The racism of Australians who had scoffed at the Japanese in 1941 had to be redefined in the light of defeats in Malaya, Singapore, Java, Timor, Ambon and New Britain.

These Japanese successes added a hysterical edge to the racial hatred against them. An image of the Japanese as a “superman” or “super soldier” grew up. This conception was fairly persistent, but not the majority view after 1942. The feeble physical condition of many Japanese encountered in campaigns after 1942 heightened racial contempt for them.

A far more common image than that of superman was that of a creature less than a man. Jo Gullett concludes from his experience in the 2/6th Battalion, “[The Japanese] were like clever animals with certain human characteristics, but by no means the full range, and that is how we thought of them – as animals.” Senior officers encouraged this attitude. General Blamey told troops at Port Moresby in 1942 that the Japanese was “a subhuman beast”, and at the beginning of the following year he informed soldiers that the Japanese were “a curious race – a cross between the human being and the ape”.

This idea helped Australians to account for Japanese success in the early campaigns, because it explained Japanese adaptability to primitive conditions. It also excused murderous treatment of them. A normally very humane veteran of the desert, Private
John Butler, wrote of his first brush with the Japanese: “Out foraging this morning I came across the head of a good Jap – for he was dead – like a damned baboon he was; this is not murder killing such repulsive looking animals.”

Some of the language used by Australians is disturbingly reminiscent of Nazi race propaganda. In most respects Nazism was repugnant to Butler and his comrades. However, the same racist disdain appears in American writings of the time, and there is no doubt that on this issue many otherwise compassionate western soldiers maintained attitudes towards the Japanese which today seem insupportable. This was a racist age. The Japanese themselves also harboured racist attitudes towards whites.

Moreover, we mustn’t exaggerate the importance of racism in Australians’ hatred for the Japanese during the war. When the Australian government launched an intense hate campaign in March – April 1942, the *Sydney Morning Herald* argued that Australians needed no stimulus to fight the Japanese aggressor, and certainly not “a torrent of cheap abuse and futile efforts in emulation of ... Goebbels”. The propaganda campaign was opposed by 54 per cent of Australians surveyed in a Gallup Poll on the issue.

Moreover, the peculiar circumstances in which Australian front-line soldiers served gave them reasons to temper their racism, or at least suppress it occasionally. Realism was important. While Australian training staff did not want their soldiers to feel inferior to the Japanese – a real danger in the early years – they did want them to be level-headed about his strengths. Propagandist notions are dangerous when formulating tactics. On the battlefield, being realistic about the enemy’s capacities was a matter of life and death.

It was probably observation and experience, rather than propaganda, that heightened the hatred Australian front-line soldiers felt for the Japanese. Racist prejudices, and even the threat to Australia, did not goad Australian soldiers in the same way personal experience or reports from other front-line soldiers did. Many Australians who campaigned against the Japanese considered their opponent evil, detestable, underhanded and frightening in his methods.

At the jungle training school at Canungra, recruits were told that the Japanese was “a cunning little rat”, who was “full of little ruses and tricks”. Australians were so unwilling to take Japanese prisoners largely because of distrust born of bad experiences with Japanese offering surrender and then acting as human bombs by detonating concealed explosives. The fact that Australian wounded, and the stretcher bearers who carried

日本の弱々しい肉体を頻繁に目撃するようになり、日本人に対する人種差別的軽蔑感を高めていったからである。

「超人」のイメージよりももっと一般的であったのは、日本人を人間以下の生き物とみなすことです。ジョン・ガレットは第26師団での彼の経験から、「（日本人は）人間的でなく、野蛮で野蛮であるような存在がある」、とても方全ではない、そうして、これが彼らについて我々が思っていることなのだ。即ち、彼らは野蛮である。」

と結論している。高級将校は、オーストラリア軍がこの認識を持とうと意図した。1942年、プレミー将軍はポールマレスピで部隊の兵士に前、日本人は「人間以下」の野蛮であると語り、翌年の初めには、兵士たちに日本人は「奇妙な種族、人間と猿の種族」であると告げている。

オーストラリア人にとってこの考え方は、日本人が初期の作戦で勝利したことを説明するのに好都合だった。つまりこの考え方が、日本人の原始的な環境への適応力を説明したことからである。それはまた、彼らを残恥に取り扱うことへの言い訳にもなった。

砂漠の戦争の体験者であり、普段はたいへん人情味のあるジョン・バトラー等兵は、初めて日本兵に遭遇した時のことを次のように書いている。「今朝、食料採集に出た時、一奴はすでにいたんだがいまいみんなとヒヒのような日本兵の首に出わした。こんなにおごおしい猟物の動物を殺すのは殺人でも何でもないんだ。」

オーストラリア人が使った言葉の幾つかには、驚くべきことに、ナチの人種差別宣伝を思わせる響きがある。バトラーと彼の戦友にとっては、ナチズムはほとんどの点で嫌悪すべきものであった。しかし、同様の人種差別的軽蔑は、当時のアメリカ人がその信仰を現しており、別の面で憎じ深い西洋の兵士もこの問題に関しては、日本人に対して今日とても容認されない態度を保っていたのである。既に述べたように、当時は人種差別の時代であり、日本人もまた白人に対して人種差別の態度を示していた。

しかし、我々は戦時における対日人種差別主義の重要性を、あまりに強調してはいけない。1942年の5月から4月にかけて、オーストラリア政府は、排日感情を煽る運動を展開した。この時、シドニー・モーニング・ヘラルド総説は、オーストラリア人は日本の侵略者と戦うために己の刺激を必要としないし、失われぎり回る安楽とゲッベルズと張り合い合うという無駄な努力は無理に必要としない、と論説している。この問題に関するシャツプ調査によると54%のオーストラリア人が誹謗運動に反対している。

日本兵との対決、というオーストラリア兵が直面する生死に関わる現実は、戦闘中の日本人に対する人種差別的考慮を緩めたかもしれない。しかし、こうした現実はまた、日本人に対する憎悪の性格と激しさを決定付ける要因となった。兵士たちの間では、
them, could expect no immunity from enemy fire was a major source of criticism, as was Japanese bombing of medical facilities. Thus a medical officer wrote about a tent "ward" attacked by enemy aircraft in Papua:

When the smoke cleared the twelve [patients] were still in the tents, but each one was dead – killed by the deliberate sub-human fury of Tojo's men.

It's hard to know how much Australians in New Guinea knew of the atrocities against their compatriots in the early 1942 campaigns, but it appears that it wasn't much, and that such information did not inflame hatred as much as it might have. Stories about New Britain became widely distributed, and well-informed Australians knew of Japanese excesses against the Chinese. However, the Australian wartime government, like the British and American, was unwilling to publicise material about atrocities, for fear of worsening the conditions of prisoners.

Australians in New Guinea had the pressing relevance of the issue of brutality brought home to them by the many Japanese atrocities at Milne Bay. Here is one example of the impact of these atrocities: At the sight of Allied men who had been bayoneted to a slow death at Milne Bay, a Tobruk veteran who had been sceptical of stories of Japanese atrocities, said his "hatred rose to boiling point and I cursed those cruel, yellow cowardly curs of hell".

The atrocities continued throughout the war. In March 1945, for example, a signalman on Bougainville reported that Australian provosts caught in a jeep by Japanese had been tied to their vehicle and set alight. During the Aitape–Wewak campaign, the corpse of a member of the 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion was found "badly mutilated, disembowelled, the left leg was missing from the hip, as well as portions of the right leg, and the hips had all flesh removed". This was an atrocity of a type that horrified Australians and occurred also in the Papuan campaign: namely cannibalism.

Of course such sights created intense hostility towards the perpetrators. An officer whose battalion had suffered such casualties in the Aitape–Wewak area in 1945 argued: "The frequent evidence of Japanese atrocities had a remarkable effect on the troops. It developed a feeling of disgust that caused men to enter battle with a greater determination to eliminate the enemy." An astute regimental historian says that not propaganda stories, but the physical evidence of Japanese atrocities was crucial in making Australians hate the Japanese in a way they had not hated Italians and Germans. This is a crucial point in
understanding Australian attitudes towards the Japanese.

