There were a large number of soldiers other than Japanese, who fought in East New Guinea in the Japanese Army in the front. They were Asian prisoners of war (POW) of the Allied personnel. It is considered that the number of the Asian personnel was nearly 10,000 under the command of Japanese 8th Area Army, Wewak, Rabaul, Kokopo, and so on.
This article focuses on the Asian sub-soldier, especially British Indian, Indonesians who had been "released" from status of POW from their homes mainly in Malayan Peninsula, Sumatra and Java. They were subsequently sent to the New Guinean front as a part of Japanese army labour units during the Second World War. In this article, the focus is firstly given on its origin and plans in the higher echelon to take some measures concerning treatment for tremendous numbers of Asian POW captured in the early stage of Pacific War. In the second, we look at the practice, the conditions related to Asian POW in New Guinea as well as memories of Japanese Veterans of these units especially traced with written memoirs.
Just as Japanese soldiers, placed under severe conditions without food and proper lines of communication, Asian soldiers were under duress in the tragic battlefield. Among the war crimes trials held in Rabaul under Australian jurisdiction after the war, about half of the 127 cases dealt with the ill-treatment of Asian soldiers. Veterans’ memoirs have mainly focused on this issue, especially the credibility of the war crime trials, instead choosing to ignore the issue of Asian personnel as being either an insignificance, or as "the dark side of war".and most of them don’t pay attention to their Asian personnel as trifles or a dark side of the war. The scholarly work both in war history and in area studies has virtually neglected the companies sent to New Guinea, as a niche between the operation and the military administration of occupied Southern territories. It is rare to find the description of the units of Asian soldiers in official and unofficial war histories compiled after the war. Also, official statements concerning the strength of personnel in this area basically excluded the number of Asian personnel, even though the units always appeared in the order of battle of the 8th Area Army. Several reasons have prevented close examination of these Asian personnel units: (1) lack of crucial records and documentation; (2) intricacy of chain of command; as these units were under the direct control of an Army or Army Group in the battle order, but were put under the direction of many other rear units from place to place; and (3) many of the key informants related to the war crime trials prevented the Japanese survivors from talking openly on the issue, in addition to the high mortality during the war.
The status of Asian soldiers and the reality of their life in New Guinea clearly show two contradicting sides of the "Greater East Asian War" – between the very core ideal of "war of liberation" and the "opportunistic demand for cooperation for local population". In the case of Asian personnel, it was clearly an outcome of latter notion, as we see it later. The issue contains political and legal problems, with which the Japanese army would have been faced sooner or later .
The prelude to the formation of sub-soldiers and Asian POW
According to the policy "the Points Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War" (Furyo Shori Yoryo) dated 6 May 1942 (Riku-A-Mitu 1456), among POW "Caucasians should be interned in Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and China and (where we will) make use of their labour for the enlargement of production, and for the operational demand". However, concerning "non-Caucasians considered not necessary to be interned, (we will) make use of them after parole in the original places to the maximum advantage". [1] That was the policy of the Army Ministry. Along with this guideline, Japanese Army operational units released Indonesian Muslim personnel, Filipinos and Chinese from April 1942. However, Christian Ambonese and Menadonese of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and British Indian personnel were exempted from this policy, and were not released but remained in detention camps in Singapore, Malaya, Sumatra, and Java (see Table 1).
Table 1. Release of non-Caucasian POWs in Southern Area (1942).
Area | Ethnicity | POW | Released | Date of release | Notes |
| Philippines | Filipinos | 42,539 | 4,167 | 9June – 20July | – |
| Malay | Indian | 71,319 | 0 | – | 36,200 for Iwahori Kikan, the others for various use in the Army |
Indonesian | 2,700 | 1,080 | 11 May – 22 June | – | |
Malayan | – | 11 | – | – | |
| Java | Indonesian | 15,962 | 18,151 | 1May – 23June | – |
| Burma | Indian | 1,730 | 0 | – | – |
Burmese | 0 | 1,000 | – | – | |
| British Borneo | Indian | 561 | 0 | – | Planned for release, but not carried out. |
Indonesian | 369 | 0 | – | – | |
| Hong Kong | Indian | 1,856 | 641 [2] | 15May – 10July | – |
Chinese | 110 | 0 | – | – | |
Others | 5 | 0 | – | – | |
| Shanghai | Chinese | 25 | 0 | – | Remained under detention Source: Furyo Johokyoku, "Fuyro Geppo August 1942" (POWs Information bureau, Monthly Report of Prisoners of War), 5 Sept. 1942, in Utsumi Aiko, Nagai Hitoshi (eds.) Tokyo Saiban Shiryo: Furyo Johokyoku Kankei Bunsho (Tokyo, Gendai Shiryo Shuppan, 1999), 180. |
In May 1942, Allied POW amounted to nearly 280,000. Among those, the number of non- Caucasian Asian personnel was 162,226 (see Table 2).
