At the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Rabaul, the Japanese had a lofty ideal about the treatment of the indigenous population. In early 1942, Supreme Commander TOKUNAGA expressed his idea to the Secretary of Finance of Minseibu (Civil Administration Unit): "Considering the Japanese ideals in this war, we should be prepared to give a watch or two to the natives in order to improve their living standard."(1) But his ideal was not reflected in the actual orders. The occupation force issued a set of orders to the guard forces regarding the treatment of indigenous population, stating that the primary aim in treating the villagers was to utilise their labour.(2) To this end, the Japanese attempted to shift the loyalty of the villagers from the former Australian administration to the Japanese through demonstrating the superiority and prestige of the Imperial Army.(3) The idea of the Japanese to win local respect was demonstrated in the orders regarding the contact with villagers. The orders prohibited Japanese from entering village dwellings and from chatting with villagers on an equal level. Approaching local women was strictly forbidden. Respect for local property and proper payment for goods were ordered.(4)
Two Supreme Commanders, Vice-Admiral KUSAKA Jin'ichi of the Navy, and Lieutenant General IMAMURA Hitoshi of the Army, also ordered discipline and leniency. Imamura was notable for his lenient policy towards the local population in Java where he had been posted prior to coming to Rabaul.(5) In Java his attitude caused a schism among other senior staff who insisted on a hard-line policy, and IMAMURA related after the war that this discord was a reason for his transfer to Rabaul.(6) TSUNODA argues that IMAMURA’s leniency did not come from his ideal of liberating indigenous people under Western rule, but rather from his judgement that the acquisition of natural resources, which was the primary mission of the occupation forces, was only possible by having local support, and for this reason leniency was appropriate.(7)
The establishment of Japanese authority accompanied the destruction of "white" authority. In Rabaul the Japanese interned the white residents and tried to send most of them to Japan aboard the Montevideo Maru.(8) Some remaining white residents, together with Allied prisoners were interned in a compound and assigned manual labour. The Japanese treated most whites harshly. The sight of former masters doing work previously done by indigenous servants surprised the villagers and worked effectively to make them realise who was the new authority. At Kavieng the Japanese told the villagers to gather around and watch the white people carrying bags of sand from the beaches.(9)
Banning church services was another measure aimed at eliminating Western influence. The Japanese built a barbed wire fence around Vunapope Mission of Sacred Heart, and all missionaries were interned and placed under close watch.(10) An indigenous catechist, To Rot, was murdered by Military Police because he conducted his church service – breaking the Japanese order.(11) Although the Japanese did not impose their own religion on the villages, they opened several schools in order to spread their propaganda.(12) In one school, the Japanese selected village youths and trained them for air raid precautions, airplane spotting and taught several topics related to expected enemy landing.(13) Teachers were normally junior staff of Minseibu who received a language training in Pidgin English.
Around the middle of 1943, the Allied counter-offensive intensified and Rabaul was isolated, leading to a lowering of Japanese morale and a slackening of discipline. This was exacerbated by the rapidly decreasing stock of food due to the disruption of the supply line. Most provisions that they already had received were preserved for the expected final battle against the Allied landing. From then on, all Japanese were obliged to engage in farming to complement the food shortage.(14) They starved. Consequently towards the end of the war, numerous incidents were reported of Japanese raiding native gardens, stealing domestic pigs and fowls, cutting coconut trees and killing villagers who opposed this pillage.(15) Japanese plunder of native gardens only worsened the food situation for villagers.
The harsh treatment of the villagers was exacerbated by Japanese suspicions of villagers' espionage activities. In fact, some villagers were acting for Australian intelligence, reporting the Japanese situation, guiding air raids and assisting sabotage.(16) The Japanese were aware of those pro-Allied locals and coast watchers in and around Rabaul, and their anxiety increased as the Allied bombing became intense and accurate in 1944.(17) As a result, the Japanese regarded any suspicious behaviour, disobedience and lack of respect for the Japanese as anti-Japanese activities and punished offenders severely.