The “feeling of disgust” about atrocities also explains much of the unusually murderous behaviour of Australians. As early as the Milne Bay battle, Brigadier Field wrote in his diary: “The yellow devils show no mercy and have since had none from us.”

The lack of prisoners taken by Australians owed much to resentment of atrocities. The circumstances of jungle warfare also militated against the taking of Japanese prisoners. The fact that in the Kokoda campaign both sides took virtually no prisoners partly reflects the problems of getting prisoners of war back over extraordinarily difficult terrain. Because enemies were hidden and ambush was a constant possibility in the jungle, there were few opportunities for the niceties of asking for surrender – one had to shoot first and ask questions later. This logic of jungle warfare was conducive to hatred of the enemy who, like oneself, could not afford to be chivalrous.

The mud, the decomposing vegetation, the pouring rain, the humidity and the eerie sounds of the jungle also contributed to the hatred of the enemy with whom this place was identified. It was a place where soldiers fought in small groups, in isolation. The frightening enemy, with his apparent enthusiasm for death, and the menacing environment in which he was encountered made for a personal hatred for the Japanese that was peculiar to the soldiers who faced him.

Despite the hatred, Australians were often impressed by certain martial abilities of Japanese soldiers. They respected their fieldcraft, their ability to ambush, and their resilience and tenacity. As an Australian at Sanamanda put it: “He is a tough nut to crack, this so often despised little yellow chap.”

Australians frequently wrote with grudging admiration about the defensive positions created by their enemy. The 22nd Battalion history, for example, says of ground near Finschhafen:

> It was obvious that this was Jap country. Along either side of the track were many weapon pits cleverly sited and expertly dug. They were exactly circular, as if marked out by compass with the sides plumb vertical. And they were finished to perfection with clever camouflage to an extent that they were quite unnoticeable until one had come abreast of them.

The idea of the Japanese super soldier was quite prevalent in the months after Japan’s
entry into the war. Defeat of the Japanese at Milne Bay and on the Kokoda Trail damaged this image, but the super soldier conception was a resilient one. Even in 1945, the Canungra Training Syllabus laid down that, on Day 2, recruits should be told that the concept of the Japanese “super soldier” was a myth. Like all armies, the Japanese had units of varying strength, experience, and ability, but the differences in quality between its soldiers were perhaps more striking than those in any other army faced by the Australians. Particularly apparent was the difference in quality between the Japanese faced by Australians in 1942, on the one hand, and those faced afterwards.

In March 1945, a lieutenant of the 2/3rd Battalion pointed out that the soldiers they were facing this time were not in the same class as the men they had faced in the Owen Stanleys—and for good reason, as this enemy was out of communication with Tokyo and had little or no food. Aspects of Japanese performance that were criticised in New Guinea included poor marksmanship, poor weapons, their tendency to be incautious, especially by chattering or laughing loudly near the front, their naivety in attack, their tactical inflexibility and their tendency towards needless self-sacrifice.

Even the do-or-die courage of Japanese soldiers did not necessarily raise the military prowess of Japanese in Australian eyes. The Japanese willingness to die appeared

A curious Australian officer approaches one of the first Japanese to be captured in New Guinea, November 1942. Few prisoners were taken by either side.
bizarre to many Australians. Let me give you one example. A Japanese prisoner near Aitape "wept with frustration and humiliation" when his Australian captors would not shoot him, even though he bared his chest to them hopefully. Instead the Australians said: "Wake up to yourself you stupid bastard, you don’t know when you’re well off!" The Japanese attitude was incomprehensible. Their bravery in action often seemed like fanaticism or madness rather than traditional military heroism.

Naturally, many veterans of the Middle East compared the Japanese with their European enemies. “As a fighter, the Jap might be a little better than the Italian,” a 9th Division infantryman conceded in October 1943, "but he can’t compare with the Jer.” On the other hand, an Australian who had been with the 6th Division in Greece said after fighting at Kokoda and Sanananda, “I think Nip a better fighter than Fritz”. This may have been a common attitude among 6th and 7th Division veterans of the Middle East who fought the Japanese in 1942. At Canungra recruits were told that “the Jap is NOT like the German whom we have become accustomed to fighting. He is NOT as good a soldier”.

When Australians discussed their defeats at Japanese hands in 1942 they complained about numerical inferiority and lack of air support. Their defeats were explained by factors external to their soldiering ability. Paradoxically, Australians’ victories later in the war tended to be explained by their own soldiering abilities, while external factors such as their numerical preponderance, aerial superiority and the lack of supplies available to the Japanese tended to be forgotten.

Even when Australians felt contempt for the Japanese, in battle he was treated with great caution. There was a terrible grimness about the campaigns against him in New Guinea. The fear of falling, dead or alive into Japanese hands ensured this.

In March 1945 an artilleryman in action on New Britain wrote in a letter home:

When you stop to think war is a pretty rotten business, here we are throwing shells at the Japs hoping they blow them to bits and although we call them little yellow – ! yet they’re human just as we are.

It was unusual for Australians to write in such a detached manner about the Japanese, however, detachment and even sympathy were occasionally evident. Dower’s suggestion that Allied soldiers had images of Japanese as superhuman, subhuman and inhuman, but not as humans like themselves is not entirely accurate. Sometimes Australians showed

いかなる軍隊よりも甚だしかった。特に顕著なのは、オーストラリア兵が1942年に交戦した日本兵と、その後交戦した日本兵の資質の差異である。

1945年3月、豪第2/3大隊のある中尉は、今回彼らが遭遇した日本兵たちは、彼らがオーストラリア兵を含めた交戦した兵士たちにはまるか劣るが、それでもそのはず。この点は東京との通信が途絶え、ほとんどが、或いは全く食料がないのだからと指摘している。さらに、ニュージニアでの日本兵の戦い振りは、次のような点で批判された。下手な射撃術、劣たる武器、前線近くで大声でしゃべったり笑ったりする不注意な性向、攻撃の単純さ、戦術における柔軟性の無さ、不必要な自己犠牲を払う性向などの問題点である。

つまり、オーストラリア軍の目的は、日本の兵の覚悟を悟らせた勇気も、日本兵の戦力を必ずしも高めていないと見たのである。喜んで死んでいこうとする日本人の態度も、多くのオーストラリア兵には奇妙に思えた。一つの例を挙げると、アイタベ近くで捕虜になった日本兵は、撃ってくれるように願って胸をだけだが、オーストラリア兵の捕虜者が撃たなかったので、「悔しさと屈辱感で泣いた」という。代わりに、オーストラリア兵は、「目を覚ませ、このおれは野郎。おまえは今どれほど恥ずかしいのかも分からない」と言っていたそうだ。日本人の態度は理解し難かった。彼らの戦場での勇気は、伝統的な軍人の英雄的行為というよりも、しばしば狂気的行為、或いは狂気と見られた。

中東での戦闘を経験した兵の多くが、自然と日本兵とヨーロッパの敵を比較した。「戦士としては日本人はイタリア人よりも少し優れている」と豪第9師団のある歩兵は認めるが、「ジェリー（読者訳：ドイツ人）たちは白雪物にならない」と述べている。一方、ギリシアで豪第9師団に所属したあるオーストラリア兵は、コソボとササハで日本軍と戦った後、「日本兵はフリッツより優れた戦士だと思う」と述べており、先に豪第6・第7師団で中東の戦争に加わった兵で、1942年に日本兵と戦った者の共通の感想だったのかもしれない。カナダの訓練校では、「ジャンプは我々が奪ったドイツ兵とは異なる。奴らはそれほど優れた兵士ではない」と訓練兵は教わった。

1942年代の対日戦の敗北を論じる時、オーストラリア兵はいつも敵国の劣勢と航空支援の欠如を嘆いた。彼らの敗北は、自分たちの戦闘技能とは関係のない外的要因で説明された。不利益なことは、後の戦闘の勝利は彼ら自身の戦闘技能によって説明される傾向もあり、数値の劣勢、制空権の優位、日本軍の物資の欠如といった外的要因は忘れ去られる傾向にあった。

日本兵を取るべき相手を見失っていた時でさえも、実際の戦闘では、オーストラ
empathy with the enemy, saying they knew what it was like to have dysentery as the Japanese did, imagining his discomfort under Australian gunfire, picturing his reaction as an amphibious invading force came towards him or saying, in the Aitape–Wewak region, that living there for three years as the Japanese had done would be "pure hell".

