What role did propaganda and spying play in New Guinea? (QnA)
This page was contributed by Mr Stephen Robinson (Department of Veteran's Affairs)

At the outbreak of war, New Guinea had not been surveyed properly and, apart from some remote areas of geological interest to mining companies, maps were poor or non-existent. . Military commanders from both sides therefore had limited information on which to plan, and even less understanding of the terrain ahead. Allied commanders had to rely on aerial reconnaissance and maps that were known to be inaccurate. When the 2/14th Battalion arrived in New Guinea, its Intelligence section had only one map, and this was in 1:500,000 scale with no contours or trig points marked. At times the only maps were sketch maps drawn on the site. To overcome these deficiencies, the Allied forces raised a small New Guinea Field Survey Section. Its members worked in forward areas during fighting on the Kokoda Track in September 1942, and at Wau in March 1943. Additional survey units were also sent from Australia, and these units helped to prepare maps for operations to capture Japanese bases on the New Guinea coast at Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen. Another aspect of intelligence was "signals". The Allied ability to break Japanese codes allowed an insight into Japanese planning. In May 1942, MacArthur’s code-breakers deciphered a Japanese radio message that their next operation would be an advance over the Owen Stanley Range to take Port Moresby. One senior code-breaker called it "one of the three most important to be decoded in the war". General MacArthur dismissed the message and militia, rather than AIF troops, were sent to New Guinea. MacArthur refused to take the Japanese threat seriously because he believed that, once the US Marines landed at Guadalcanal on 7 August, the Japanese might withdraw from Buna. As a result the Australians were unprepared for the Kokoda campaign. When used properly, decoded Japanese radio messages could be decisive because they told the Allies the strength and intentions of the Japanese. The Japanese thought the Allies would make more landings near Rabaul, and Madang or Wewak. By a brilliant piece of deception, the Allies reinforced the Japanese understanding of the sequence of Allied operations, but planned and executed a surprise landing at Hollandia. This effectively placed the Japanese forces in New Guinea, New Britain and Bougainville in the rear of the Allied front line of advance, and as the Japanese had no sea or air units capable of diverting the Allies, made them ineffective. Both the Australians and the Japanese used spies with radios to observe and report on enemy activities. The Australian "Coast Watchers" had its beginnings in 1922 when the Royal Australian Navy recruited a network carefully selected civilians that included merchants, missionaries, planters and public servants who were located near the coast of northern Australia and the islands to the north. The purpose was to report in wartime any unusual or suspicious happenings. When Japan began its move southward in January 1942, the network was enlarged with more people with local knowledge and personnel from the Australian armed forces. Lieutenants Jack Read and Paul Mason for example, were able, from Bougainville, to alert the US forces at Guadalcanal when Japanese aircraft and ships were heading south to the American positions. The network spread from mainland Australia to Papua New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, the Solomons, New Hebrides and later to Fiji. It was absorbed into the Allied Intelligence Bureau which decided to replace personnel in previously over-run or abandoned positions, many still occupied by the Japanese. Most of them were helped by the indigenous people in the area where they operated despite the threat of instant reprisal if they were discovered. Some villagers were acting for Australian intelligence, reporting the Japanese situation, guiding air raids and assisting sabotage. Some Australian colonial officials and missionaries stayed behind and reported Japanese activities by radio. Major General Morris created the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) that continued the essential functions of civil administration to prevent disintegration of districts not occupied by the Japanese, but which also carried out surveillance similar to the coastwatchers. Allied air attacks against shipping at Gona were directed by two Allied Intelligence Bureau men, Lt Noakes and Sgt Carlson, who were positioned nearby with an excellent view to radio exact locations of Japanese ships. Allied air reconnaissance also began detecting Japanese convoys heading to New Guinea and air strikes could be launched. The Japanese set up a system of observation posts and wireless stations throughout the Solomons, including the entire coast of New Britain, and in Rabaul this was supplemented by air and boat patrols. They had relatively few watching posts