Table 2. Numbers of Released Asian POW (1942–44).
Year | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 |
| Asian soldiers | 153,200 | 22,253 | 1,352 |
Ambonese and Menadonese Indonesian POW of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, through an Army Ministry regulation in September 1942 (Riku-A-Mitu 3636), became so-called Heiho: assistant (or sub-) soldiers of the Japanese army. [3] But the treatment of British Indian POW was not the same.
On 14 March 1942, Vice Minister of the Army Ministry and Vice Chief of Army General Staff [4] promulgated "the Points Concerning the Treatment of Indian POW" (Indo Jin Furyo no Toriatukai Yoryo) to the Chief of General Staff of Southern Army (Riku-A-Mitu 252). This policy suggested that British Indian POW should be divided into two categories, one for labour, the others for the manipulation of "liberation of India". [5]
A mMore concrete measure, "Regulation on the treatment for British Indian Soldiers" (Indo Hei Toriatsukai ni Kansuru Kitei) was issued on 13 September from General TERAUCHI, Commander in Chief of South General Army to Army Ministry. UTSUMI Aiko pointed out that there were three types of treatment of Asian personnel after detention. According to this regulation, the first group those – who surrendered or pledged allegiance to Japanese military forces – would be incorporated into the "Indian National Army". The second group would form a "special labour unit in order to support labour and act as assistant guard of Japanese force", the others would be remained at POW camp for labour. UTSUMI examines article 4 which regulates that "temporary suspension" of the status of POW should be applied to the second group, because "it was a grave issue for Japanese force whether they were the Prisoners of War under the protection of Geneva Convention or a resource which Japanese could use at will". [6]
Pre-war Japanese plans on Usage of Asian POW
The idea of using Asian Prisoners of War could be found in pre-war plans. We can trace Japan’s two separate intentions. The first was an administrative asking in occupied southern territories. The treatment of an enormous numbers of Prisoners of War would pose difficulties for agarrison with limited strength to keep law and order in the area. The second intention came from a purely operational demand, concerning the serious issue to manage the shortage of manpower especially in the lines of communication.[Table 3] The idea of paroling Asian POW and using them as labour satisfies Japanese need to enhance manpower in the Southern Army, intermeshed with the the ideal of "liberating Asia" putting an anti-Western point of view into Asian captive soldiers who had been under the European colonial army. It was considered that this measure should contribute to build the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in the military level. This convenient use of two notions, however, caused great tragedy for mobilised Asian soldiers.
Table 3. Proportion of military force of the Japanese army, late 1942.
Area | Kwantung Army | China Area Armies | Southern Army | Inland Service |
Stgt. (1,000) | 6,570 | 7,040 | 2,500 | 4,590 |
% | 31.8% | 34% | 12% | 22.2% |
The idea of using "native troops" to restore order in occupied territories could be found in a series of plans in relation to the military administration of occupied territories by the First Research Group set up in Japan’s General Staff Office in February 1941. [7] In November 1941 the General Headquarters of the Southern Army unveiled a more detailed set of plans in "The Army shall guide existing police or native troops for the maintenance of order under the support and the instruction of the Japanese force". [8]
The idea of using local people in these capacities became part of the major policy documents for the military administration of occupied Southern territories, namely the "Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas", and the "Principles for Administering Occupied Southern Areas in accordance with Southern Operations", approved by the Liaison Conference between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government in November 1941. [9]
In this respect, the Army Ministry also gave active consideration to large-scale military mobilisation among the populations in occupied territories to reinforce the Japanese Army. A document "A Study for Japan’s Human Resources in the Greater East Asian War" (January 1942) pointed out the importance of "conserving troop strength", and noted that "measures like the utilization of native military personnel within the Co-prosperity Sphere are such an essential condition for carrying out the Reformation of the Japanese Army that it is necessary to accelerate these studies". [10] The Army Reformation programs (Gun-yo Sasshin) – pending since the outbreak of the China–Japanese War – were undertaken in order to reduce the army strength in the southern area and reform the order of battle of the Japanese Army in China.