Moreover, the murderous treatment meted out to Japanese prisoners was not morally acceptable to all. As an example, Captain J.J. May was responsible for the loading of wounded men onto air transports from the Wau airfield during the heavy fighting there in January 1943. He was approached one day to make room for six Japanese prisoners who would soon arrive, bound together, and who were to be taken to Port Moresby for questioning, but they did not come at the expected time. Captain May wrote:

A soldier appeared with his rifle slung over his shoulder and looking at the ground told me that they would not be coming. I blew off what the bloody hell do you mean you ask us to make room for you and now don't want it. One could sense something was wrong and it very shamefacedly came out, they had been killed, a soldier had opened up on them with a Tommy gun and shot the lot. The boys and I were pretty aghast at this and we said they had been tied up, the poor messenger was also rather stricken and tried to explain how it happened. A soldier that opened up had his mate killed alongside him during the night. It some-

1945年3月、ニューギリバーで戦闘中に死んだ日本の兵士が銃撃手に次のように書いた。

あなた方が戦争は本当にわからないんだ、とじっくり考えている時、ここで我々は日本兵を穏やかにすることを願うのだから、彼らに銃弾を撃つものでない。

そして、我々は彼らを小さな黄色人と呼ぶが、しかし、彼らも同じ人間だ。

オーストラリア人が、このように冷静に日本人について書くことは珍しい。しかし、冷静な観点や同情心さえも、時にはオーストラリア人の意識に現れた。連合国軍の兵士は、日本人を自分たちと同じような人間ではなく、超人、または人間以下、非人間的とし、冷然としていた。しかし、この日本人は完全に正確であるとはいえない。時には、オーストラリア人も敵同様に感じていた。彼らは、日本人と同じように、自分たちも戦うことがどんなに有利かを知っていると言ったり、豪華な鉄火にさらされた日本兵の不安を想像したり、上陸隊が日本兵に向かっていく時の日本兵の反応を思い浮かべたり、また、日本兵がしたように、ジャングルに3年間過ごすことがまったく地獄にいるようなものだ、とアイル・ウェールズ地区で言ってみたり、とオーストラリア人が日本兵に同情心を示した事例もあるのだ。

さらに、日本兵捕虜を残敵に取扱うこと、道義上すべてのオーストラリア人に受け入れられるものではなかった。一例を挙げよう。1943年1月のWuで激しい戦闘の中、Wu飛行場から負傷兵を移送する飛行機の搭乗手配の担当であったある日、彼と一緒に捕虜の6人の日本人捕虜が間もなく来るので、飛行機の席を取っておくよう指示された。日本人捕虜は尋問のために、ポートモレスビーへ移送されることになっていた。しかし、彼らは予定の時間に来なかった。結局、次のような結末であった。そこで、メイ大尉の言葉を引用しよう。

[第5章]「しかし、彼らも同じ人間だ」— オーストラリア兵の日本兵捕虜
how cast a dark shadow over us including the poor B who had to tell us.

So, some conceived of Japanese as fellow men, and believed that killing them was, at times, immoral.

Those who did the killing also had their emotions tested. An Australian who had just killed a walking Japanese skeleton at Sanananda described him as a “rather poor specimen of humanity”. Even such grudging admissions did acknowledge the humanity of this enemy, and soldiers who killed Japanese tended to think more than usual about this point. Captain May reported a conversation with a wounded sergeant who had been on patrol near Wau when confronted by a Japanese officer wielding a sword. In a tone that made clear his regret, the sergeant told May, “I think he must have been an M.O. or something and I had to shoot the poor bastard.”

Occasionally when Australians examined corpses they saw evidence of the civilian side of their enemy. Fearnside writes of an incident in New Guinea in 1945 where his platoon ambushed and killed a lone, emaciated Japanese soldier. He says that although they were immune to compunction about such homicidal acts, searching the body brought a haunting emotional impact. They found two objects. One was a rudimentary map of Australia. The other was a faded photograph of a beautiful Japanese girl. Such images brought home the fact that the enemy too had a civilian, peaceful background.

However, such fellow feeling could vanish under the pressure of events. Thus one day in January 1945 a 6th Division infantryman wrote in his diary about how his unit had fed prisoners and protected them from angry natives. The day after, and immediately after an ambush of his unit he wrote: “What little pity one had for the animal cravens we had here as prisoners yesterday has now vanished.” In jungle warfare there was not much scope for compassion.

One particular story illustrates a different view. It concerns an Australian NCO, Steve Sullivan, who took some men to look around the battlefield of Slater’s Knoll, Bougainville, during the fighting there in March 1945. They found a wounded Japanese, and several of the men suggested to Sullivan that they kill him. Sullivan objected. “I knew all about the Japs and their treatment of prisoners”, he recalls, “but to my mind that is not good enough reason to kill a man in cold blood. We are not Japs.” He couldn’t do what he identified as a Japanese thing to do, that is kill a defenceless human being. Yet it was also an Australian thing to do against Japanese in this war. The fact that we were not Japs...
prevented Sullivan from killing the man. For other Australians, this difference was precisely what justified killing them – they’re not like us in their behaviour and their appearance, so we can kill them. Ironically, in their brutal treatment of each other, Australians and Japanese had something in common.

As the previous anecdote suggests, it’s difficult to generalise about Australian soldiers’ attitudes. However, one can’t help but make grim conclusions as to their feelings about their Japanese counterpart. Their evaluations of his martial prowess varied, but they usually feared him and almost invariably hated him. They were passionate in their willingness to kill him.

でも、奴等の捕虜に対する待遇についても全部知っていたが、私の考えではそれは、一人の人間を冷酷に殺す十分な理由ではない。我々は日本人ではないのだから」と彼は当時の事件を回想している。サリバンは、日本人のすることと彼が認める行為、即ち、無防備の人間を殺すことができなかった。しかしこの戦争では、それはオーストラリア兵が日本兵にする行為でもあった。我々は日本人ではないという事実によって、サリバンはその日本兵を殺さなかった。しかし、他のオーストラリア人にとっては、この事実こそが日本兵を殺す正当な理由になったのである。奴等は行動も容儀も自分たちと同じでない。だから、奴等を殺してもいいのだ。こう彼らは考えた。皮肉にも、互いに対する残酷行為において、オーストラリア人と日本人には共通点があったのである。

この逸話が示すように、オーストラリア兵の日本人観を一般化することは難しい。しかし、日本兵に対する彼らの感情については、厳しい結論を出さざるをえない。日本兵の戦闘能力については彼らの評価も様々であるが、彼らは大抵は日本兵を恐れたし、ほとんどいつも憎んでいた。その結果、彼らは日本兵を殺すことに情熱をたぎらせたのだ。

吉田晴紀訳
Chapter 7

Japanese forces in post-surrender Rabaul

Tanaka Hiromi
Japanese forces in post-surrender Rabaul

The large theatre of the Pacific War included many battlefields similar to Rabaul, where Japanese soldiers were left behind on islands and had to continue their fight against starvation. This aspect is distinctive to the Pacific War. Since the Pacific War was a war over control of the islands, the Allied forces launched fierce attacks on islands that were strategically essential to their operations. They almost completely annihilated the Japanese defending these islands and deprived the enemy of their transport on other islands by destroying aeroplanes and war ships, thus making them immobile. These tactics enabled the Allied forces to advance towards Japan in a short period of time with relatively few fatalities.

As a result, the Japanese forces isolated on remote islands received no supplies from Japan and faced a battle against starvation. However, few had succumbed to death by starvation on these islands. Wartime Japan was not a fully established modern country and many of the servicemen had agricultural or small industry backgrounds. Therefore, their skills and diligence enabled them to survive the shortage of supplies.

