Introduction
It is said that people are transparent on the field of war. The noble and the base of humanity are clearly exposed on the battlefield where life itself hangs in the balance. The battlefields at the extremities of the Greater East Asian War, at Guadalcanal where supplies were blockaded, in New Guinea and Imphal, are perhaps representative. Among these, however, surely the soldiers of the 18th Army in eastern New Guinea were dealt the cruelest of all fates. Here, units fought on even though they were reduced to 10 per cent of their original strength. Where once over 140,000 men of the 18th Army roamed the battlefields, in the end a scant 13,000 struggled to maintain discipline as a fighting force. I would like to retrace the steps of ADACHI Hatazô, the commander of the 18th Army, to discover what type of man he was, and what kind of leadership he undertook.
1. The journey to the battlefields of New Guinea
ADACHI Hatazô was born in Ishikawa Prefecture in 1890 the fourth son of ADACHI Matsutarô, a military teacher. His older brothers, Sôroku and Jûku, and his younger brothers, Hatago, Mitokazu and Mitoji, were also named after the year of their birth. [1]
Hatazô completed primary school was appointed Second Lieutenant in 1940 after leaving the Military Academy. He then progressed from the First Imperial Guards Regiment to the Military Staff College. After serving with General Staff Headquarters, and periods as a regimental and divisional commander, he was appointed Head of General Staff of the North China Area Army in November 1940. He served under OKAMURA Yasuji, famous for his "love of the people" leadership policies. The flames of war spread like wildfire from continental China into the Pacific. The Navy, basking in unimagined successes in various campaigns against the US and England, began the FS Operation which was intended to blockade supply between the US and Australia. The Army, having received an unexpected call to be dispatched to the South Pacific, advanced into the relatively uncharted islands of New Guinea and the Solomons. They were soon confronted with the management of an invasion of Guadalcanal without sufficient Naval air support.
The 17th Army, led by General HYAKUTAKE Haruyoshi, was responsible for eastern New Guinea and the Solomons areas. However, in order for it to concentrate exclusively on the focal campaigns at Guadalcanal, Imperial Headquarters, in November 1942, formed in the region the 8th Area Army to be led by Lieutenant General IMAMURA Hitoshi, and the 18th Army to be commanded by Lieutenant General ADACHI Hatazô.
Mobilisation of the 18th Army was completed on 16 November at the Ichigaya base with a ceremony marking the departure of the formation. The troops, on parade in full military dress, received an address that was hardly considered possible for the Army at that time. Commander ADACHI implored his troops to "Do everything with love!" The scene was described in the Japanese Official War History as follows:
In the eager unit, the word "love" struck a deep impression on the reactionary spirit of the troops. It was an episode that suggested the essence of the command of the 18th Army over the ensuing three years. [2]
After that, the 18th Army began a bitter fight which lasted two and one half years against an Allied army proud of its naval and air superiority.
General MacArthur, the commander of the combined US and Australian forces, recalled all officers of the divisional command level and lower from the bitter fighting on the new front at Buna. It is said that he appointed Lieutenant General Eichelberger to the command of the 1st Corps with the statement, "I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive". [3] The Army and Navy Garrison that fought at Buna inflicted over 8,600 casualties (2,959 US, 5,698 Australian), much more than it’s own killed and injured. [4] The fierce fighting after Buna continued at Giruwa, Salamaua, Lae and Finschhafen, spanning a battleground of more than 1,000 kilometres.
2. The officer’s lot
The 20th and 41st Divisions were incorporated into the strength of the 18th Army in March 1943 and arrived safely from Parao. The 51st Division, however, led by Lieutenant General NAKANO Hidemitsu, came under Allied air attack in the Dampier Strait while being transported from Rabaul. All eight transport ships and four destroyers were sunk with the loss of 3,664 men. The division, which comprised only 2,427 men rescued after the disaster, was transported to Finschhafen in April 1943. It was later incorporated into the South Seas Force and entrusted with the protection of Lae and Salamaua. US troops landed at Nassau Bay north of Salamaua at the end of June which developed into a relentless defensive battle over the following two months. The 9th Australian Division landed on 4 September east of the strategic rear position at Lae. The following day, the 7th Australian Division were dropped to the east of Lae. The 51st Division was facing an enemy from the front and the rear. The line of communication to the main strength of the Army at Madang had been blockaded. Consequently, Commander ADACHI ordered Divisional Commander NAKANO to withdraw to consolidate with the main force.