After the overwhelming success in British Malaya, culminating in the surrender of Singapore on 15 February 1942, the capture of strategic points in the Southern region had occurred at a pace beyond Japan’s expectations. Further, the military authorities calculated that the Allied Forces would not be able to counterattack until after 1943.
The military’s "Tactical Guidelines for 1942" called for the redeployment of some troops from the Southern Army to China and Manchuria, and other troops from the Southern Army had already been deployed for clean-up operations. The garrison left behind in Malaya, Java and Sumatra was reduced in strength to around one-quarter of its original size. These garrisons, had to maintain order, deal with the enormous numbers of POWs and internees that fell into Japanese handsat an early stage of the occupation, and make preparations for a counterattack by the Allied Forces.
Already mentioned in pre-war plans, Japan had a definite intention to make these Asian POW cooperate for Japan. But the problem was to circumvent International law of the usage of War, because using enemy’s regular personnel for their own operation was prohibited. Declaration of parole was the only measure for Japan to avoid the conflict in this respect. That’s why the status of Indian POW became the main point of issue in the war crime court in Rabaul.
Induction into Japanese army and duties
Along with the "Regulation for the treatment ofBritish Indian Soldiers", acknowledged in September 1942 by the Army Ministry and the Chief of General Staff, KURADO Shigenori, Chief of Staff of Southern Army, made a statement on 22 April 1943 regarding the direction to release Indian POWs. According to KURODA, GHQ gave order to the South General Army to organise special service companies, transport them to the area under the command of the 8th Army Group (Nan-So-San 1445-1). It was in accordance with the policy of the Japanese government which was to liberate Asia and unite the races in East Asia, KURODA said. [11] (Table 4)
Table 4. Special Service Companies in East New Guinea, Solomon, Bismark Islands
| Area | Unit Names | Commander | Strength / Ethnicity |
| Wewak | 16th Special Sea Service Company | Okubo | 500/ British Indian |
| Wewak, But Boikin, Sepik | 17th Special Sea Service Company | Yamaoka | 500/ British Indian |
| Wewak, But, Sepik | 18th Special Sea Service Company | Araki | 500/ British Indian |
| Wewak | 19th Special Sea Service Company | Izumi | 500/ British Indian |
| Wewak | 20th Special Sea Service Company | Kubo | 675/763 British Indian |
| Wewak Hollandia | 26th Special Construction Service Company | Kashiwagi | 649/706 British Indian |
| Rabaul | 1st Special Land Service Company | Yabe |  |
| Rabaul | 3rd Special Land Service Company | | 675/763 British Indian |
| Rabaul | 6th Special Land Service Company | | 675/763 Menadonese 155 British Indian 520 |
| Rabaul | 26th Special Construction Service Company * | Hamada | 280/300 Ambonese 20 British Indian 220 |
| Rabaul | 27th Special Construction Service Company (1 platoon in Timor) | Tanaka | British Indian |
| Rabaul | 26th Field Supply Depot | | British Indian, Chinese |
| Rabaul | 26th Field Ordnance Depot | | British Indian |
| Rabaul | 26th Field Motor Vehicle Depot | Kiyooka | British Indian |
| Kokopo, Rabaul | 2nd Special Land Service Company | Nakamura | Ambonese 155 British Indian 519 |
| Kokopo | 4th Special Land Service Company | Yamamoto | 675/763 British Indian 550 Ambonese, Menadonese 150 |
| Bougainville | 5th Special Land Service Company | Ikeba | 360/398 Ambonese 82; British Indian 278 *26th Special Construction Service Comp was comprised with half strength of 5th Special Land Service Comp. |
As shown in Table 4 the Special Service Companies consisted of Japanese soldiers mixed with Indonesian Heiho and Indian ex-POW. The recruit of these Asian POW was conducted from detention camp directly to the front. KURODA explained after the war, that almost all of the Indian ex-POWs in Malayan area eagerly desired to cooperate with the Japanese Forces, for the purpose of the independence of India, and some of them joined the Indian National Army from their own free will. In respect of Indian ex-POWs’ status, in the HQ of the South General Army, Indians released on parole were no further regarded as having the status of POWs.