After the war, a member of the South-East Area General Staff Office once said: “Rabaul was almost like a small independent country after supplies from Japan had stopped.” This is a clear expression of his admiration and respect for the effort of Japanese servicemen who had successfully established self-sufficiency and protected Rabaul from attacks by the Allied forces, without supplies from Japan. Another reason for such a favourable description of Rabaul is that it was the only case where no financial assistance from Japan was required immediately after the war, when the Japanese government exhausted the national treasury to fund its forces in need of food and daily essentials.

Numerous memoirs written by returned Japanese servicemen proudly introduce the success of achieving self-sufficiency in Rabaul during the war. However, their life and self-sufficiency at the internment camps under the Allied forces have rarely been mentioned until today. The reason for their apparent omission, apart from the Japanese military ideology at that time which refused to embrace the surrender, is that Japanese servicemen generally only considered what happened during the war as paramount. Life in

戦後ラバウルでの日本軍

太平洋戦争の広大な戦域では、ラバウルのように日本軍兵士が島に取り残され、飢餓と戦い続けなくてはならなかった戦場が多かった。これは太平洋戦争に特有の状況であった。太平洋戦争が、太平洋の島々を獲得するための戦いだったため、連合軍は日本を目指して進撃のルートにあり、将来の作戦のため戦略的に絶対不可欠であった島々に、激しい上陸作戦を敢行した。そして、これらの島々を防御していた日本軍兵士は、しばしば全滅の運命をとどめた。連合軍は、他の島々にあった日本軍飛行場や艦艇を攻撃して交通を遮断することで日本軍の移動を不可能にした。このような戦略によって、連合軍は比較的短期間で日本本土に向けての進を行うことができた。

その後、遠く離れた島々に孤立した日本軍は、日本からの補給を受けることができず、飢餓と戦いなくてはならなかった。しかしながら、これらの島々で飢餓から逃れた兵士の数は少なかった。戦争中の日本はまだ近代的な国家とは言えず、多くの兵士が農家や手工業者の出身で、彼らに残っていた技術と資材に助け、食料不豊から乗り越えることができたからである。

戦後、南東方面総督府本部の関係者が、「補給が途絶えた後のラバウルは、まるで小さな独立国のような様相を呈していた」と語ったことがある。これは明らかに、自給自足の生活を築き、日本からの補給なしにラバウルを連合軍の攻撃から守った日本軍兵士たちに対しての賞賛である。また、ラバウルがこのように賞賛を受けたのは、戦争終了直後に日本から財政援助を受ける必要がなかった場合である。この時期の日本は、食料や日用品の補給が必要な外洋の兵士たちへの送金のため、国の財政が逼迫していた。

ラバウルから帰国してきた兵士たちの多くが執筆した回想録の中で、戦争中に自給自足をうまく達成したことから誇らしげに書いている。しかし、連合軍統制下の収容所での生活は自給自足の生活では、今日はまでほとんど具体的に語られることがなかった。その理由は、降伏を認めないという当時の日本軍の理念によるだけではない。日本兵たちは、戦争中に達成したことがすべてだったと考え、収容所での生活は語る余ってないとみなしていたからである。復員兵士に対しては、復員船の中でも、また下船後も、日本政府による事情聴取が実施された。これらの聴取の際にも、戦争中の出来事を扱
the internment camps afterwards, was not worth mentioning. Interviews with returned servicemen were conducted by the Japanese government on repatriation ships and upon disembarkation. They also focused on wartime activities so that even the interview reports compiled after the war refer mostly to what had happened before the surrender.

The Australian forces transferred part of the captured Japanese material to the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, where it has been kept as a collection of historical material entitled AWM82. It is possibly the only existing collection of Japanese military documents that illustrate how Japanese servicemen spent time, from a few months to a few years, under the control of the Allied forces before they were repatriated. It is said that contingents of Allied forces, other than the Australians, destroyed all material confiscated from the Japanese. It will be interesting to reveal the historical significance of this period on the basis of a study of the extremely precious AWM82 collection.

The Japanese forces in Rabaul formally surrendered to the Australian 1st Army under the command of Lieutenant General Sturdie, and were then placed under the control of Major General Eather. In reality, however, the Japanese were allowed to retain their wartime unit formation, and General Imamura continued to direct the Japanese troops in Rabaul according to Australian orders.

The Australian commanders (with a force of 10,000 servicemen) in the Rabaul area must have been perplexed at the task of controlling 100,000 Japanese in Rabaul and 40,000 scattered around the neighbouring islands. Since the Australians estimated the remaining Japanese strength to be about 30,000, no preparations had been made for the enormous task of providing a total of 140,000 men with food and daily essentials.

Due to the large size of the remaining Japanese forces, Lieutenant General Sturdie issued two rather unusual orders on 10 September 1945: first, that the Japanese construct their own internment camps, and, secondly, that the Japanese produce food and daily essentials to provide for themselves. In other words, the Australians ordered the Japanese forces which had long been self-sufficient, to remain self-sufficient after the surrender once they had moved to designated camp sites and constructed living facilities there. The reason for these arrangements was that the transport and supply capacity of the Australians had already been stretched to meet the needs of their own troops, let alone provide for such a large number of Japanese.

However, there were some contradicting elements in these orders. Supervision of the

点があてられため、戦後まとめられたこの聴取調査の報告書も、ほとんどが降伏前に起こったことの記録のみである。

オーストラリア軍は、日本軍捕獲資料の一部をキャンベラにあるオーストラリア戦争記念館に送り、これらはそこでAWM82と呼ばれる歴史資料コレクションとして保存された。日本の将兵が復員するまでの数ヶ月間から数年間を、連合軍の管理下でのように生活したかを物語る唯一現存している日本軍文書類がAWM82に多数含まれている。オーストラリア軍以外の連合軍は、日本軍から没収した文書をすべて廃棄したといわれている。ラパウルの日本軍は降伏から平和への移行期を収容所で過ごした。非常に貴重なコレクションであるAWM82の研究を通じて、この時期の歴史的意義を明らかにすることは大きな意義がある。

ラパウルの日本軍は、オーストラリア軍第1軍司令官スターディー中将に降伏し、イーサー少将の管理下に置かることになった。とはいえ、従来の編成には変更がなく、オーストラリア軍の命令は日本軍を代表して今村大将が受け、命令系統を通じてラパウルの全軍に伝達された。

兵総数1万人のオーストラリア軍指揮官らは、ラパウルに10万人、そして周辺の島々に4万人いた日本軍兵士を監督する任務を与えられ、頭をかかえたりかもしれない。オーストラリア軍は日本兵の数を約3万人と見積もっていたため、14万人全員への食料と日用品の補給の準備はまったくできていなかった。

1945年9月10日、残留日本兵の数が多いため、スターディー中将は珍しい命令を出した。第1に、日本軍は自分達が入るキャンプを建設すること、そして第2に、日本軍は

Many lower-ranked Japanese servicemen had a farming background and the gardens they established went a long way to creating a self-sufficient food supply on Rabaul.
former enemy troops might become easier by confining them to the dozen or so camp sites in the area. On the other hand, this meant the dissolution of the self-sufficient system that had been firmly established during the war. However, the Japanese were able to use food reserves while new farmland was cultivated and a new self-sufficiency system was established. If they had failed to harvest sufficient food by the time the stock ran out, the Australians would have had to guarantee the provision of supplements.

Although Lieutenant General Sturdie was well aware the Australians were not in a position to guarantee such supplements, he insisted the two orders be executed. Despite protests from the Japanese forces, his orders were carried out and ten camps were completed by the end of October 1945.

