Remembering the war in New Guinea
Milne Bay–Rabi, 1942 (Longer text)
Module name: Campaign history (All groups perspective)
This page was contributed by Mr John Moremon (Australian War Memorial)
The battle for Milne Bay is also known by the Japanese as the battle for Rabi, as this was the village closest to where the Japanese landed.
The decision to establish an Allied base on Papua’s eastern tip was made shortly after the battle of the Coral Sea. General MacArthur decided to build an airbase there so aircraft could patrol the approaches to Port Moresby and raid Rabaul without needing to fly over the Owen Stanley Range.
In June 1942 a patrol reported that Milne Bay possessed all the key features required for base development: a deep harbour, tracts of flat land, fresh water, construction materials including coral, gravel and wood, and villagers who could be employed as labourers.
Milne Bay was an awful place. It was virtually cut off from the rest of Papua, with the only access by sea and air. Jungle-clad mountains pressed in from three sides and swamps rimmed the coastal belt. During the months in which the base was set up, there were seasonal torrential rains and it was oppressively humid. It was also one of the worst places ever discovered for malaria – the disease classified as hyperendemic with up to 90 per cent of villagers infected.
Before the war, Australian planters established coconut plantations but these were deserted in early 1942. The few houses and huts, jetties, roads and tracks were in poor shape. Plantation managers had implemented malaria control measures including drainage dug by Papuan employees, but the drains had fallen into disrepair.
Australia New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) officers employed villagers to cut kunai grass on the site of the proposed airfield and to build a pier. In late June, a company of American engineers arrived along with an Australian militia battalion and anti-aircraft battery. The engineers constructed airfields assisted by Papuan men and women, while Australians and Papuans built and maintained roads and bridges, cleared campsites, and constructed wharves. Faced with shortages of manpower, equipment and tools, the Allies adopted some Papuan construction methods: for example, villagers took over pile-driving for jetties using their manpower-intensive techniques, and demonstrated the laying of timber stringers as corduroy on boggy roads.
During July and August, over 6,000 troops were posted to Milne Force under the command of an Australian, Major General C. A. Clowes. Along with engineers, Clowes had the 7th and 18th Infantry Brigades, the latter a veteran of North Africa, who mostly worked as labourers building roads and unloading ships. Two RAAF fighter squadrons, 75 and 76, equipped with Curtiss P-40 Kittyhawks also arrived.
The Japanese did not know about the base when they started planning. Their intention was to land an army detachment and start a second advance on Port Moresby. When construction activities were detected, it became necessary to attack the base. Intelligence suggested it was defended by two or three infantry companies, along with twenty or thirty aircraft. The detachment earmarked for the operation was still in the Philippines so Vice-Admiral MIKAWA Gun’ichi, commander of the 8th Fleet, decided to land naval troops.
The fleet sailed from Rabaul on 24 August 1942 with 1,171 troops of the 5th Special Naval Landing Force and 16th Naval Pioneer Unit. A second force of 353 troops sailed from Buna to make a second landing, but Kittyhawks destroyed their barges when beached on Goodenough Island and the troops were stranded.
Shortly after midnight on the night of 25–26 August, the main fleet entered Milne Bay and landed troops at K. B. Mission, near Rabi, on the Australians’ left flank. They pushed back the militia battalion defending that sector.
The battle was the first in New Guinea in which the Allies could employ direct air support decisively. Despite the difficulty of observing through the jungle canopy, at daybreak Kittyhawk pilots began bombing and strafing Japanese troops and supply lines. The Japanese suffered a further setback when three light tanks that had caused havoc amongst Australian troops were disabled after becoming bogged.
Despite air attacks, the Japanese pushed back the 61st and veteran 2/10th Battalions. There was some panic at MacArthur’s General Headquarters, however Clowes had four fresh battalions. He positioned two militia battalions and the American engineers at No. 3 Airstrip to make a stand. Supported by anti-tank, anti-aircraft and field artillery batteries, and with open ground to site and range machine-guns and mortars, this defensive line was formidable. On 30–31 August, the Japanese attacked repeatedly but, after incurring heavy losses, fell into retreat.
The Australians launched a counter-attack using the fresh 2/9th and 2/12th Battalions. Fury was fuelled by the discovery of some bodies of Australians who had obviously been tortured and murdered after surrendering. No Japanese were taken prisoner.
The further the Australians counter-attacked, the harder it became to deliver reinforcements, ammunition and supplies. Roads were in poor condition which meant trucks could not reach the forward area; villagers made themselves scarce and thus unavailable for carrying; and only a handful of small vessels were found to move men and supplies along the coast.
The Japanese evacuated about half the landing force by sea. By 5 September, only stragglers remained and were dealt with by Australian patrols over the following weeks. The battle cost the Japanese about 600 men. The Australians lost 123 and 198 were wounded; one American was killed and two wounded.
Having secured the base, the Allies stepped up development. As more mechanical equipment arrived, engineers improved the port, roads, storage facilities and accommodation – assisted at all times by other troops and villagers. Milne Bay was to be a primary supply base for the planned attack on Buna, using small ships to transport stores.
However, there was another, very different battle still to be waged. When Milne Force was established, the Allies had no real comprehension of the threat posed by malaria. Troops arrived wearing shorts, lacking mosquito nets, and resisted orders to wear long sleeve shirts at night; initially there was no quinine; and water near campsites was neither drained nor oiled to eradicate mosquitoes. By the time ‘malaria consciousness’ was enforced, the damage was done. Almost the entire force was infected. There was an incubation period, so only a small number suffered bouts before and during the Japanese attack, but an epidemic then erupted.
At any given time, hundreds of men suffered attacks of malaria and, with too few hospital beds to treat them, many were evacuated to Australia. The epidemic peaked in October–November but was not brought under control until early the following year. Nature thus proved as effective an enemy as the Japanese.