Actually, among the British Indian POW, there were lots in the first group to enroll Indian National Army on their own will. However, as far as "Special labour units" concerned, the second group – those who declined to join the INA, because their leader Chandra Bose, had no prominent profile among them, only at best regarded as a collaborator to Japan.
Major G.A. Waheed, 1st Battalion, Hyderabad Infantry gave a thorough explanation on his experiences from his captured place and until picked by Australian Army in Rabaul. The recruit of INA member from Indian POW camp was made by way of several Indian officers of British Indian Army. In his interrogation report,
Those who declined to join Indian National Army were sent to the separate labour camp for airfield construction. During this period from May 1942 to April 43, lectures were given to us to join INA repeatedly. After we were split up into 6 companies, we left Singapore on 1 May [19]43. When we arrived in Batavia, the Japanese commander called all officers and men and asked them two points; (1) To remove badge of rank and become other ranks, (2) To take up arms and fight for the freedom of Asia. There were very hot discussions and [they] offered to give all comforts, good food, money and to excuse us from fatigue in the labour camp. After we replied bluntly "no", then asked the reasons for it by Japanese commander, our reply being we have laid down arms and surrendered to you. We cannot take up arms and fight on the side of the enemy. (Japanese) were very surprised to hear the words "enemy" or at least showed their surprise at this. They asked us whether we considered them our enemies saying that they thought we were friends and giving them helping hand for all Asians to attain freedom from the Allies– still we refused to do any sort of work against International Convention and explained our present situation as POW. [12]
As in the General IMAMURA’s description, several Special Service Company retained written oath as a proof that their status of POW was in suspension, but most of them were burnt out in August 1945. [13] The written oath of the 4th Special Land Service Companies was kept safely after the war, as follows, " Declaration, On leaving our present prisoners of war camp, we promise not to commit any crime of violence and obey the orders of the Imperial Nippon Government effecting Prisoners of War." [14] It is dated on 20 April 1943 (2603), and signed in Shonanto, present-day Singapore.
MIYAMA Yozo, Chief of the 3rd Section, Staff Officer Division of the Imperial General HQ, engaged in duties on mobilization stated that, "around the beginning of 1943 at the request of the 8 Army Group to the Imperial HQ for labour, the Chief of General Staff of GHQ sent instructions and put the South Army in charge of organizing a Special Service Company, and to dispatch to the 8 Area Army Group. The content of the instructions to the South Army for those organization of these Special Service Coys was to be in conformity with the mobilisation plan." [15] After demobilisation, MIYAMA became Chief of Archives and Document Section of 1st Demobilisation Bureau.
His statement shows the mobilisation of Indian personnel came from purely operational demand, but one which is connected with the treatment of POW. [16] They are to be considered as labourers employed to fill the deficiency of manpower which would be supplied by Indonesian Heiho, as by April 1943, source of manpower for Heiho in Netherlands Indies was limited to only Ambonese and Menadonese who remained detention, because of their pro-Dutch inclination, and for fear that they might participate in anti-Japanese activities or cause instability. [17] KURODA also reported to Vice Minister, KIMURA Hyotaro on 2 April 1943 on "the status of Indian labourers as a substitute for Assistant Soldiers" (Nan-So-San 1470-1). Mobilisation of Indian soldiers was made, "because of the shortage of assistant soldiers (Indonesians who we call "Heiho") to fill up the vacancy of these companies, have been employed as a substitute for labour which should be supplied by assistant soldiers, and that they are neither assistant soldiers nor those corresponding to assistant soldiers in respect of their status and treatment." [18]
3. Duties, actual situation
Duties varied from the time and places, but all these units were on rear duty not in the front. Special Land service and Sea Service units mainly engaged in loading and unloading ships, road construction, carrying ammunition and transportation. Special Construction unit cut down trees for lumber and laboured in a sawmill under the direction of airstrip battalions. These kinds of labour were to support the Japanese force in the bottom of the hierarchy of military structure.
The orders were made with smattering English or sometimes in little Japanese words. Although Japanese language education had been given to them on the way to Rabaul from Singapore, misunderstandings of orders or difficulties of mutual communication sometimes resulted in Japanese slapping or beating them. Several Japanese veterans wrote in memoirs that they made efforts to avoid such treatment conducted by Japanese subordinates, in order to respect the cultural differences and religious custom. Indians formed Naimuhan, grouping of men in barracks for internal administrative duty mixed with Japanese personnel at the same time Indian officers retained their original chain of orders to maintain discipline.