Numerous records can be found in files of the war crime trials on Japanese ill-treatment of indigenous people, Chinese and Australian residents.(18) The accurate number of villagers who were killed by the Japanese is difficult to estimate due to the paucity of documented records. The most reliable source is postwar reports of patrol officers who conducted investigation on war damages for compensation. The Australian government compensated villagers even for the loss and damage caused by the Japanese in order to regain villagers’ confidence in their administration and to express their gratitude for their cooperation during the war. In Kokopo area, at least one or two members of all 17 villages were killed by the Japanese for reasons such as "suspected of assisting an Allied airman to escape"; "accused of leaving the village with the intention of joining Australian troops", "suspected of assisting Australian troops", "suspected of being contact with Mr English [Australian intelligence officer]", "accused of spying when found in close proximity to Japanese living quarter one night", and so on.(19) In Keberinga Village, the Japanese massacred the villagers, and the patrol officers estimated at least 40 were killed in this.(20)
The Chinese were another target of brutality mainly because the Japanese suspected that some were members of Kuomintang Party. Those Chinese who were suspected of leaking information to the Australian troops or of holding information, were beaten, tortured and executed.(21) Japanese suspicion against Chinese seems to be so deep. There was an allegation that one Japanese Military Policeman thrashed a Chinese man only because he possessed electric light bulbs, a union jack flag and lead wire.(22) Similarly three members of Harvey (an Australian coconut planter family at Keravat) - a husband, wife and their son - were executed suspected of spying.(23) Indigenous Christian sisters were tortured, being suspected of holding information.(24)
Some Japanese veterans recollected the development of friendships with villagers.(25) Vice Admiral KUSAKA Jin’ichi claimed that the fairness of administration of Minseibu in the treatment of indigenous population was proved by the fact that there was no indigenous uprisings against the Japanese after the surrender.(26) This is partly true. However, the most cordial relations existed mainly for the first two years of the occupation when they had sufficient supplies and did not suffer from severe air raids by the Allies, although there was a case of friendship that lasted even after the war.(27)
Notes
(1) KAYA, Kan, “Harukanaru seishun - kaigun no omoide [Young days long ago - memories of the Navy]”, Yasukawa (ed.), Kaiso no nebi laifu - dai 3 ki tanki geneki kaigun shukei ka shikan bunshu [Reminiscence of the Navy life - collection of writings by the 3rd short-term service naval pay officers], (Tokyo: 68 kai bunshu kanko kai, 1984): 213.
(2) A set of Japanese orders to the guard forces at Rabaul, 1 July 1942, National Archives of Australia (hereafter abbreviated as NAA), AWM54-506/2/2, "Intelligence Information Memorandum, No.32. The Japanese attitude towards natives in New Guinea and the Solomons".
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) TSUNADO Fusako, Sekinin rabauru no shogun Imamura Hitoshi [Responsibility of Supreme Commander of Rabaul Imamura Hitoshi], (Tokyo: Shincho-sha, 1984): 224–25.
(6) Ibid., 341.
(7) Ibid., 383.
(8) Although this ship was sunk off Luzon by a US submarine.
(9) Statement of Peter Lawrenteus Kylert, Rabaul, 10 September 1944, NAA, AWM54-779/3/93, "Handling of personnel (civilian) liberated from Japanese occupied territories. Report by Lt. Archer - Intelligence Summary. Rabaul - Pondo Area by W.O. Robson, R.A.A.F. containing interrogation of Kylert, Natives etc. brought out by Archer Patrol. Statement of evacuees from New Britain".
(10) Statement of Fr Josef Leo Brenninkmeyer, member of the Mission of the Sacred Heart, Vunapope, interviewed at C.T.C. Lae, in December 1945, AA, AWM54-1010/9/117, "Statements by Missionaries regarding the treatment of Prisoners of War and Natives during the invasion of New Britain".