Given the highest priority, the construction of camps proceeded smoothly as planned and the Japanese troops were all transferred between October and November 1945. These camps had no names apart from the official camp numbers, but they were commonly called by the name of the place where they were located (see table no.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Number</th>
<th>Japanese name</th>
<th>Number of residents</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 Camp</td>
<td>Gazelle</td>
<td>8,830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 Camp</td>
<td>Tauri</td>
<td>(10,310)</td>
<td>Abolished soon after establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 Camp</td>
<td>Minamizaki</td>
<td>11,591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5 Camp</td>
<td>Akane</td>
<td>11,606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6 Camp</td>
<td>Kagamihara</td>
<td>11,661</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 7 Camp</td>
<td>Tobera</td>
<td>11,603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 8 Camp</td>
<td>Toma</td>
<td>11,606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 10 Camp</td>
<td>Nishiboekiten</td>
<td>11,550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 11 Camp</td>
<td>Kokopo</td>
<td>(9,635)</td>
<td>Korean/Formosan camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 12 Camp</td>
<td>Tali(li)</td>
<td>(2,826)</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 13 Camp</td>
<td>Tabuna</td>
<td>11,623</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Less than satisfactory progress was made in the cultivation of new farmland and the production of food. One of the main problems was the difficulty in securing enough labour for food production. A personnel list from the No. 6 Camp for 18–21 February 1946 indicates that malaria sufferers accounted for about one third of the total camp residents, a similar level to that during the war. A major difference between the wartime and the period after the surrender is that large numbers of Japanese servicemen were either taken as labourers to assist the Australian forces or were engaged in maintenance.

Table 1: Post-surrender Japanese camps near Rabaul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Number</th>
<th>Japanese name</th>
<th>Number of residents</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 Camp</td>
<td>Gazelle</td>
<td>8,830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 Camp</td>
<td>Tauri</td>
<td>(10,310)</td>
<td>Abolished soon after establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 Camp</td>
<td>Minamizaki</td>
<td>11,591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5 Camp</td>
<td>Akane</td>
<td>11,606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6 Camp</td>
<td>Kagamihara</td>
<td>11,661</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 7 Camp</td>
<td>Tobera</td>
<td>11,603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 8 Camp</td>
<td>Toma</td>
<td>11,606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 10 Camp</td>
<td>Nishiboekiten</td>
<td>11,550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 11 Camp</td>
<td>Kokopo</td>
<td>(9,635)</td>
<td>Korean/Formosan camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 12 Camp</td>
<td>Tali(li)</td>
<td>(2,826)</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 13 Camp</td>
<td>Tabuna</td>
<td>11,623</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

必要な食糧と日常生活に必要な物資を自分たちで生産することである。つまり、オーストラリア軍は、すでに長期間の自給自足をしていた日本軍に対し、降伏後指定されたキャンプ地に移転し、そこに生活のための施設を建設した後も、自給自足を続けるようにと命令したのである。このような手配がなされた理由は、自軍への補給と物資の輸送に手一杯であったオーストラリア軍には、降伏した多数の日本兵に補給をする余力がなかったからである。

しかし、オーストラリア軍の命令には矛盾点があった。まず11ヶ所あるいは12ヶ所のキャンプに日本軍部隊を集団することで、監観は容易になるものの、戦争中に部隊の周囲に閉鎖された農耕地を放棄しなければならないため、既存の自給自足体制が崩壊する可能性があった。またキャンプの周囲に新しい農地を開発し収穫がでるまでに、日本軍は余剰の食料を使い過ぎてしまう可能性もあり、もし食料の底をつくまで十分な収穫が得られない場合には、オーストラリア軍が補給を保証しなくてはならなかった。

スターティング中継は、オーストラリア軍がそのような補給を保証できないことをよく承知しながらも、上述の2つの命令を遂行しようと行動。日本側の抗議にもかかわらず、オーストラリア軍側は命令の遂行を強制し、1945年10月末までに10ヶ所のキャンプが建設された。

キャンプの建設はまず優先とされてほぼ定通りに進み、1945年10月から11月にかけてすべての日本兵はそれぞれのキャンプへ移された。各キャンプは公式のキャンプ番号以外に名表がつけられていなかったが、一般的にキャンプ地にちなんだ名前で呼ばれた。表1を参照

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>キャンプ番号</th>
<th>日本名</th>
<th>収容者数</th>
<th>付記</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 Camp</td>
<td>ガゼル</td>
<td>8,830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 Camp</td>
<td>タウリール</td>
<td>(10,310)</td>
<td>設営後もろくに廃止</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 Camp</td>
<td>隈原</td>
<td>11,591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5 Camp</td>
<td>赤根</td>
<td>11,606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6 Camp</td>
<td>鶴原</td>
<td>11,661</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 7 Camp</td>
<td>トベラ</td>
<td>11,603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 9 Camp</td>
<td>トーマ</td>
<td>11,605</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 10 Camp</td>
<td>西賀島</td>
<td>11,550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 11 Camp</td>
<td>ココボ</td>
<td>(9,635)</td>
<td>朝鮮及び台湾人キャンプ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 12 Camp</td>
<td>タリ(り)</td>
<td>(226)</td>
<td>本部</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 13 Camp</td>
<td>タブナ</td>
<td>11,623</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
duties at the newly constructed internment camps.

The ratio of personnel engaged in food production had never been as low as indicated in this list, even during the war when the soldiers could spare little time to work the fields. One advantage after the war was that the Japanese could improve their productivity by continuously working on the land, whereas during the war, bombing often disrupted the farm work. So it is not entirely appropriate to argue that the allocation of less labour meant lower yields. However, it did make the task of clearing sufficient land and initiating food production in a short period of time more difficult.

While the main cause of the declining self-sufficiency rate was the lack of labour, the relocation of farming ground gave rise to another obstacle since the camp sites were selected in haste without sufficient investigation into the suitability of the soil for farming. If the Australians had seriously wished the Japanese to be self-sufficient, they should have made a more careful selection of camp sites and allocated sufficient labour for food production.

Most of the veterans alive today were too young to understand the hardship experienced by their superiors in the South-East Area Headquarters. The lower-ranked soldiers were obviously not concerned about the new self-sufficiency system at the camps in Rabaul. They enjoyed lollies, meat and ham occasionally distributed by the Australians, and believed that the Australians would offer help if they failed to produce enough food. On the other hand, the headquarters staff, who kept records of harvests, daily consumption and the amount in reserve each month, had to deal with a 60 per cent decrease in harvests from wartime to the end of 1945, as well as the rapidly decreasing reserves. Harvests eventually recovered to 60 per cent of the wartime amount in March 1946. Under these circumstances, the general staff could not have helped feeling resentful about Australian orders to relocate camps and to supply labourers.

Since the Japanese forces regularly reported to the Australians about the food in reserve, the Australians should have been aware that offering some food on a personal basis would not solve the problem. Comments from veterans and in documents suggest that the Japanese forces had initially expected to be repatriated in 1948. When they were told that the repatriation would commence in February 1946, many Japanese servicemen thought that it had to be a mistake, so they did not rejoice at the news.

Despite the poor harvests, Japanese servicemen enjoyed peace in the camps and started preparing a meal in October 1945. The Australians had underestimated Japanese numbers and could only provide supplements to provisions.
to engage in various activities that could only be dreamed of during the war. Although
daytime labour at the camps was as demanding as it was during the war, they could at
least rest without being woken by bombing raids. They could read, study, write letters to
family and enjoy discussions on a selection of topics.

However, the staff at headquarters, including General Imamura, were somewhat concerned about the fact that Japanese servicemen could enjoy time off work. It was not very difficult for commanders to maintain order and discipline during the war. When the war came to an end, however, the command structure became more difficult to maintain.

It was therefore necessary to give new purpose to the lives of the servicemen restless for early repatriation and to make them understand that they should be able to work towards their ultimate goals of life while in the camps. AWM82 contains a long message from Imamura to his men in which he repeatedly addressed the questions about why they should remain in Rabaul for a while, what the benefits of them remaining in Rabaul were and what they should start doing there. After describing the war damages caused in Japan to the Japanese officers, General Imamura explained the purpose of staying in the Rabaul camps as follows:

1) Immediate repatriation of servicemen would create a burden on war-stricken Japan and, in a way, their remaining in Rabaul temporarily would help the mother land.