The course of withdrawal was either to break through the Australian and US troops that occupied the coastal areas, or to cross the Saruwaged Range that towered some 4,500 metres to the rear of their position. Commander NAKANO sent former Olympic Marathon runner Lieutenant KITAMOTO to reconnoitre the crossing of the snow-covered mountain where it fell to thirty degrees below zero. KITAMOTO’s report that "it will be difficult, but it is possible", confirmed NAKANO’s determination to cross the Saruwaged Range. At the time of the departure of the unit, arrangements were made to evacuate by large barges the approximately 100 seriously injured soldiers who remained at Lae.
Approximately 8,600 troops departed with each carrying ten days rations. About 2,200 of these men were lost en route; either their malaria ravages bodies succumbed to the cold, or they plummeted from steep precipices. For over a month, they trudged along together. Troops had been dispatched from Kiria on the other side of the mountains with food and medicines. It is said that they embraced and wept for joy when they met their retreating colleagues in the mountains.
These men had somehow survived in the face of despair, but an even harsher fate awaited them.
3. The attack of the 18th Army on Aitape
On 22 April 1944, MacArthur attempted to halt the western advance of ADACHI’s forces by landing the main strength of his army at Hollandia, and dispatching an Army Corps to Aitape. These "island hopping manoeuvres" by the US and Australian Armies were movements in front of the advancing Japanese forces.
From 25 March, the 18th Army was removed from the order of battle of the 8th Area Army at Rabaul and placed under the command of the 2nd Area Army in Western New Guinea (Lieutenant General ANAMI Korechika). However, the Allied landings had broken the line of communication to the Area Army. Consequently, Imperial Headquarters considered the 18th Army to be under the control of the Southern Area Army from 17 June. The 18th Army, however, was severed from the Area Army’s line of supply, and was therefore fighting a solitary battle in the South Pacific. The 18th Army was ordered to "simply carry out general holding operations to sustain key areas in the region". This notice effectively ended their future as a fighting force, and forced them to become self-sufficient for supplies.
At that time, Commander ADACHI’s troops numbered some 55,000, but there were only enough supplies in store to last two months. After that period, self-sufficiency could not be attained even if the entire arable land that fed the 15,000 local natives was confiscated. It was estimated that three months supplies could be obtained by felling and burning the virgin forests. These conditions were expressed by the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General YOSHIHARA Kane: "There is death in staying, and death in going. We are facing disaster both in retreat and in advance." [5]
Under these circumstances, Lieutenant General ADACHI determined to attack Aitape regardless. The campaign opened on 10 July with the 20th and 41st Divisions. The Commander issued the following instructions at the start of the battle.
Today, with our Army at barely fighting strength, we are sitting around idly in a meaningless existence. We must not be remembered as the soldiers, in all of Japanese history, who sought to live with a thousand regrets that we did not do what we must do. This must be banished from our thoughts, and the fighting spirit of all the army must be roused. We must confront the conditions that face us, and ensure that the true worth of the Imperial Army is raised high.
The Chief of General Staff made the following reminiscence on the Commander’s decision.
A person may say, the commander may have sufficient courage to adopt a course of action that has no regard for human life, but is it not a crime, then, to drive innocent troops to these killing fields based on his determination?