Table 5. Strength of Asian personnel under the 8th Area Army
| Indian | Indonesian | Malay | Chinese |
| Rabaul | 5,463 | 607 | 688 | 1,397 |
| Bougainville | | | | 80 |
| New Ireland | 107 | | | 61 Source: Chaen Yoshio, BC kyu Senpan Gogun Rabaul Hotei Shiryo (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1990),144. |
For an example, 5th Special Land Service Company placed in Arigua in Bougainville had 142 Ambonese soldiers, and 498 British Indian soldiers together with 61 Japanese officers and men. Unit war diary of this company, from Sept–Oct 1943, recorded the offer of medical treatment, hospitalisation for Indian personnel same as Japanese, though general deficiency of medical supplies and food. [19] During the period from the Allied landing until January 1945, this company lost more than half of its strength: out of 278 Indians, 42 were killed, 109 died of disease or wounds, and 27 were executed. Of the 100 left over, out of 82 Ambonese, 22 were killed, 37 died of disease or wounds, 9 were executed, leaving only 17. [20]
In a post-war interrogation report, an Indian informant stated that he had been engaged in work at a wharf, but that there had been no work since January 1944 since ships were not coming in. Parties were detained for digging tunnel shelters, trenches, pill boxes, gardening extracting oil from coconuts and making salt from seawater. Although "we had a great chance of robbing them of their medicine during the loading and unloading of the ship," the situation was very difficult, as "no special food was given to us, in spite of our repeated protests and the answer given to us every time was beating."
In short, we can see the maximum effort of Japanese responsible for these companies in limited circumstances in the battlefield and desperate food conditions, however the same situation looked different to the Asian personnel who considered themselves as Prisoners of War.
We should examine what "execution" means in a cause of death. The death penalty of personnel was based on the Emergency Punishment Order issued at the end of October 1944 by ADACHI Hatazô Commander in Chief 18th Army. In his explanation regarding the issue to the Australian investigating officer, ADACHI referred to an instruction by the Army Ministry issued in April 1943, "You may treat Indian soldiers dispatched to New Guinea as a component part of the Japanese forces. The Japanese Army Criminal code can be applied to the crimes committed by them." This order was based on the principle of the Article 22 of the Japanese Army Criminal Code and also a part of the Army Criminal Code. The order provides that the death penalty can be executed without trial.
The occasion for this order arose after the Aitape campaign in Aug 1944, when hunger and starvation forced men to cannibalism, and for desertion or running away in the face of the enemy and also for those who disobeyed and even killed their officers and NCOs. The General Commander of 18th Army gave the power to award this penalty to commander of any Regiment but only in respect of personnel within his regiment. Major Generals and Lieutenant Generalss were given the power to punish anyone, whether within or without their forces, by the death penalty. However, the lower the orders went down, the more elasticity arose in the interpretation. Lieutenant MITSUBA, platoon commander of 19th Special Sea Service Company, said "general order of ADACHI was that if any Indian POW refused to comply with an order he could be killed without trial by any officer". For example, the situation for carrying out this order was applied to anyone stealing garden produce such as potato leaves, pumpkins, and lemons. Captain IZUMI, commander of 19th Special Sea Company, explained the situation in his interrogation. "To maintain the lives of all, strict discipline was necessary. In case this discipline was broken, such as someone stealing, whether it be Japanese or Indians, I had the legal authority from the General Commander under the Emergency Punishment Law to shoot to kill and this was conveyed to all my subordinates". [21] It is true that both Indian and Japanese soldiers were executed without trial under this order, [22] however this decision later brought many Japanese to the criminal court.