on New Ireland and Bougainville. Japanese patrols also operated on these islands to hunt Allied Coast Watchers. The Japanese Tatsu organisation infiltrated teams into New Guinea by parachute and flying boat to conduct reconnaissance, look for possible airfield sites, attempt to get Papuans to help them and counter allied efforts to do so. Tatsu Propaganda was distributed to Papuans telling them that they would protect them and crush the Allies and stop Western colonialism. They were told that they would have a future in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere where their goods would be paid for and they would be well treated. They could ask for medical help and they would be rewarded if they reported allied activity. Propaganda has always been considered a vital component of war. Allied psychological warfare was primarily achieved through the production and distribution of leaflets. The Australian body charged to undertake combat propaganda in the South-West Pacific Area was the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO). FELO distributed over 69 million leaflets in 14 languages and dialects in the region. The purpose of leaflet propaganda efforts was to weaken the fighting spirit of the Japanese and to strengthen the resolve and resistance of the local people. More than 500 staff were employed within FELO at its height, including over 145 New Guineans, 8 civilians and 5 Japanese POW translators. The bulk of leaflet production was carried out by editors and translators at FELO’s Australian offices. Texts and images would be produced in English before translation and preparation for printing. Bundles of completed leaflets were then flown to advance positions for distribution over enemy occupied areas. News leaflets proved popular with local populations, and when in full swing were produced regularly like a small newspaper. Warnings to New Guineans to leave an area were often distributed prior to heavy offensives, despite the risk of forewarning the Japanese. These proved at times very effective, as were admonitions against collaboration. News bulletins to Japanese troops were also regularly produced. They often contained only factual information, which was intended to weaken morale by giving a more accurate indication of the war effort than was coming from Japanese sources. Another type aimed at the common Japanese, with whom it was hoped the troops would identify, was often depicted as suffering great hardship at home, often resorting to pawning possessions to survive. The most common type of leaflet urged Japanese soldiers to cease fighting and surrender to the Allied forces. It is difficult to gauge the success of the dropping operations in terms of effects on morale and fighting spirit. Surveys of surrendered Japanese troops, for example, indicated that approximately one-fifth were influenced by leaflets. Certainly, evidence suggested that the majority of Japanese in some areas were in possession of leaflets. The Japanese used propaganda directed towards Papuans to strengthen their control by attempting to adapt them into the Japanese Empire and turn loyalties against the Allies. There was a strong Japanese anxiety about espionage activities by villagers. The Japanese opened several schools in order to spread their propaganda. In the schools, the Japanese conducted simple lessons, teaching Japanese words, writing, counting, songs, and conducting some basic military drills. Some children who did well in these lessons were selected to receive further military training. In one school, the Japanese selected village youths and trained them for air raid precautions, airplane spotting and taught several topics related to expected enemy landing. In and out of schools, the Japanese rigorously attempted to spread propaganda. Villages were forced to attend announcements where Papuans were forced to say statements like "Japan No. 1! America and Australia No. 10!" Banning church services was a measure aimed at eliminating Western influence. The Japanese regarded any suspicious behaviour, disobedience and lack of respect as anti-Japanese activities and punished offenders severely. It was the Kenpeitai military police units that were mainly in charge of discipline during the occupation. The Kenpeitai were supposed to supervise the discipline of the Japanese Army and were responsible for the security of military information. They controlled travel permits of Papuans, closed missions, attempted to capture Allied personnel and had jurisdiction over Papuans for offences. The Kenpeitai acquired a harsh reputation for brutality and Papuans who received friendly treatment from other Japanese units learnt to fear the Kenpeitai. Obedience by villagers of the Japanese can be mainly attributed to the brutality of the Kenpeitai who tortured and executed villagers who were suspected of spying or who had committed theft. All villagers came to know of the brutality and realised that they had no option but to obey the Japanese.