2) Another important purpose of life in the camps should be to acquire extensive vocational skills and to improve their knowledge of science and technology so that they would be able to contribute to the reconstruction of Japan upon repatriation.

The communication line between Rabaul and Japan, which had been cut off since February 1943, was re-established soon after the surrender. This allowed the Japanese in Rabaul to obtain fairly accurate information about the process leading to the defeat and the degree of damages inflicted on Japan. Because he was informed about the current situation in Japan, General Imamura was able to persuade his troops that it was necessary to stay on in Rabaul. On the instructions of General Imamura, the Japanese servicemen began tackling two major tasks at the camps. One was to find out why Japan lost the war. The other was to commence education and training which would help soldiers con-

あまりにも若さであろう。兵士たちは明らかに、ラバウルのキャンプ地での新規の自給自足制度に関心のなかった。彼らはオーストラリア軍からの物資供給された食べ物や生火で栄養を摂る。もう少し十分な食料が生産できないならば、オーストラリア軍が期待の手を差し伸べるであろうと信じていた。その一方、収穫や一日ごとの消費量や毎月の予

備給食量を記録していた指令本部部員は、収穫量が1946年までに戦争中と比較して60％も

減少し、その上収穫量に及ぶ事態に対処したと見なされなかった。1946年3月に、

収穫はようやく戦前の60％の量まで回復した。このような状況で、キャンプ地を

移動し労働力を提供せよ、とのオーストラリア軍の命令には反発を感じずにはいられ

なかったのである。

日本側が定期的に、備蓄食料の量をオーストラリア軍側に報告していたので、オース-

トラリア軍は、個人的に食糧を分け与えることで問題を解決することはできないと気

がついていたはずである。元兵士の証言や当時の文書によると、日本軍の復員は当初

1948年に行われるであろうと予想されていた。そのため、1946年2月に復員が始ま

ると知らされた際、日本兵の多くはそれを聞いて喜ぶよりも、間違いに違いないと

思った。

自給自足政策の初期において、収穫量が悪く見当がちのこともあったものの、キャンプ内では

冷静な日々が流れ、戦争中には夢しか見られなかったような活動が開始

された。目中の自給自足キャンプでの作業は戦争中の一時的に変わらぬ大変だったが、敵の爆撃で起こされないように既に頑張ることができ、勉強や読書をしたり家族に手紙を書

いたり、いろいろな話題を話し合うことができた。

指令本部の今村大将をはじめ幹部、日本軍兵士が勤務外の時間を使うことを懸念

した。司令官にとって、戦争中に軍の統制を取りることに困難ではなかった。しかし戦

争が終わり、戦地にいる目的が失われると、軍隊組織に烏賊が入り、上下関係がゆるん

で指揮統制がきくことができなかった。

そのため、1日でも早い復員の日を持って私が泣いていた兵士たちの新鮮な目

的な、キャンプ生活での最終目的のために努力する意味を理解させることが必要

となった。AWMS2コレクションには、今村大将が、ラバウルにしばらく残る処理

理由や、ラバウル残留者にとっての利点や、そこに住むべきことを、何度も彼の部

下たちに訴えている長谷川の記録がある。日本の戦争被害をそこで土官たちに説明し

た後、今村大将はラバウルでのキャンプ生活の意義を次のように説明している。

1. 早期の復員に在戦時で打ちのめされた日本に負担を与えることになり、その意味

では、ラバウルに一時的に留まることは祖国を助けることになる。
Japanese soldiers attempted to find the reason for the loss. They believed it would be impossible to start again without having reasonable answers to their questions about the war and coming to terms with the defeat. It is said that Japanese servicemen frequently discussed this issue during breaks from work and after meals, and their debates often continued for days and months. Most of these servicemen seem to have believed that the defeat was largely attributed to Japan’s poor scientific and technological capabilities, coupled with underdeveloped industries, as well as its pre-war and wartime philosophy that disregarded the importance of science and technology.

Since these servicemen were still part of a Japanese military organisation then, though they were under the control of the Australian force, none of the above documents mention the Imperial system as a reason for the defeat. However, there were quite a few comments criticising military dictatorship and the perception of Japan as a divine land. A particularly unique opinion was that the Law School of the Tokyo University should be closed because its graduates had become senior bureaucrats who collaborated with the military to turn Japan into a fascist nation. It is a little surprising to note that some servicemen in Rabaul were well aware of such domestic problems.

Education and training programs had commenced, thanks to General Imamura’s foresight and initiative, before requests for such programs were made by the servicemen.

これらの兵士たちは、形式的にはオーストラリア軍の管理下にあったとはいえ、日本軍組織の一部であったため、上記のどの文書も帝国制度の敗北の原因としているものはない。しかし、軍の独裁主義や日本は神国であるという考え方に対する批判は多数あった。特にユニークな意見は、東京大学法学部を閉鎖するべきだというものである。なぜならば、その卒業生が幹部官僚になり、軍部と組んで日本をファシスト国家にしてしまったからだという。ラバウルの兵士がこのような国内の問題をよく理解していたことは少々驚きである。

今村大将の方針と積極的な取り組みによって、兵士たちからの要求がでる前に教育と訓練が始まった。今村大将は1945年10月付で「ラバウル駐留軍における将兵の心構え」と1945年10月31日付の「集団教育要綱」と題されたこの方針を発表した。前者は収容所での生活の目的を「科学教育の促進と産業の振興」と定義づけている。後者は、前者で収容所生活の目的と唱えられた科学教育の内容を説明している。しかしここで述べられたのは、日本の軍国主義と密接な関係がある教育体制や軍人倫理の精神にのっとったものであった。これによって、当時の日本の兵士が持っていた共通の考え方が、支配的な西洋イデオロギーから完全に孤立して教えられたものであることが判る。
General Imamura issued two policy statements entitled *Frame of mind for life in the Rabaul camps* and *Guidelines for education in the camps* dated October 1945 and 31 October 1945 respectively. The first statement defined the purpose of life in the camps as “the development of science education and promotion of industrialisation”, while the second provided details of this science education. However, the latter policy statement is ideologically based on the spirit of the Imperial Rescript on Education and the Imperial Military Rescript which were closely related to Japan’s militarism. This demonstrates the thinking common among the Japanese soldiers at that time, who had been educated in complete isolation from dominant Western ideology.

The commissioned officers were responsible for developing curricula, compiling textbooks and giving lectures. Military surgeons, in particular, played an important role in education and training. According to the internal rules of the 12th Group, there were two one-hour lectures a day, one in the morning and the other in the evening when it was relatively cool. The 12th Group Education Rules indicates that the compulsory subjects (see table no.2) should be taught in the morning lecture, and electives in the evening.

**Table 2: Education at post-surrender Japanese camps, course structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory Units</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil education</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-sufficiency</td>
<td>Tuesday/Thursday</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural sciences</td>
<td>Wednesday/Friday</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electives</td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>Wednesday/Saturday</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>College preparatory</td>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic English</td>
<td>Tuesday/Friday</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture of sentiments</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subjects relating to self-sufficiency were of immediate use in Rabaul and compulsory for all servicemen. Vocational subjects were designed for those who had completed only primary school in Japan and aimed at providing them with skills enabling them to find employment upon repatriation. Basic science subjects were full and rich in content, and designed to achieve the pre-war high school level, which is equivalent to the standard of the first year of university today.

It is difficult to see any disillusionment about the defeat from the way the Japanese soldiers strove to realise their educational programs. It appears that they had quickly come to terms with the surrender and started to consider how they could contribute to
the rehabilitation and the future of war-stricken Japan. Although General Imamura had initiated this move, it was the will and strong sense of responsibility of his men that had built up the right mood. The postwar period spent at the Rabaul internment camps should probably be seen in a positive light as a time when the Japanese soldiers, coming to terms with the defeat, began to strive for improvement in their individual capabilities and prepare themselves for participating in the rehabilitation of Japan, rather than spending time idle waiting for repatriation.