Aside from the cases stealing food, especially after the Aitape operation, desertion of Indians from unit could not be prevented. At this time, Indian personnel became a kind of encumbrance. YOSHIHARA Kane, Chief of Staff of 18th Army, held discussion with 18th Army HQ on Indian issue: "We even considered freeing all Indian troops. We had this in mind after the Aitape operation as from then onwards, we considered our position desperate and we considered that we would free them when we finally made our last stand as we thought it too much for them to die with us. So towards the close of the campaign I was sent to the Sepik area to tell the commanders there and that when they made their last stand, they were to free all the Indians." [23]
However, in this respect, the commander of each Indian company thought differently. Freeing them could have meant giving the Allies information of Japanese positions, and thus the question of whether to hold or release them was a grave and vital issue. 2nd Lieutenant SAITO, a Warrant Officer of 18th Special Sea Company confessed he actually shot an Indian officer in his memoir, when he found Indian officer Hanawar waving a white flag to an Australian aircraft. [24] SAITO always chose to walk to the rear in the march, and so no one could witness the incident except for hearing a gunshot, he wrote. In his trial in Rabaul, Indian survivors, who returned to India after the war, were called as witness. However, because of anair crash on their way to Rabaul, all witnesses were lost and the trial of SAITO was discarded on the ground of insufficient evidence. He was released shortly after that.
Senior officers in 8th Area Army interpreted the point regarding the act of Prisoners of War in Geneva Convention "in case of acts hostile or of scheming to desert, they shall be considered our enemy", as that "when worse comes to worse they will have to be considered enemies and we may even have to kill them." The order would entitle certain officers to carry out an execution without reference to higher authority and that the order did not lay down any procedure to be followed prior to carrying out the execution. Concerning the final treatment of Indians, Major KUDO, in August 1945, gave an order that Indians should be executed for crimes of rebellion and resisting orders at Sepik. As criminal acts of Indians were confirmed and such acts, in view of the pressing war situation, were acknowledged to correspond to the death penalty, but it was impossible to convene a court-martial.
The death rate and the number of survivors are not clear. Press accounts state that only 3,250 Indian POW out of 8,000 dispatched to New Guinea and New Britain returned home. More than 2,500 died through ill-treatment. After the arrival of POWs on New Britain they suffered months of slave labour, disease and brutal treatment. [25]
Conclusion
Serious manpower shortages forced the Japanese to depend on local recruitment to augment forces recruited from Japan. The sub-soldier system in Papua New Guinea was created to provide the labour to "cooperate" and to "support" Japan’s expansion of empire militarily. However, as the war was closing to an end, the more entangled the information and the purpose of orders about the treatment of the Asian soldiers became – the heaviest burden was imposed on the units atthe bottom of the military structure. A mobilisation plan of the convenience to dispatch the "released" POWs threw a great many Asians into the grave tragedy and Japanese into the bitter end.
Japanese personnel could not escape from being named as suspect war criminals in many cases. Since the recovered Indian personnel identified the suspects by way of accusation or personal grudge against them, Japanese members of these units took the full brunt of criticism.
As one of theaccused, and senior officer to be responsible for his subordinates in 8th Area Army, General IMAMURA never bent his view to protect the Japanese accused; that Indians were not the Prisoners of War, and the Indians dispatched to this area were a part of the Indian National Army who pledged themselves to co-operate with the Japanese Forces. He wrote petitions in the same tone several times during and after the war criminal courts. He was the one of the first Generals who made the decision to use Asian POW for labour or military mobilisation while he was in Java early 1942. He committed suicide in vain with razor on 27 July 1946 to take responsibility for sending his subordinates to war crime trials.
2nd Lieutenant SAITO Soju reflects on his days in Wewak, But and Sepik as a Warrant Officer of 18th Special Sea Service Company. He was the person in charge of 500 British Indian soldiers. In his memoir, he clearly states that he believed Indian personnel were Prisoners of War, because he himself chose the provisional members for this unit from Singapore detention camp in 1942. It was much later that he came to know that these personnel had been paroled and "released" from the status of POW before their departure to New Guinea. At the end of the war, less than 10 men out of the 500 attached to this company survived. Several Indians fled to Australian Army or were picked up by friendly Papuans when they fell behind the march and discarded by their company men.
Many authors who were in the above-mentioned units place their memoirs as requiem for the executed Japanese, and the description of their experience criticises the easy planning formed in the centre. For the Indian personnel, the Japanese authors understand that whole situation during and after the war urged them to accuse the Japanese, and hold deep compassion for them. Their memories and reflection of the experiences can never easily be identified with the view of liberation of war.
Notes
1. Furyo Shori Yoryo (Riku-A-Mitsu 1456) 6 May 1942, Utsumi Aiko, "Nihon gun to Horyo: Sono Kankei Bunsho to Kanri Kiko ni tsuite" (Japanese Army and Prisoners of War: Related Documents and Management System Structure), Utsumi Aiko, Nagai Hitoshi (eds.) Tokyo Saiban Shiryo: Furyo Johokyoku Kankei Bunsho (Tokyo, Gendai Shiryo Shuppan, 1999), 26.