However, it is in no way possible for a comrade to harbour a desire to live while all others die; that is, one with absolutely no self interest can not say such things. A person who embraces both life and death in comradeship – one who can say if you die, I will die, or if you live, I will live – can sympathise from the start with such a position. [6]
The attack ceased on 3 August. The Japanese suffered approximately 9,000 casualties in that period while inflicting 3,000 casualties on US troops. The troops in this attack on Aitape repeatedly suffered hardships and fought over an front of several hundred kilometres, but delayed the advance of the US Army to the Philippines by 22 months. As a result, General Eichelberger remarked that: "The most bitter fighting during the Pacific Island campaign was against ADACHI’s 18th Army". [7]
4. ADACHI’s command policy
Barely 13,000 among the original 140,000 men of the 18th Army survived to meet the end of the war. After hostilities ceased, the Army was once more placed under the command of the 8th Area Army in Rabaul. Although repatriation to Japan gradually began for most, some 140 suspected war criminals were detained in a compound in Rabaul; they were called the Hikari Butai by General IMAMURA. [8]
Notice of the official completion of war crimes trials arrived from the commander of the Australian 8th Administrative District on 8 September 1947. The remaining eight suspects, who were held until the end, were subsequently released on the following day. Lieutenant General ADACHI, on the day he heard this expected good news, resolved to carry out his prearranged plan to commit suicide. Later that day he visited the group of Japanese lawyers and expressed his gratitude, and then entrusted his staff officers with his affairs after his death. His preparations lasted late into the night. Just after 2 am on 10 September, he sat upright in military dress uniform, faced the country of his birth, and committed ritual suicide with a rusty knife. This alone, however, did not kill him; he died only after cutting his carotid artery by his own hand. It was a death worthy of the words of a Shogun who said "a man will die by any means once he has truly reached a determination to die". [9]
However, by what creed did ADACHI Hatazô, a man who could carryout such determination, live? His command policy comprised the following four items:
1. austere military discipline;
2. an iron-clad unity;
3. a zealous fighting spirit;
4. policies that adapt to actual conditions.
Colonel SUGIYAMA Shigeru, a high-ranking officer of the General Staff, said of Commander ADACHI:
He enforced his policies to the letter to the very end—you could say they were carried out by his example. For item 1, command was pure and uncomplicated. There was not the merest hint of self-interest. The commander of the army was severely disciplined in himself on this point
Concerning policies that adapt to actual conditions, often, when the situations of a formation were examined and problems arose, they were dealt with by himself. He strove to incorporate opinions from his units in his dealings. This was related to his notions of "trust and love".
Further, staff officer Lt Col TANAKA Kengorô said of his "policies that adapt to actual situations":
He strongly rejected proposals based on appearance and theoretical strategic tricks that ignored the actual conditions. When it came down to the actual conditions, even though appearance was considered unrelated, strategies were adopted to achieve victory.
The staff officers judged his character and credentials for command in a similar way. His last statement, to be examined below, perhaps speaks to all of the depth of spirit ultimately attained by the man ADACHI Hatazô.
5. "Trust and love" in his "Final Testament"
To the officers and staff of the former 18th Army in the compound:
I have decided today to make a final farewell to those whom I love most.
I felt it a great honour to have been appointed the commander in chief in November 1942, at a time when the issue of the day was to be settled, and posted to the point of strategic importance in order to ensure that the tide of war moved in our favour. I was thankful for that appointment. However, notwithstanding the fact that my officers and men did their best in the exceptional circumstances, surmounting all difficulties, and that my superiors gave the utmost assistance, the hoped-for end was not attained, because of my inability. Thus I paved the way for my country to be driven into the present predicament. The crime deserves death.
During the past three years of operations more than 100,000 youthful and promising officers and men were lost and most of them died of malnutrition. When I think of this, I know not what apologies to make to His Majesty the Emperor and I feel that I myself am overwhelmed with shame.
Our Imperial country totters on the brink of disaster. I believe it is the natural path for our citizens and soldiers alike to continue fighting until the last drop of our blood is shed. I have demanded perseverance far exceeding the limit of man’s endurance of my officers and men, who were exhausted and emaciated as a result of successive campaigns and for want of supplies. However, my officers and men all followed my orders in silence without grumbling, and, when exhausted, they succumbed to death just like flowers falling in the winds. God knows how I felt when I saw them dying, my bosom being filled with pity for them, though it was solely to their country that they dedicated their lives. At that time I made up my mind not to set foot on my country’s soil again but to remain as a clod of earth in the Southern Seas with the 100,000 officers and men, even if a time should come when I would be able to return to my country in triumph. [11]
The text of this testament is sufficient to recognise the sense of duty of a commander that "demanded perseverance far exceeding the limit of man’s endurance". Lieutenant General ADACHI saw his soldiers, who "when exhausted, succumbed to death just like flowers falling in the winds". He fulfilled his promise "not to set foot on [his]country’s soil again but to remain as a clod of earth in the Southern Seas" with his men. The words of the commander were those of a comrade-at-arms: "who can say if you die, I will die, or if you live, I will live". This was proof of his "pure and uncomplicated" command. It could be said that he was martyred for the "trust and love" for his soldiers.