(11) Investigating officer’s report, 12 August 1948, NAA, MP742/1-336/1/1955 BOX1, "[1] New Britain 4 Part 1 - War crimes - Rabaul area".
(12) Sworn statement of YONEZATO Tsuruzo, 7 June 1949, NAA, MP742/1-336/1/1955 BOX 3, "[15] 155/1 - Safe custody - War crimes Rabaul - Investigating officer Capt. Tindale".
(13) Sworn statement by MATSUDA Kiyoshi, 27 April 1949, NAA, MP742/1-336/1/1955 BOX 2, "[9] 155/1 - War crimes - Rabaul - New Britain".
(14) TANAKA Kanegoro, Papua nyuginia chi"hiki ni okeru kyu-nihon-riku-kaigun-butai no dai 2 ji sekai-taisen kan no sho-sakusen [Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea theatre during Word War II], (Tokyo: Nihon-Papua nyuginia yuko kyokai, 1980): 98–100.
(15) Report of Patrol Officer Douglas J. Parrish, Patrol report No. K1/46 of patrol to headwaters of the Warangoi river, 20 August 1946; Patrol Officer Douglas J. Parrish, Patrol Report No. 2/46 of patrols in North coast Bainings division of Gazelle peninsula, 15 October 1947; Report of Cadet Patrol Officer K.J. Lang, No. KPO 3-49/50, 15 February 1950; Patrol Reports. E.N.B. KOKOPO 1946-1970, MCN 1036, National Library of Australia.
(16) Alan J. Leadley, “A history of the Japanese occupation of the New Guinea islands and its effects”, MA thesis, (Port Moresby: University of Papua New Guinea, 1976): 133–37.
(17) TANAKA, 94.
(18) They are kept mainly at Australian War Memorial Research Centre and the Melbourne Office of the National Archives of Australia. Patrol Reports also contain detailed records.and are kept at National Library of Australia.
(19) Patrol Officer, Douglas J. Parrish, Patrol report No. K1/46 dated 20 August 1946, of patrol to headwaters of the Warangoi River, Patrol Reports. E.N.B. KOKOPO 1946-1970, MCN 1036, National Library of Australia.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Many testimonies are kept in NAA, AWM54-1010/9/119, "Japanese Atrocities: Statements by Chinese and Native Witnesses".
(22) Statement taken by Lieut. W.J. Lewer, 11 January 1946, NAA, AWM54-1010/4/161, "Statements by Native Police Boys, re the illtreatment of natives".
(23) Execution Mr. and Mrs. A.A. Harvey and their son, 12 October 1949, NAA, MP742/1-336/1/1955 BOX1, "[3] New Britain 4 Part 3 - War crimes - Rabaul area - Matupi massacres".
(24) Statement of Fr Josef Leo Brenninkmeyer.
(25) For exmple, YANAGIBA Yutaka, "Nankai shitai guamu rabauru senryo hiwa [secret stories of occupation of Guam and Rabaul by the South Seas Detachment]", Taiheiyo senso shogen shirizu 8, Maru, Bessatsu, sensho no hibi (shosen no riku-kaisen) [Series of testimonies of the Pacific War 8, Maru, special issue, days of victory (land and sea battles in early stage)], (Tokyo: Shio shobo, 1989): 281; OTAKI Mitsuo, "Waga shoku dai 1 chutai no ki [Record of the 1st Search Light battalion]", Senyu [Comrade], 11 (1972) (Osaka: Bo-to senyu-kai):29.
(26) KUSAKA Jin’ichi, Rabauru sensen ijo nashi [All quiet on the Rabaul Front], (Tokyo: Kowado, 1968): 103.
(27) For example, see MIZUKI Shigeru, Mizuki Shigeru’s Rabauru senki [History of battle at Rabaul by Mizuki Shigeru], (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo, 1994).
Japanese attitude:
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