Propaganda has always been considered a vital component of the arsenal of war. In the Pacific theatre during the Second World War, Allied psychological warfare was primarily achieved through the production and distribution of leaflets. The Australian body charged to undertake combat propaganda in the South-West Pacific Area was the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO). In the period from its formation in September 1942 till the end of the war, FELO distributed over 69 million leaflets in 14 languages and dialects in the region. The purpose of leaflet propaganda efforts was twofold: to weaken the fighting spirit of the Japanese, and to strengthen the resolve and resistance of the local people.
Although FELO was commanded and directed by Australian officers drawn from the three services, its personnel included officers from Britain, Holland and the Netherlands East Indies force. More than 500 staff were employed within FELO at its height, including over 145 New Guineans, 8 civilians and 5 Japanese POW translators. For the content of propaganda to be effective, its authors had to be privy to high-level command decisions and the most recent intelligence. Its Operational Headquarters were consequently based in Brisbane along with MacArthur’s Headquarters, with a Research and Production section in Melbourne and offices in Sydney.
Leaflets became FELO’s most important means of propaganda dissemination, though it also undertook limited direct broadcasting. The effectiveness of this latter method was hampered by technical limitations and the difficulty of the terrain. FELO was also engaged in gathering intelligence in the field, and to this end established several advance stations in forward operational areas.
The bulk of leaflet production was carried out by a group of skilled editors and translators at FELO’s Australian offices. Texts and images would be produced in English before translation and preparation for printing. A variety of printing techniques were used, and print runs of individual leaflets numbered in the tens or even hundreds of thousands. Bundles of completed leaflets were then flown to advance positions for distribution over enemy occupied areas. Some leaflets had space for “spot” messages to be added in the field for maximum utilisation of recent intelligence or developments.
The content of leaflets distributed in Papua and New Guinea depended on the target audience. News leaflets proved popular with local populations, and when in full swing were produced regularly like a small newspaper. Warnings to New Guineans to leave an area were often distributed prior to heavy offensives, despite the risk of forewarning the Japanese. These proved at times very effective, as were admonitions against collaboration. Leaflets requesting assistance to downed pilots were popular with the aircrew who dropped them. There were cases where these were effectively dropped where a plane had gone down.
News bulletins to Japanese troops were also regularly produced. They often contained only factual information, which was intended to weaken morale by giving a more accurate indication of the war effort than was coming from Japanese sources. The “divide and conquer” method of propaganda was often applied to news leaflets, preying on existing rivalries between the Army and Navy, ground troops and air crew, enlisted men and officers, and front-line troops and general staff. These leaflets depicted the poor lot of the common soldier compared to the high life of other Japanese servicemen. Many leaflets gave news of the war effort of other Axis countries, often emphasising Allied gains and advances. German anti-Asian propaganda was often raised in order to question the Japanese troops’ reason for fighting with their Axis partners.
The common Japanese, with whom it was hoped the troops would identify, was often depicted as suffering great hardship at home, often resorting to pawning possessions to survive. Appeals to nostalgia were also made, with images of idyllic domestic scenes and children pleading for their father’s return intended to weaken the soldier’s will to fight.
The most common type of leaflet urged Japanese soldiers to cease fighting and surrender to the Allied forces. FELO leaflet propagandists were aware of the strong ideological aversion to surrender by the Japanese, so were judicial in their use of the word. Assurances were made in the leaflets that other Japanese had in fact surrendered and were being treated fairly, receiving adequate food and medical attention. POWs were sometimes depicted anonymously to show that surrender would not mean dishonour, and that it would ensure they could participate in the post-war rebuilding of Japan. Surrender leaflets sometimes appealed to loyalty to the emperor by claiming that the war was being waged by powerful militarists against the imperial will.
Initially, distribution of leaflets comprised nothing more than poking small bundles out of half-open cockpits or through bomb hatches in low-flying aircraft. More sophisticated methods emerged, however, with the increased awareness of the importance of leaflet distribution, and the necessity of flying over heavily defended Japanese positions. Dropping leaflets from high altitude was a complex process that required a knowledge of wind patterns, drift characteristics and elevation of the drop site to achieve effective distribution patterns. The requirement for safe, accurate drops prompted the development of different techniques, including the “Weigall device”, in which a bundle of leaflets was opened at a specified altitude by means of a slow release charge. Leaflets were distributed by artillery shells late in the war after successful trials of the method in the European theatre, though this method was used sparingly in the Pacific.
Despite these various attempts at accurate dropping, it has been estimated that similar results could have been obtained with as little as 5 per cent of the number of leaflets used. Of course it is difficult to gauge the success of the dropping operations in terms of effects on morale and fighting spirit. Surveys of surrendered Japanese troops, for example, indicated that approximately one-fifth were influenced by leaflets. Certainly, evidence suggested that the majority of Japanese in some areas were in possession of leaflets. To what “ends” they were applied, however, remains in question.
FELO’s distribution of leaflets that announced the end of the war and calls for surrender after the declaration of peace probably saved many lives. They were also an effective means to co-ordinate liaison between remote Japanese units and Allied forces in the immediate post-war period.
FELO leaflets:
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