After the elimination of the Japanese garrisons from their enclaves of Buna, Gona and Sanananda in January 1943, the focus of the war in New Guinea shifted to the area around Lae on the Huon Gulf. A year earlier, the Japanese had occupied Lae and the nearby town of Salamaua, and pushed the handful of Australian defenders inland, into the mountains of the surrounding jungle. The Australians’ centre of resistance became Wau. This was the administrative settlement for the region’s gold mining industry, and its airfield provided the only link to Port Moresby. The Australian defenders, organised into a formation that was known as Kanga Force, established a series of outposts overlooking the Japanese from which they maintained a vigilant watch and occasionally sallied forth to set ambushes or strike at targets of opportunity.
Although the Japanese had been defeated around Gona, their threat to New Guinea and Port Moresby had not abated. At the end of January 1943, both to regain the initiative, and to secure their hold over Lae, the Japanese decided to advance against Wau, evict the Australians and secure the airbase. In anticipation of such a move the Australian commander, General Thomas Blamey, despatched Brigadier General M.J. Moten’s 17th Brigade to Wau in mid-January. Only part of the brigade had arrived when the Japanese attacked. Advancing along an abandoned track through the dense, mountainous jungle, the Japanese successfully bypassed Moten’s forward defences until, on January 28, they ran into elements of the 2nd/6th Battalion dug in at Wandumi, only a few hours from Wau. Moten reported the seriousness of the situation to Headquarters New Guinea Force in Port Moresby, and requested the urgent airlift of the remainder of his brigade. The next morning the key airfield itself came under enemy small arms and mortar fire as the Japanese pressed their advantage. However, the tide was about to turn. Transport planes began to arrive at 9:15 am bringing the 2nd/7th and the rest of the 2nd/5th Battalions. The troops went into action as soon as they deplaned. The intensity and proximity of the fighting was such that some soldiers returned wounded to Port Moresby in the same planes from which they had emerged just a few minutes earlier. Although the immediate crisis had past, the battle raged for a further week as the Australians gradually gained the ascendancy and forced the Japanese back towards Mubo.
Decisions taken at the highest levels of Allied Command now guaranteed that Lae was to become the next area of Australian and American focus in New Guinea. The American Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur, wanted to capture Lae as part of his larger Cartwheel operation, intended to seize the Huon Peninsula as well as to isolate the Japanese at Rabaul on New Britain. Headquarters New Guinea Force planned to capture Lae with a combined aerial and seaborne assault employing the Australian 7th and 9th Divisions. However, as a preliminary, Kanga Force was to threaten Salamaua, divert Japanese attention from Lae and create the impression that the main Australian threat was from Wau.
The enhanced role meant that Kanga Force required significant reinforcements. In April, Major General Stanley Savige arrived at Wau with Headquarters 3rd Division. Elements of the division progressively arrived, and by July Savige had under his command three Australian infantry brigades (15th, 17th and 29th) as well as the American 162nd Infantry Regiment and supporting arms. In addition, Savige greatly eased his logistical dependence on the troublesome aerial supply route over the mountains between Wau and Port Moresby by opening a sea link on the coast at Nassau Bay.
Savige’s first operation was an attack by the 2nd/7th Battalion on the enemy’s defence on The Pimple, a key feature which guarded the Japanese forward base at Mubo. Mubo was the keystone of the Japanese outer defensive line and its reduction was essential if the Australian were to threaten Salamaua. The Japanese realised its importance and had made great efforts to reinforce the position’s natural strength with well-sited fortifications. The combination of steep slopes, dense jungle and determined defence proved too much for the attackers and after repeated efforts Savige ended the attack.
Instead of direct assaults, Savige decided to weaken the enemy first through a policy of aggressive patrolling and ambushing. By these methods he planned to inflict casualties on the Japanese, isolate their forward positions from their line of communications, and deny them the jungle. The policy reaped rewards. Each day, small groups of lightly armed Australians penetrated the Japanese lines, laid in wait on jungle trails, and poured fire into enemy parties that happened to come along. It was a potentially risky course for those men who quietly stole out of the relative safety of their unit’s perimeters to seek out their opponent, but it bore results. Slowly it weakened the enemy’s hold, and the constant pressure the Australians applied kept the Japanese focused on Salamaua rather than on the defence of Lae.
While Savige had laid much of the groundwork for the campaign, he would not see its conclusion. On 23 August he handed command of the Salamaua operation over to Major General E.J. Milford, the GOC of 5th Division. Headquarters 3rd Division rotated out of the line while Headquarters 5th Division took over, part of the Australian Army’s policy of giving all its divisional headquarters combat and command experience. The combat units of the 3rd Division remained behind to continue the battle, now as part of 5th Division.
The long-planned operation against Lae began on 4 September. To the east of the town Major General G.F. Wootten’s 9th Australian Division came ashore and began to push towards Lae along the coast. The next day the paratroopers of the American 503rd Parachute Regiment descended onto the Japanese airbase at Nadzab to Lae’s West. Once secured, transport planes from Port Moresby began to ferry Major General G.A. Vasey’s 7th Australian Division to the airhead. At the same time, to the south, Milford’s 5th Division advanced on Salamaua. The Japanese defenders were caught in a three-pronged pincer.
Instead of the ferocious Japanese reaction the planners had anticipated, the enemy’s response was almost non-existent. The 9th Division landed unopposed and its troops did not fire a shot in anger for another 24 hours. The paratroopers also seized their objectives without encountering the enemy, and the only casualties were a result of jump accidents. The 3rd Division’s diversionary efforts before Salamaua had worked better than anyone could have hoped.
Japanese resistance around Lae increased, especially against the 9th Division, but the enemy could not halt the Australian advance. Instead the Japanese conceded defeat, and fled over the mountains to the north. Lae fell to the 7th Division on the 16th while the 5th Division occupied Salamaua on the 11th. Lae now became a centre of construction activity as the Allies created a major base that would support the next round of Australian operations in New Guinea.
Australians at Wau:
Overview text Longer text Images Readings Australian readings AustraliansClick images to enlarge.
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