The positive and assertive attitude of servicemen in Rabaul is also apparent from the fact that they had begun preparing for repatriation well before the schedule was announced. It was considered necessary to give the highest priority to the recovery of agricultural production in order to rehabilitate the country which was suffering from starvation. The headquarters of the 11th Division of the Australian forces under Major General Eather initially decreed that these farming tools would only be transported on the very last repatriation ship from Rabaul. However, after tenacious lobbying by the Japanese, clothing, farming tools and food stuff were allowed on every repatriation ship.

By defining the internment as preparation for the rehabilitation of Japan, it was possible to redirect the long-simmering fighting spirit of the Japanese servicemen towards education and vocational training. This salved the pride of the soldiers who never had an opportunity to enter combat with the enemy before the surrender. Seeing the repatriation as the beginning of a new duty of rebuilding war-stricken Japan, the repatriation of the troops to Japan between May and October 1946 was promoted as a rescue operation. It is reported that the 3rd, 4th and 5th repatriation ships alone could bring home as much as 1,850 tons of food, 8,000 items of farming tools and a large volume of clothing and paper as relief supplies.

Although Rabaul was unique in having such a long, clearly defined period between the surrender and repatriation, memoirs written by veterans indicate that lectures on mathematics and physics were also delivered elsewhere. One can imagine that the miraculous economic recovery of Japan could be attributed not only to domestic rehabilitation policies but also to the repatriation of nearly six million Japanese (half of whom were military personnel) who had been detained in such a way. As a logical consequence, one cannot help thinking that more attention should be given to the return of millions of servicemen from the battlefields of the Pacific War and to their role in the rehabilitation of Japan.

Translated by Steven Bullard and Inoue Akemi
Chapter 8
Searching for dad
Unsolved mysteries of the war
Margaret Reeson
Searching for dad  
 Unsolved mysteries of the war

There is a significant group of people who have been profoundly affected by the events of the war in New Guinea. Yet they never lived in a war zone, were never under attack and never saw the enemy. In many cases they had never set foot on the islands of New Guinea. These were the women and children of the men who disappeared, never to be seen again. Their business with the war remains unfinished and to this day there are people who are still, consciously or unconsciously, searching for dad.

As someone who lived in Papua New Guinea from 1961–78, I had heard the story of the loss of the prison ship, the Montevideo Maru, and had seen in Rabaul one of a number of memorials to those who were lost. Then in 1988, through a series of circumstances, I met a group of people who had gathered for a memorial service for the missing men of New Guinea. Among them were widows and children of the missing, and colleagues and friends and fellow soldiers from Lark Force. As these people shared their stories, both in the formal setting of the memorial service and later in private conversation, I realised that here was a whole community of people whose war was still not over. It was not only unresolved grief – these people were still trying to solve the mysteries of the war years, even though they feared it was an impossible quest.

Although I did not recognise it at first, I too had begun that search, partly from interest and with a view to writing about their experience, and partly searching on their behalf. My own search would lead me to documentary evidence in archives at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra and in Melbourne. And it would involve long interviews with people in several states of Australia who had suffered from this particular loss. It has led to two books and a thesis. Whereabouts unknown (Southerland, 1993) is about six mission women in New Guinea, wives and nurses who lost their husbands and colleagues. A very long war: the families who waited (Melbourne, 2000) examines the experience of a cross-section of military and civilian families who are still affected by this episode.

What has it meant to search for father or for husband or brother or mate? What has it meant for the Australian families who have had no finality, no grave, no funeral, no certainty about what really happened?
For the women the searching began during the silent years of the war. In the months immediately after January 1942, some Australian soldiers and civilians struggled home from Rabaul after long and hazardous treks across the unforgiving mountains and jungle of New Britain. As each group arrived, wives of the missing tried to discover anything they could about men who were still missing. The survivors seldom had any news. Some women were told that their men were on the way, and they kept on hoping. A number of women received a single page letter from their husbands, dated early in 1942, which informed them that they were in a prison camp in the Rabaul area. These letters were delivered, very ingeniously and humanely, by a drop of mailbags over Port Moresby by Japanese aircraft.

After that, nothing. The women and their families waited. There were several subsets of families. There were the civilians who had lived in the islands of New Guinea and had been hastily evacuated by ship and plane just before Christmas 1941 – the families of public servants, government officers, business people, missionaries, plantation and timber mill managers and workers. Then there were the families of the men of 2/22nd Battalion, Lark Force, both officers and other ranks. Letters began to cross Australia as women built networks among themselves and with the men who had escaped. Clubs were established for mutual support in Melbourne, Adelaide, Sydney and Brisbane and the women met regularly with the purpose of sharing any crumbs of information about their men which might emerge.

Rumours spread across the country. In time, they learned that the officers of the 2/22nd Battalion had been transported to Japan and were in captivity there. This news gave hope that the other men – soldiers and civilians – were also safely in a camp somewhere. Even so, women heard stories of distressing conditions in prisoner-of-war camps in south-east Asia and remained very anxious about their men. During these years, young children were growing up with the legendary figure of the absent father who would one day come home.

But father did not come home. At the end of the war, the 2/22nd’s officers in Japan and former prisoners from camps across south-east Asia came home. But when Australian forces re-entered Rabaul, there was no sign of the missing civilians and soldiers. Over a thousand men had disappeared without trace. By the end of October 1945, telegrams were sent to the families of the missing informing them that their men had been lost with the sinking of the prison ship Montevideo Maru on 1 July 1942 by the US Navy.
submarine USS Sturgeon. Interestingly, many households greeted this news with cynicism and uncertainty. Many women did not believe it. There were still no witnesses, no remains, no grave.

The rumours began again; was there really a ship, or was that a deception? How could you be sure which men went aboard which ship? What if, as some suggested, the men were loaded on the ship and then massacred at sea? Was the story of a ship torpedoed by a US submarine an elaborate device to provide a somehow softer version of their end? Perhaps they were tortured and executed or suffered a painful and lonely death of disease on a jungle track while trying to escape? Was their own government trying to hide something?

So the searches began and have continued ever since. The widows, then their children as they matured, and these days the grandchildren, have tried to discover the truth.

Why has it been so hard to discover the truth? Or to trust the “truth” that has been offered? There are a number of reasons.

First, parts of the puzzle were held by people scattered around the world. For years no one could see the whole picture and even now there may be missing pieces. The Australian officers saw the other ranks and civilian men marched out of camp late in June 1942 and did not see them again. The Chinese and New Guinean labourers saw Australian men they knew board a ship in Simpson Harbour, but did not know where it was heading. The US navy knew their submarine had sunk a large Japanese vessel, and when and where, but not which one. The Australian War Memorial has a copy of the log recording the chase and its result. The Japanese ship owners knew that their ship was lost. A list of names of prisoners from Rabaul existed in the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau. The Australian authorities knew the names of some, but not all of those who probably had been killed at Tol and Waitavolo, but did not release those names. Until late 1945 no one held all the parts of the puzzle together. The women who waited were not the only ones in the dark.

Second, some suspected a deliberate cover-up by the Australian government. It was felt by a number of families that the Australian authorities used the possibility that a great many Australians were lost with the sinking of the Montevideo Maru as a useful reason to offer for the loss of all missing Australians. There has been continuing bitterness and anger toward the Australian government of the day. This is where most blame has been

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When family members were asked where their anger was directed in the years after the war, it was interesting that few blamed the US submariners (“they didn’t know who was on board”, it was said, or “there should have been a Red Cross sign on the ship to warn them”). Some blamed the Japanese military. But most bitterness has been directed at the Australian authorities, both military and civil. The military authorities should never have sent Lark Force and the other small groups of naval, air force and Independent Company men to New Guinea in the first place, they say. As for the civilians, why didn’t they at least give the older men the chance to be evacuated while there was still time? Because they believe that they have been poorly served through their government’s errors of judgement, many of the families of the missing still suspect that the government authorities had something to hide. If that was true, they suggest, then any pronouncements that they made on the fate of the missing should be viewed with a degree of scepticism. Can they be trusted?