Concluding remarks
Whether or not it was possible for the organisation of the army to be maintained on that last, grim battlefield lies, in the final count, in the sense of responsibility the commander held towards his troops that were stricken and led to their death. There is great disparity in the substance of humanity. The commander’s outlook on life was not just a personal concern, but must surely been seen to be equally entwined with the lives of the troops under his command. Whereas it is possible to compel a person to die because of this sense of comradeship, it is also natural to entice them to fight for survival in the face of death. Command of the 18th Army was based in leadership that espoused "do everything with love", and sought "policies that adapt to actual conditions". Such obedience to orders could not be established without similar trust in the commander and senior officers.
The transparency of humanity on the field of battle is in most cases the perspective of the troops looking at the commanders in whom their lives are entrusted. One has a renewed appreciation that obedience based in trust and love emerges for the first time in a military unit when its command and leadership responds to the actual everyday conditions.
The psychological bond between the troops and their commander forged on these battlefields at the extremities was perfected on the day the war crimes trials were completed. Through his own actions, the commander had fulfilled his promise to his men.
Notes
1. [Translator’s note: The characters used to write Hatazô mean twenty-three, which corresponds to the twenty-third year of the Meiji period, i.e. 1890. His brothers were given characters meaning sixteen, nineteen, twenty-five, thirty-one and thirty-two.]
2. Bôeichô Bôei Kenshûjo Senshishitu (ed.), Senshi sôsho Minami Taiheiyô rikugun sakusen 2: Gadarukanaru-Buna sakusen (Official war history South Pacific Area army operations, vol.2: Guadalcanal-Buna operations), Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1969, pp. 249–250.
3. Bôeichô Bôei Kenshûjo Senshishitu (ed.), Senshi sôsho Minami Taiheiyô rikugun sakusen 2: Gadarukanaru-Buna sakusen (Official war history South Pacific Area army operations, vol.2: Guadalcanal-Buna operations), Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1969, p. 353. (The original quote is from Robert Eichelberger, Our jungle road to Tokyo, New York: Viking Press.
4. ITÔ Masanori, Teikoku Rikugun no saigo: kessen hen (The end of the Imperial Army: the decisive battle volume), Tokyo: Bungei Shunga Shinsha, 1960, p. 161. [Translator’s note: These figures are much lower according to Australian records.]
5. Bôeichô Bôei Kenshûjo Senshishitu (ed.), Senshi sôsho Minami Taiheiyô rikugun sakusen 5: Aitape–Puriaka–Rabauru (Official war history South Pacific Area army operations, vol.5: Aitape, Puriaka, Rabaul), Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1960, p. 100.
6. Bôeichô Bôei Kenshûjo Senshishitu (ed.), Senshi sôsho Minami Taiheiyô rikugun sakusen 5, p. 101.
7. ITÔ Masanori, Teikoku Rikugun no saigo: kessen hen, p. 161.
8. [Translator’s note: This is translated literally as the Radiant Unit.]
9. KOMATSU Shigerô, Ai no tôhitsu Adachi Hatazô (ADACHI Hatazô, who led with love), Tokyo: Kôjinsha, p. 118.
10. Bôeichô Bôei Kenshûjo Senshishitu (ed.), Senshi sôsho Minami Taiheiyô rikugun sakusen 5, p. 131.
11. Bôeichô Bôei Kenshûjo Senshishitu (ed.), Senshi sôsho Minami Taiheiyô rikugun sakusen 5, pp. 451–454.
Japanese occupation:
Overview text ADACHI HatazôRelated theme/s:
Campaign outline Japanese occupation Click images to enlarge.
Contributed by Lt Col Kuzuhara
Contributed by Lt Col Kuzuhara
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