2. Transferred and attached to the Hong Kong Military police and as guards. See more precise information, Furyo Geppo no.5.
3. In late April 1942, Colonel NISHIURA Susumu, then Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the Army Ministry, suggested incorporating indigenous troops into the Japanese army. He argued that such an arrangement would make it possible to "improve them gradually, and lead to the creation of an independent force which would defend Greater East Asia in the future", and that legal obstacles to this course of action could be overcome by treating such personnel as civilian employees of the army, on the model of the auxiliary military police in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria. Nihon Kindai Shi Kenkyu Kai, ed., Nishiura Susumu shi Danwa Sokkiroku, 378–79. The Army Ministry, which was already embroiled in the Army Reformation program, supported this suggestion. On 29 July 1942, the Chief of the General Staff approved the use of indigenous troops to supplement Japanese forces in the Southern Area (Tai-Riku-Shi 1196). The Army Ministry issued a set of Guidelines on 23 September 1942 (Riku- A-Mitsu 3636), and this marked the formal beginning of the Heiho system, although recruitment was already underway among former POWs. The process of establishing the Heiho, or assistant soldier, system matched pace with the treatment and release of Indian POW. The Heiho system later enlarged its mobilization for released Muslim personnel as well as civilian youth, in total, up to 80,000. Although not put into practice, Heiho sub-soldier system was to be a prototype of the local National army by the official formation of PETA in October 1943 in Indonesia. For more details on Heiho, see Kaori Maekawa, "Native Troops, under Japanese Occupation in Indonesia- the enlargement of the Heiho System and Their Perception of the Experiences", The Journal of Sophia Asian Studies (Jochi Ajia Gaku), 15 (1997). Kaori Maekawa, "Military Mobilization: Heiho during the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia 1942-45", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, in press.
4. Vice Chief of Army General Staff, TANABE held the post of Inspector General of Line of Communication (Heitan Sokan) General Headquarters in the Army section.
5. Utsumi Aiko, "Nihon Gun to Horyo", 27.
6. Utsumi, 28–9.
7. The Group had drafted 15 reports by the end of the March. Japanese military authorities began making plans for the military administration of the Southern areas in February 1941 after the First Research Group was attached to the General Staff Office. Goto Kenichi, Nihon Senryoki Indoneshia Kenkyu (Tokyo: Ryukei Shosha, 1989), 21.
8. General Headquarters of Southern General Army, "Chapter XI: Plans for Implementation of Military Administration in the South (Draft), (Dai Juichi Sho Nampo-gun Gunsei Shiko Keikaku An)", 3 Nov. 1941. This document was divided into two sections, the first containing general plans for military administration over occupied territories, and the second dealing with occupied areas individually.
9. The Liaison Conference between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government, "Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas (Nampo Senryo-chi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo)" 20 November 1941: "Principles for Administering Occupied Southern Areas in accordance with Southern Operations (Nanpo Sakusen ni tomonau Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo)", 25 November 1941.
10. Department of Armaments, The Army Ministry "Dai-toa Senso ni Tomonau Waga Jinteki Kokuryoku no Kento" (A Study of Japan’s Human Resources in the Greater East Asian War), 20 January 1942, in TAKASAKIRyuji, Jugo Nen Senso Gokuhi Shiryo Shu No.1 (Fifteen Years War Secret Documents Collection), (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1987), 22.
11. B4175/9 Notes on Trial of General IMAMURA Hitoshi, NAA Melbourne Office, "statement by Kuroda Shigenori, Chief of Staff South General Army", 22 April 1943.
12. Interrogation of G.A. Waheed, MP742/1 336/1/1205.
13. Several companies held a copy of the written oath. According to Gen. Imamura, (a) 2nd Spacial Land Service Comp had been safe keeping a copy of the said written oath in this, area, but burnt it up by mistake in Aug of 1945 upon the cessation of hostilities. (b) Acopy of the written oath kept by the 3ed Special Land Service Comp is now in safe-keeping with 2nd Lieut. Kotani the former commandant of the first compound of POW in Singapore. The representative of the Indians who affixed their signatures if Lieut. Padamusin. (c) The 6th Special Land Service Company transfer the management of a copy of the written oath in their possession to Captain Tazumi, Comandant of the 4th Detachment of Malay compound of POW and to Lieut. Colonel Kazuhiko Fukase, Chief of the third detachment on Jan. of 1943, when the said company departed. MP742/1 336/1/1205 12/20.