Third, some information was deliberately placed under embargo. When a handful of men who had survived the massacres at Tol and Waitavolo plantations finally arrived back in Australia, their evidence was gathered. This material was combined with all other information collected during the war in the Report on Japanese atrocities and breaches of rules of warfare prepared by Justice William Webb and completed in 1944. As was appropriate, this report was kept secret for the sake of national security and with the intention of protecting families from the terrible detail of what had happened to some of the missing. Fragments of this information appeared in the press, however. The horrifying thing about this was that every example of inhumanity or cruelty was described in detail, but without the names of victims or clues about where these incidents had taken place. The effect of this was that family members whose men remained missing filled in the blanks for themselves, imagining their son or husband in every possible situation of pain and despair. It is possible today to read the detail of the Webb Report in the Australian War Memorial archives, but the names of victims have been neatly and literally sliced from the text with a razor blade. This has been done with good intentions – to protect the families – but I would challenge this. It seems to me that families would deal better with the truth than with haunting mystery. Those who do not want to know will not go searching in a document like that. And those who have nightmares about the unthinkable could be reassured that in fact, it was not their husband or father who suffered this particular end.
Fourth, there were lists of names of men said to have been on the Montevideo Maru, but the lists were inconclusive. The first references to lists of names of those who later disappeared come from the notes that Rabaul journalist Gordon Thomas kept in captivity. He described the occasion in May 1942 when he was taken to the prison camp at Malaguna near Rabaul for a camp muster. All those Australians, and others present that day, were listed by name, age, occupation, region and place of origin. Immediately after the war, Major H.S. Williams was sent to Japan to try to discover any news about the missing Australians. The records of the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau had been hastily transferred out of Tokyo because of serious bombing in 1945 and were now in a state of confusion. However, Williams found documents, which had been transliterated into Japanese, which listed men of the 2/22nd Battalion and civilians of New Guinea.

But were those the names of men who had been on board the Montevideo Maru, or simply those who had been in camp when the list was made in May 1942? It seemed that some names had been added much later, including names of men who were known to have been in New Ireland earlier in 1942. Plausible stories about subsets of men on the list were told. The list of civilians, in particular, created more puzzles than solutions. Into the 1950s, many versions of lists of the missing men were produced. In the course of research, I saw at least thirteen versions. And yet there was never enough firm evidence to state that those listed had met their end in a way which could be identified and with the benefit of witnesses. Family members who continue to search for information say, “His name was on the list”, but the question remains: which list? How reliable is it? What does the list really tell us?

Fifth, postwar investigations were not conclusive. It was not lack of will or energy on the part of those Australian troops and officers who were sent to investigate the possible whereabouts of the missing. From late in 1945 until at least 1950, teams of people did their best to find answers. One group served in the War Crimes trials in Rabaul and Tokyo, seeking to uncover the truth through legal processes. This was not an easy task as they were sometimes given alternative versions of events and cases were re-opened years later. Another group worked to search for human remains and to establish identity where possible. This was a nightmare task as human remains were scattered in isolated jungle settings, or hidden under high kunai grass. Burial sites had been relocated. One cemetery location had been bombed by the Allies, with the result that any remains were fragmentary and scattered. Caskets of bones or ashes were unlabelled or mixed and there were discrepancies between lists of names and numbers of caskets. There was
大隊の遺体の一部は、たまたま戦争後になってから見つかった。しかし、他の遺体は、まだ今も捜索の対象としている。この使節団の活動は、再発見の可能性を示すものであった。また、この使節団の活動は、遺族の親しさをはぐくむものであった。

第六章　戦争経験: 不明の謎

6. 家族の数が減り、次世代への伝承が困難となった。
7. 家族が戦争経験を伝える機会が減った。
8. 家族が戦争経験を伝える機会が減った。

以上の事象は、遺族の心をはぐくむものであった。
Many have relied on news passed along through letters or personal contacts, or more “popular” books written by coastwatchers and those who escaped. The difficulty is that these writers did not have much information to offer, and what they did know was often confined to their own escape experience. There are large amounts of archival material available, but much of it may seem inaccessible or overwhelming in volume and detail.

Finally, unsubstantiated rumours are still current among this community and people still try to solve the mysteries. Are any of the stories that continue to circulate about the mystery of the missing men from Rabaul able to be proved? I doubt it. Nor can they be disproved. This week I received a long letter from someone who had just read A very long war. He writes again of the possibility that a thousand and more men were loaded on to a ship in Simpson Harbour, Rabaul in 1942. “I now firmly believe that at the time the United States submarine even sighted the Montevideo Maru, not a single prisoner remained on the vessel – either alive or deceased.” He based this on documents he saw some years ago in the United Kingdom in which a Japanese signalman was reported to say that he had made friends with the Australians in Rabaul and had been fearful for them when they were sent away by sea. Unfortunately, my correspondent cannot remember where he has filed this document. A woman who grew up in New Britain writes bitterly this month that her own view – that the story of a torpedoed ship was “sick fairy tale” – has been ignored.

The questions about the mysteries of the war years are still alive for many Australian families today. Without definite answers and formal documentation, some have faced legal obstacles. The stresses of uncertainty have affected physical and psychological health. Families have tried to deal with unresolved grief fifty and even sixty years after their loss was known. They have written memoirs, searched archives, established memorials and made pilgrimages. Most of them have accepted that it is most unlikely that their questions about the fate of a family member can ever be answered. Even so, it is most important to them that the significant loss from the islands of New Guinea is recognised and remembered.

第7章には、家族の者たちは捜査の努力をどこに向けてはইいのかというとわからなかった。ニュージーナの戦争に関してかなりの激しい議論があるとはいいえ、多くの家族は公式戦争を避けていたかった。人々は手紙や個人のつながりの中で知ったニュースに頼るか、一般読者向けに海岸監視者や脱出した人々によって書かれた本を頼りにして、ここで問題になるのは、著者が提供できる情報が限られており、また手書きの情報がそれぞれの脱出の経験の範囲内に限られていたことだった。公文書館には数多くの史料が保存されていなかったが、その多くは公開されていないように見え、素人は量の点でも内容の点でも手に負えないように思えた。

そして最後に、事実に基づかないいうわさが現在でもこの人々の間で伝えられ、彼らは今でも何かと話題を巡ることが多い。ラバウルから姿を消した人々に関して、今でも話されるいろいろな話は、いつか実証されるのだろうか。しかし、それはないであろう。同時に、ウワサが本当ではないと証明するのもまた難しい。今週、私の本『長かった戦争』を読んだある人から長い手紙を受け取った。彼はその中で、繰り返し主張された一つの可能性にまたもや触れている。彼は手紙に、1,000人以上の人々が1942年にラバウルのシンバン湾より船に乗せられに思わせらず、「アメリカ軍の潜水艦がモンテビデオ丸を見つけた時点で、その船に捕虜は（死にかかわらず）一人も乗っていなかったと心から信じている」と書いている。数年前にイギリスで読んだ文書には、ある日本人信号兵がラバウルでオーストラリア人たちと親しくなり、彼らが船に乗せられずにどこかに送られたその後の運命を想像していたと書かれていたという。しかし残念ながら、手紙の主はこの文書をどこにしまいか知りたい思い出せないという。ニューギニア島で育ったある女性は、魚雷攻撃を受けた船があったというのを伝えたが、彼女の意見は全く無視されたと非常に苦しみを書いている。

多くのオーストラリア人家族にとって、戦争中のこの不可解な話は、今でも解決されていないことである。はっきりとした答えや正式な文書がないため、法律的な問題に直面した人もいた。確かなことが分からないことによるストレスは、彼女やここでの健康に悪影響を及ぼした。失聴が判ってから50年あまりは60年たった今でも、家族はまだ消え去らない悲しみをかかえている。そのため人々は追憶記を書いたり、文書館を調べたり、記念碑を建立したり慰霊の旅をした。ほとんどの人は、自分の家族のただった運命への問いかけには、答えは何もないであろうとあきらめている。たとえそうであっても、ニュージーナの島々で起こったこの人の失敗を認めそして記憶することが、この人々にとって非常に大切なことなのである。

[第8章] 戦を捨てて一戦争の解かれざる謎—