14. MP742/1 336/1/1205 12/20, AWM54 1010/1/23, Trials of Senior Japanese officials, "Status of Indian Labours", Document for releasing on parole and thereof as well as copies of written documents regarding the handing over of the Indians, The Fourth Special Land Service.
15. Report by Miyama Yozo, Chief of Archives and Document Section, 1st Demobilization Bureau, 31 Dec 1946. MP742/1 336/1/1205 "Trials of Senior Japanese Officials" According to MIYAMA, "documents relating to the mobilisation plan have been burnt after surrender, as I do not remember in detail but the composition of those Coys included Japanese soldiers, civilians, and inhabitants. The inhabitants were employed from voluntary and among the included Indian prisoners of war released on parole. The Indian in the Japanese Coys are part of the strength and their status (treatment) is connected to be in proportion with Japanese civilians."
16. Article 6 of the Hague Convention in 1911 which Japan ratified, provides that POWs may be employed but "the work shall not be excessive, and shall have no connection with the operations of the war." YOSHIHARA Kane, Chief of Staff of 18 Army, received instruction that the Indians were to be treated as Japanese soldiers, except that their ration was to include flour mixed with rice, instead of rice. He laid stress on the point that they worked behind the front lines, never in front-line, unloading ships, constructing airfields, distributing rations, and general labour work. Concerning the division of labour in front or in behind, Gen. IMAMURA stated it was considered that if Japanese used them not in front, it would definitely avoid the conflict with International law of the Treatment of Prisoners of War, article 31 Geneva Convention in 1929 although Japan did not ratified it.
17. The decision not to free Ambonese and Menadonese prisoners can be traced to a series of intelligence studies conducted on the KNIL in August 1941 by the Japanese General Staff Office, which called attention to the strong links between these groups and the Dutch: "While cadres of the Dutch Colonial Army are regarded as being loyal to their country, Eurasian personnel are inferior, and in the case of native personnel, the extent of loyalty toward their country is uncertain. Christian Menadonese and Ambonese as a whole, however, have strong loyalty to the Dutch Colonial Government, due to their receiving material benefits from the colonial authorities". General Staff Office, "The 2nd Report: Investigations regarding the nature and ability of KNIL" (Ran’In Gun Jo 2 Go: Ranin Gun no Soshitsu oyobi Noryoku ni kansuru Kento), 31 August 1941. The document appears to be part of a set of intelligence studies which would provide valuable information concerning how the General Staff Office regarded the KNIL and its former members, but the rest of the series has not survived.
18. The following groups of Indians were regarded as labourers: those incorporated into 1st to 7th Special Land Service Companies, 16th to 20the Special Sea Service Companies, 26th and 27the Special Construction Service Companies, those who were released on parole under Japanese instruction Nan-So-San 1445-1.
19. There were difference in quantity of supplies such as cigarettes and alcohol according to their status, one is sub-soldiers and the other was labour personnel Tokusetu Rikujo Kinmu Dai 5 Chutai, (5th Special Land Service Company) Jinchu Nisshi (War Diaries) Sept – Oct, 1943. Boei Kenkyu Sho.
20. Dai-ichi Fukuin Kyoku (The first Demobilisation Bureau), Tobu Nyuginia Homen Butai Ryakureki (Brief Record of Military Units in Eastern New Guinea), Boei Kenkyu Sho.
21. MP 742/1, 336/1/1205, 6/20
22. Interrogation of Lieutenant General SHOGE Ryoichi, staff officer 18 Army HQ, MP 742/1, 336/1/1205, 6/20
23. Interrogation of Liuetenant General YOSHIHARA Kane, 19, 29 Dec 45 at Wewak. MP 742/1, 336/1/1205, 8/20
24. SAITO Soju, Watashi no Nyuginia (My New Guinea), (Tokyo: published privately, 1999)
25. MP 742/1, 336/1/1205 Trials of Senior Japanese Officials, Memorandum from 1 Aust War Crime Sec to Army Melbourne, 21 Feb 1947.(1/20)
